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Why, despite no formal representation of the working class in the government, do 
authoritarian regimes expand labor rights to more workers? After the successful 
liberalization of its socialist system, the Chinese government began to regulate the 
labor condition through expanding labor contracting practices from the state to the 
non-state sector in the 2000s. Challenging the threat of revolution and regime 
transition argument, this dissertation examines the internal politics within the Chinese 
state and the dynamics of how Chinese labor officials make use of workers' grievances 
to secure and enhance their bureaucratic power by introducing rigid labor rules. First, 
tracing the processes of the reform, I find that the expansion of labor rights to non-
state workers is a direct result of the desire of two Chinese bureaucracies, namely the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the All China Federation of Trade Unions, 
to take the opportunity to regain their power that has been relinquished under 
marketization since the 1980s. This incentive drives these bureaucracies to be a 
"representative" for workers' interest. Second, employing a diverse-case-selection 
strategy, I examine three provincial-level regions, namely Beijing, Hunan and 
Guangdong, and find that local officials' various concerns about their bureaucratic and 
political power have led to different patterns of regional labor regulatory regimes. 
Third, based on the three case studies, I generate two hypotheses and include a 
  
statistical analysis of the labor policy-making of the 31 Chinese provincial-level 
regions from 2001-2008. The study explores the influence of labor officials' career 
prospects on the regional efforts to implement the practice of labor contracting. I 
conclude that China's promotion of labor rights in the 2000s is mainly motivated by 
labor officials' self-interests about their bureaucratic and political power. Societal 
actors have not yet enjoyed systemic influence in China's labor policy-making. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction: 
The Promotion of Social Rights in Authoritarian Regimes 
 
The new Labor Contract Law helps workers to regain their iron-rice bowls, because it 
provides detailed regulations on non-fixed-term labor contracts.    
    --Zhang Shicheng, Vice-director, the Administrative Law Office of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress, August 20071 
 
Small- and media-sized enterprises should be exempted from the new Labor Contract 
Law. 
    --Wang Yijiang, Research Fellow, Center for China in the World Economy, 
Tsinghua University, February 20082 
 
In June 2007, the Labor Contract Law (Laodong Hetong Fa; henceforth LCL) 
was adopted at the tenth National People's Congress as one of the most important 
reforms of China's labor market regulation system. During the prior thirty years, as it 
had in almost each dimension of its economic life, China had gradually evolved her 
labor regulatory regime from the ancien régime of the iron rice-bowl system to one 
based on market-oriented principles. Starting with the labor contract system 
introduced in the early 1980s, the Chinese labor market has been substantially 
liberalized. The flexibilities allowed for hiring, setting work hours, and firing have all 
been significantly increased. As of 2007, however, the passage of the LCL seems to 
have opened a new episode of re-regulating the labor market in China. While the LCL 
is celebrated for its comprehensive protection of employed persons, it also gives rise 
                                               
1
 Sina News, August 14, 2007. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-08-14/101213659777.shtml 
2
 Economic Observer News, February 18, 2008. http://home.eeo.com.cn/space/html/51/81551-
380588.html 
2 
to a variety of controversies regarding its economic impacts, ranging from increasing 
costs of labor for enterprises to possible rising unemployment. How did China go from 
deregulating the labor market to re-regulating it? After market-oriented mechanisms 
have been established, why was the authoritarian regime interested in drafting more 
rigid labor regulations in the 2000s, given that the country's economic growth has still 
been largely fostered by labor-intensive manufacturing industries?  
In most developing countries and transition economies, labor markets remain 
largely unliberalized during economic reform. While the pace of China's labor market 
flexibilization was also gradual and slow, employment and dismissal protection in 
China was much more successfully reduced during its economic transition in the 
1980s and 1990s. Since the 1980s, when state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were allowed 
to employ workers through contracting, the system of lifetime tenures had been 
gradually destroyed, and job security was significantly reduced in the new system. 
Due to this reform, China has been able to achieve a higher degree of labor market 
flexibility in comparison with other countries. According to the World Bank's Doing 
Business3, from 2003-2008, the overall employment rigidity in China remained lower 
than that in many other regions. As shown in Table 1.1, in 2003, the rigidity in China 
was indexed at 47 out of 100, a much lower value than that for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (61 out of 100) or Eastern Europe and Central Asia (58 out of 100).  
 
 
                                               
3
 The Doing Business Project measures the degree of governmental employment regulations and laws of 
most countries. 
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Table 1.1 Overall Rigidity of Employment Index, China and Others, 2003-2009 
 
Note:  
* The data on East Asia and Pacific include those on China. 
** The Overall Rigidity of Employment Index is calculated by the author from a 
simple average of the three original indexes recoded by the Doing Business, namely 
the Difficulty of Hiring Index, the Rigidity of Working Hours Index, and the 
Difficulty of Firing Index. Index values range from 0 to 100, with higher values 
indicating more rigid employment regulation.  
*** A Country/Region which ranks 1st means that it has the most rigid employment 
regulations in comparison with others, and 8th the least.  
Source: Doing Business 2004-2010, and author's calculations.  
 
China's path towards labor market flexibility was reversed recently, however. 
New priority rules for group redundancy dismissals were introduced, making 
employment regulation more rigid (World Bank 2009, 20-21). Moreover, the 
government also launched several administrative programs to target the labor 
condition in the non-state sector, including organizing trade unions in private and 
foreign enterprises and expanding the labor contract system from the state to the non-
state sector. This development marked China's labor market reform as a very 
distinctive one. The World Bank's Doing Business finds that in most developing and 
post-communist nations, employment regulations were largely flexibilized during the 
late 2000s. In 2007 and 2008, Eastern Europe and Central Asia introduced the most 
reforms aimed at increasing flexibility, followed by Africa and Latin America/the 
Country/Region 2003 Rank 2004 Rank 2005 Rank 2006 Rank 2007 Rank 2008 Rank 2009 Rank
China  47 30 30 24 24 27 31
East Asia & Pacific* 45.69 33.08 26.39 22.96 19.75 19.46 15.8
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 57.64 41.42 44.35 40.75 40.04 38.11 29.2
Latin America & Caribbean 61.33 44 42.24 31.74 32.19 31.09 26.6
Middle East & North Africa 48.07 38.71 40.19 35.76 33 31.63 24.5
OECD: High Income 45.27 34.36 36.09 33.26 30.79 31.42 26.4
South Asia 49.2 42.33 38.5 34.75 27.13 26.38 26.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 52.88 56.03 53.08 47.07 42.5 41.26 35.5
6th 8th 7th 7th 7th 6th 2nd
7th 7th 8th 8th 8th 8th 8th
2nd 4th 2nd 2nd 2nd 2nd 3rd
1st 2nd 3rd 6th 4th 5th 4th
5th 5th 4th 3rd 3rd 3rd 7th
8th 6th 6th 5th 5th 4th 5th
4th 3rd 5th 4th 6th 7th 6th
3rd 1st 1st 1st 1st 1st 1st
4 
Caribbean. In China, however, the rigidity has escalated since 2008. In 2009, China's 
labor regulation flexibility ranked 140th around the world, while in 2007, the ranking 
was 86th.4 As Figure 1.1 illustrates, the flexibility of China's labor regulation in 2009 
was lower than many other countries such as India and Russia. 
 
Figure 1.1 Ranking of China's Labor Regulation Flexibility - Compared to selected 
economies 
 
Source: Doing Business 2010 China, p.18.   
 
Why did a country whose economic growth was widely thought of as being 
fostered by labor-intensive manufacturing industries have such rigid employment 
regulations? After successful liberalization of the socialist labor system, why did 
China start to more stringently regulate the labor market during the 2000s? The 
                                               
4
 China was ranked 111th in 2008. See Doing Business 2009, p. 97 Country Tables. 
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5 
aforementioned data reveal the divergent path of China's labor policy reform in 
comparison with other countries. The re-regulation of China's labor market during the 
2000s is even more puzzling if we take into consideration the global trend of 
flexibilization occurring at the same time. Motivated by these questions, this 
dissertation seeks to identify the causes of labor policy re-regulation in China. What 
were the forces that motivated this change? How did they shape the path and direction 
of China's labor policy reform?  
This dissertation focuses on the self interests of China's bureaucracies in the 
labor policy reform process to illustrate why the rigid regulations were successfully 
introduced in the 2000s. My analysis provides a subtle understanding of the internal 
politics within the state apparatus. I argue that, in China's labor policy-making in the 
2000s, at the national level, there were two strong bureaucracies in the Chinese 
governing system, namely the then Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) 
and the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), acting on behalf of skilled 
workers to promote job security rules to regulate the labor condition in the non-state 
sector. The strong influence of these two bureaucracies also explains why the Chinese 
central government compromised more with skilled workers than with unskilled 
workers and the non-state business community. A negative case study of this 
dissertation on non-state enterprises' low political influence in the policy-making 
process demonstrates that their grievances were unable to stop the pro-labor policy 
reform because there were no competitive bureaucracies in the government wishing 
for the same policy outcome as these enterprises. At the same time, when it came to 
policy implementation at the regional level, some Chinese provinces drew more rigid 
6 
regulations to support the central pro-labor policy reform than other provinces did. To 
explain these variations, this dissertation also focuses on local officials' political and 
bureaucratic interests in the local policy-making process. 
Evidence for these arguments comes primarily from my fieldwork from 
September 2007 to August 2008. My interviewees include managers and workers, 
government officials, labor law lawyers, and Chinese experts. For managers, most of 
them are human resources people in the manufacturing sector, the construction 
industry, data management companies, the metallurgy industry, information 
technological companies, and the service sector. These enterprises' ownership 
structures are either private, foreign-invested, or state-owned. Most of the workers are 
also from these industries. As for government officials, I interviewed low-ranked 
officials from several provincial federations of trade unions, municipal federations of 
trade unions, labor assistants and labor commissioners from local labor bureaus, 
officials from provincial labor departments, and Chinese experts who participated in 
the drafting process of the 2007 Labor Contract Law. I also consulted with research 
fellows in universities and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences as well as several 
provincial Academies of Social Sciences. Together I conducted more than 60 
interviews for this dissertation. 
The following discussion is divided into six sections. I start by examining the 
existing approaches to the shifts in authoritarian regimes' social policies. Section One 
discusses the conventional wisdom that focuses on the threats of social revolution and 
regime transition. From its point of view, concerns about regime stability compel 
autocrats to appeal to the socially disadvantaged for support. The chapter then reviews 
7 
the two major theories in the political economy of policy reform literature. The first 
one is the societal approach which emphasizes social forces' impacts on the state. It 
argues that policy outcomes are directly driven by social actors. Section Three 
analyzes the pros and cons of the state-centric approach. I introduce my alternative 
explanation based on an understanding of the internal politics within the Chinese state 
structure in Section Four. Section Five discusses the utility of my explanation in 
examining the regional labor policy-making patterns. The outline of the dissertation is 
presented in Section Six.  
 
1.1 Regime Stability and Redistributive Politics 
 
China's reform in the 2000s of regulating its labor market raises an important 
question in the study of social policy reform in authoritarian regimes. Why does an 
authoritarian regime act on behalf of workers to improve labor conditions, given the 
lack of representation of the working class in the political system? In the absence of 
democracy, what accounts for an autocrat's efforts in promoting labor rights? Perhaps 
the most common explanation is to look at autocrats' concern about the potential social 
threat to regime stability. In this argument, state-society relations are generally 
conflictual. Disenfranchised social actors lack any means to express their opinions 
except that they can contest power by threatening revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2000; Conley and Temimi 2001). In order to prevent societal grievances from turning 
into violent revolutions, autocrats are likely to make preferential policies beforehand 
to buy off potential detrimental social forces.  
8 
In the literature on democratization, redistributive conflicts between 
socioeconomic classes have long been argued as one of the theoretical variables that 
explain the outbreak of regime change. If it is the case, then we should expect 
autocrats to make preemptive steps to stop these potential threats. Most of the current 
literature analyzes autocrats' decision to compromise with social grievances as a 
function of their desire to avoid revolutions and mass protests. Autocrats can choose to 
deliver public goods policies, such as the provision of public education as a transfer 
from the rich to the poor (Justman and Gradstein 1999), or they can finance more 
social spending on the poor to satisfy the demand for more transfer from the 
government (Morrison 2009). In other cases, they can even introduce elections to 
manipulate public belief about the true popularity of the government and thereby 
change the calculus of revolt to the current regime (Rozenas 2009). But autocrats' 
commitment not to exploit the poor might not be credible. If the probability of 
revolution is high, autocrats will need to bestow voting rights on their citizens in order 
to prevent large-scale rebellions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). Sometimes, even if 
there is an absence of mass protests, new leaders will still increase public consumption 
due to the anticipation of riots during leadership succession. By doing so, they can 
reduce the insecurities happening in the succession period and draw new support from 
previously ignored social groups (Bunce 1980). According to these arguments, 
autocrats' voluntary but grudging compromises with social grievances are entirely 
motivated by the fear of social unrest and regime transition.  
For these studies, an authoritarian regime is defined as a system where the rich 
elite have the political power and the poor non-elite are largely excluded. Before 
9 
introducing elections and grating voting rights to the non-elite, most autocrats will first 
try to make policies to redistribute wealth from the elite to the disenfranchised. This 
action may appease the non-elite and prevent their grievances from becoming a real 
threat to the dictatorship. However, non-elites in the society, being one of the major 
sources of instability of authoritarian regimes, are composed of different kinds of 
social groups. While Barrington Moore's classical statement of “no bourgeoisie, no 
democracy” (1966) focuses on the role of private entrepreneurs, other students of 
democratization emphasize that labor is always pro-democracy (Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens, and Stephens 1992). The argument for the importance of the bourgeoisie is 
echoed by modernization theory which treats democratization as an outcome of the 
expansion of middle class and the growth of civil society (Lipset 1960; Przeworski 
and Limongi 1997). Huntington's analysis on the third wave also finds that democratic 
movements were largely led by none other than the urban middle class (Huntington 
1991, 57). Other studies, however, downplay the constructive role of bourgeoisie. 
Rueschemeyer et al. for example, emphasize the importance of the working class in 
democratization processes. This argument is supported by Collier's study which traces 
a gradual decline in the upper classes' involvement in democratization and a growing 
role of the working classes (Collier 1999). If it is debatable whether it is the working 
or the middle class that serves as the ultimate threat to authoritarian regimes, we 
should expect autocrats to draft policies that can buy off both the working as well as 
the middle class.  
In fact, the bulk of the literature on China's political development largely 
draws on the threats of revolution and regime transition argument for explaining the 
10 
government's compromises with social forces, either with non-state entrepreneurs or 
with workers. For example, in 2001, the then president Jiang Zemin extended the 
membership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to the owners of private 
businesses. This inclusion was widely thought of as the government's intention to 
conciliate private entrepreneurs (Dickson 2007). On the other hand, to buy off the 
working class and the poor in general, the political slogan of building a “harmonious 
society” was introduced by the current Hu-Wen regime to respond to increasing social 
disorder in the 2000s. According to these arguments, Chinese autocrats' concerns 
about potential social threats and regime transition seems to explain when the 
government will make policies to promote social rights.  
Based on this logic, a quick answer to the question of why the Chinese 
government announced rigid employment regulations in the 2000s to improve labor 
conditions might be that these policies were passed by the top leaders to quell 
potential social unrest and to stabilize the regime, because these government 
regulations could signal that the top leaders cared about the socially disadvantaged. 
For example, many scholars regard the promulgation of the 2007 LCL as a reaction to 
industrial unrest (Wang et al. 2009), or as a response to the growing complexity of 
labor relations that occurred during the 2000s (Cooney et al. 2007). Gallagher and 
Dong also argue that the social contexts of the 2000s, such as abusive working 
conditions, low degrees of employment security, and escalating labor disputes, 
generated new concerns for the Hu-Wen regime that ultimately gave a new impetus to 
the making of the 2007 LCL (2009, 3). Threats of social unrest compelled the new 
leaders to commit to social equality and justice beyond mere economic growth. 
11 
 None of these arguments, however, give adequate explanations of autocrats' 
behavior. An autocrat might initiate redistributive policies to buy off the poor, but if 
the redistribution involves actions that move assets from non-state businessmen to 
workers, the argument based on autocrats' concern about social unrest and regime 
transition itself can hardly be satisfactory. Why do autocrats choose to favor the 
working class and why are they not worried about the attack from the non-state 
business community? In reality, policies involving redistribution between non-state 
businessmen and workers are not rare. More social spending, for example, usually 
implies that the working class will receive what has been taxed from people whose 
income level are higher, including the business community. Therefore, theoretically 
speaking, autocrats' concern about regime transition itself cannot determine why a 
redistributive policy that compromises more with workers than with businessmen is 
chosen by autocrats. 
China's regulation of the labor condition in the non-state sector in the 2000s 
was exactly this kind of policy that significantly involved asset redistribution from 
non-state businessmen to the working class. The new reform establishing a more 
stringent labor contract system in the non-state sector benefited the working class 
because it provided them with more tools to fight against the abusive labor conditions 
in their enterprises. At the same time, deprived of the advantage taken from the slack 
labor market regulations on how to make contracts with non-state workers, non-state 
businessmen were the direct loser of the new rigid labor regulation. For them, the 
reform significantly increased their labor cost. To mitigate the impact on these 
enterprises, some labor economists asked the government to exempt non-state small 
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enterprises from the obligation to obey the newly-made LCL, as the quotation from 
Wang Yijiang cited in the beginning of the Chapter indicates. These pro-business 
voices were unsuccessful, however. Why did the Chinese government choose to favor 
the working class? Did this mean that they perceived the threat from workers to be 
more serious than that from non-state businessmen?  
In fact, unlike in democracies where regular elections provide the opportunity 
for a politician to test how secure his or her seat is, a policy-maker in an authoritarian 
regime faces difficulties defining how much support he really has among either the 
general population or the small subordinate groups which have the power to depose 
him (Wintrobe 1998, 37; Wintrobe 2001). Based on this logic, the Chinese 
authoritarian government actually lacked real mechanisms to determine which social 
groups posed the most serious threat to the regime although it can somehow gather 
pieces of information through media or its police stations (paichusuo) under the public 
security system. Moreover, the Olson-type explanation that a social group can be more 
influential when it is more organized is not suitable for determining Chinese autocrats' 
calculations about regime stability, because in China, there are very few, if any, large 
and organized social groups having the ability to challenge the government. If the 
government basically has no information ex ante to determine which social group's 
potential unrest will be more serious, then the argument based on autocrats' concern 
about regime survival is inadequate as an explanation of the redistributive policies 
favoring the working class and harming the non-state business community as those 
adopted in the 2000s.  
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In addition to the uncertainties about which social group will cause a fatal 
damage to the regime, the Chinese government actually do not have high concerns 
about its ability to stay in office. Neither non-state workers nor businessmen are 
interested in regime changes. Nor do they have much opportunity to solve the 
collective action problem to pose credible and widespread threats to the regime. As 
many researchers have found, most Chinese non-state businessmen do not have 
interests in democratization (Tsai 2007, 17). On the other hand, for the working class, 
the intensive intra-competition within them for jobs substantially erodes their 
collective identity (Gallagher 2002). Most labor protests in China today are all cellular, 
lacking a larger regional base of organization (C. Lee 2007). In fact, one of my 
interviewees in the government reported that while the slogan of “stability is of 
overriding importance” (wending yadao yiqie) was still being emphasized, “we do not 
see the society becoming any more unstable than before. It is certainly not more 
unstable than those years in the late 1990s when large amount of SOE workers were 
laid off.”5 The various individual grievances found in the Chinese society might be 
serious, but the mere existence of these disputes do not amount to any real threats of 
social revolution to the current government. The argument focusing on the role of 
potential unrest in shaping the policy-making in authoritarian regimes has the essential 
shortcoming of conflating social disputes and their ability to threaten the regime on a 
national level. In China, social grievances and labor disputes may be found 
everywhere, and some of them are even high-profile, but very few of them have 
involved organized social groups effectively challenging the regime.  
                                               
5
 Informant 35. Interview conducted in Changsha, Hunan on May 20, 2008. 
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These shortcomings reveal that the threat of regime change argument itself 
cannot adequately explain why and how Chinese autocrats compromised more with 
workers than with businessmen in its labor policy-making in the 2000s. Some studies 
have shown that autocrats' voluntary improvement of social rights is not necessarily 
accompanied by serious and effective social threats. In their study on the peaceful 
expansion of franchise in nineteenth century Great Britain, Lizzeri and Persico (2004) 
directly argue that concerns about revolution did not complete the story of why 
political rights were given to more citizens. For them, the reform was actually caused 
by some elites' intention to make use of the franchise expansion to reduce pork-barrel 
politics and to increase public goods provision. In their study, the possibility of social 
revolution itself was not so serious to have persuaded the elites to expand political 
rights. Rather, there were other considerations of the elites in the governments that 
drove the autocrats to make pro-social group policies, even if social voices themselves 
were in fact left out in the policy-making process.  
Accordingly, in addition to the intention to quell potential unrest, autocrats 
may have other goals to achieve when they speak for social actors. As this dissertation 
will illustrate, China's regulation of the non-state sector in the 2000s also reveals that 
some political elites in the government had other purposes to fulfill when making the 
rigid labor market regulation. While regime survival was still the priority, Chinese 
autocrats' concern about social unrest itself is not adequate to explain why the 
government launched redistributive actions to move assets from non-state 
businessmen to workers in an era where neither of them had avid interests and abilities 
in forming collective actions against the state.  
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1.2 Societal Group Approach to Policy Reform 
 
Similar to the threat of revolution and regime transition argument, the second 
approach of social policy-making in authoritarian regimes also focuses on non-elites' 
influence on the government. But this approach does not treat the announcement of 
pro-social voice policies as an outcome of autocrats' preemptive action to stabilize the 
regime. Rather, it argues that social policy outcomes are directly shaped by societal 
actors' inputs in the policy-making processes. For this approach, not only the policy 
content reflects what these actors ask for, but the trajectory of policy changes is also 
determined by social groups. From this perspective, the state itself does not have an 
agency. This dissertation calls this loose body of research “societal group approach”. 
This approach is a preeminent explanation for developing countries' political 
economy of policy reform. Many scholars argue that policy reform (or the non-
implementation of reform) is the outcome of the pressure of a coalition of societal 
special interest groups on the government (Olson 1984; Bates 1983). Drawing on the 
economic stabilizing reforms in Latin America, many studies find that, because reform 
usually has short-term costs feeding long-term benefits, namely the J-curve, if a state 
or a political institution has no ability to defuse the intensive resistance from the short-
term losers in society, socially beneficial policies will usually be delayed, or not at all 
implemented (Laban and Sturzenegger 1994; Fernandez and Rodrik 1991).  
In China, as mentioned in the previous section, societal actors do not have the 
systemic ability to direct China's decision-making with organized activism. While it is 
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essentially difficult to employ the societal group approach to explain China's policy-
making, one can hardly say that after thirty years of economic reform, the Chinese 
government is still completely isolated from societal influences. As students of 
contentious politics in China indicate, powerless citizens can open up the clogged 
channels of participation through mobilizing small-scale contentious collective actions. 
For example, SOE laid-off workers have organized many protests to fight for their 
rights concerning subsistence issues and pension payments (Hurst 2004; Hurst 2009; 
Hurst and O'Brien 2002; C. Lee 2000; C. Lee 2002; Solinger 2000). In today's China, 
social actors, including organized civil society groups as well as unorganized 
individuals, have entered the policy-making and made the political process more 
pluralized (Mertha 2009).  
As far as organized groups is concerned, scholars notice that the role of 
domestic non-government organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) 
has substantially been strengthened in China. For example, Teets (2009) finds that in 
dealing with some crises such as the 2009 Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan Province, 
civil society groups have taken the opportunity to increase their capacity through the 
participation in relief efforts. In promoting labor rights, many IOs, such as the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Bank (WB), have played an 
important part in offering ideas to China's social and labor policy reforms. While 
international organizations have much less leverage in China than in other developing 
countries, their advice still matters a great deal especially in designing detailed 
program schemes after a policy direction is set up by the Chinese government. The 
ILO's expertise on re-employment has substantially shaped China's active labor market 
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policies. And, the transfer of industry-based pension funds over to provincial 
administrations in 1997 was under the guidance of the WB's recommendation of 
establishing a three-pillar unified pension system (World Bank 1997).  
In addition to organized civil society groups, individual activists without any 
support from social organizations have also proven to be quite powerful. The legal 
consciousness among Chinese citizens have significantly enhanced in the 2000s. Many 
individuals have become warriors for their own rights. Without making her protest a 
collective strike, the homeowner of a “nail house” (dingzi hu) in Chongqing 
Municipality held out for three years to battle against the insufficient compensation 
from real estate developers. In other cases, individual requests can open the 
government's eyes to social injustices and hence is likely to lead to policy changes. 
For example, wage arrears were noticed by the central government when a female 
migrant worker Xong Deming reported to Premier Wen Jiabao on his way to visit 
Chongqing Municipality in 2003 that her wage was withheld by her foreman of a 
construction company in Yunyang County. The news was widely broadcast and the 
worker finally received her wage of RMB 2,240. Soon after that, a national campaign 
of helping workers to demand defaulted salaries was launched. In November 2003, the 
State Council issued the “Notice of Solving the Problem of Wages Arrears in the 
Construction Sector”. This illustrates that unorganized individual protests can 
sometimes be very effective in drawing the government's attention for possible policy 
changes.  
However, not all social forces are influential in shaping policy outcomes in 
China. There are some conditions that a social voice needs to fulfill in order to have a 
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say in the policy-making process. In his study on China's hydro-power policy, Mertha 
(2008) finds that whether a social voice can determine the policy direction depends on 
the way in which policy entrepreneurs frame the issue at hand. Successful policy 
entrepreneurs can expand the political sphere of conflict and mobilize public opinions 
to generate a broad support (Ibid., 16). When fighting against the dam project in 
Dujiangyan in Sichuan Province, the discourse focusing on the argument that the dam 
will endanger China's national cultural heritage provides the protest with a nationalist 
base (Ibid., 17). This kind of strategy is frequently utilized by many other civil 
demands. In labor movements, even without the consciousness of a working class 
alliance against the state, workers' charge of “against the law” has become a powerful 
weapon against local officials' wrongdoings (C. Lee 2007, 261). The use of the central 
government's rhetoric and commitments successfully enables some protests to have a 
say in altering the government's decision because they are rightful resistance (O'Brien 
1996; O'Brien and Li 2006).  
Perhaps the most important channel to attract broader support is to have the 
media shift its tone to uphold the social requests. Media coverage can substantially 
increase the possibility of unplanned events, including shocks or disturbances to the 
status quo, to be institutionalized to foster substantial policy changes (Mertha and 
Lowry). Indeed, among the aforementioned cases, media always played a significant 
role in empowering the underprivileged. As Chan points out, press exposure can often 
lead to an improvement of local labor conditions (Chan 2001). The involvement of 
media is also critical to push for the government's reaction to natural or social disasters. 
When a serious coal mine accident happened in Shanxi Province in early 2007, many 
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newspapers reported that the death toll was concealed by the employers. The 
widespread media coverage of the incident led to the drafters of the 2007 LCL to add a 
new clause to require employers to construct worker recruitment lists when 
employment relations are established. In addition, regarding the reform of the 
household registration system, Chinese media's reports on the death of Sun Zhigang in 
a detention center in Guangzhou Municipality (Guangdong Province) in March 2003 
and many other similar cases had a great impact on the government's decision to 
abolish the “Measure for Custody and Repatriation of Urban Vagrants and Beggars” 
that had been effective since 1982.  
However, media censorship is still in place in China. The Chinese government 
generally has no major problem in sweeping away issues that are considered sensitive 
to the regime. The giant search engine Google has to compromise with the Chinese 
government to block some websites from showing up in the Chinese territory. This 
implies that the Chinese government might have something to do with why a certain 
issue is broadcast in the Chinese media while others aren't. Some studies find that 
autocrats can deliberately allow a certain degree of media freedom to serve a particular 
purpose of the government. For example, H. Huang (2007) argues that media can help 
autocrats to show off their competence in generating economic growth. It can also 
facilitate the central government's intention to monitor local bureaucrats (Egorov et al 
2007). Based on this logic, when a social grievance is widely reported by the Chinese 
media, it probably implies that the channel is selectively opened to the issue and the 
government might already has a preference to change the status quo. 
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Regarding labor issues, media coverage of workers' complaints about the 
unregulated labor market is usually very impressive. But most of these reports do not 
condemn the government for lack of ability to raise the quality of governance. For 
most non-state workers themselves, it is their enterprises and not the Chinese 
government that are to blame. Unlike the protests organized by SOE workers in the 
1990s which were targeted at the state's liberalization policy as the root cause of their 
deteriorating life conditions, most labor unrest led by non-state workers in the 2000s 
were aimed at correcting the wrongdoings of their enterprises and not of the state. This 
claim is echoed by Chinese academia. In June 2010 after a series of workers suicides 
in Foxconn's factories in Shenzhen (Guangdong Province), many Chinese scholars 
collectively blasted Foxconn and launched several petitions against the company's 
military management style such as scolding and beating front-line workers. These 
petitions were fully supported by the Chinese government. Premier Wen Jiabo 
publicly asked “the government and the society to treat young migrant workers as their 
own children”.6 The government was not the target of these social criticisms. 
Given that the state was not accused of causing abusive labor conditions, the 
Chinese government could easily retain a role in how these labor grievances were 
represented in the public. In fact, some media observers find that labor exploitation in 
foreign enterprises are more likely to be exposed by Chinese newspapers than that in 
domestic enterprises. A possible explanation behind this phenomenon can be purely 
market-driven, because for a private-funded newspaper, targeting foreign enterprises 
helps expand the circulation and readership, given that nationalist criticisms are very 
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 Xinhua News Agency, June 16, 2010. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-06/16/c_12226523.htm 
21 
much flavor of the mouth. But the widespread grievances against foreign enterprises 
have other functions. The government can, for example, use the labor controversies to 
bargain over trade issues. In August 2010 during the third China-Japan economic 
dialogue, while Japan's main agenda was to ask China to loosen the regulation with 
regard to exporting rare earth metals, Premier Wen Jiabao brought up the issue that the 
wage for Chinese workers in Japanese companies in China were too low.7 This 
condemnation was made right after the strike at Honda in Foshan Municipality 
(Guangdong Province) which was reported by the Chinese media in May 2010 as the 
“largest strike that had ever happened at a single global company in China”.8  
This reveals that the government sometimes can make use of workers' 
grievances for its own purposes. While in today's China, there are indeed more 
channels for social voices to participate in the political process, and the policy-making 
outcome also very often reflects social actors' demands, this does not necessarily mean 
that policy changes are driven by them. In many situations, the state itself already has 
a preference regarding whether and how the state quo should be altered, and this 
preference might be similar to some social voices. When the two wish for an identical 
policy outcome, the policy-making process is more likely to be opened. The state thus 
has an influence on the development of social voices. This also shows that the 
relationship between the state and the society in China is not always confrontational as 
argued in the societal group approach.  
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 International Business Times, August 30, 2010. 
http://hk.ibtimes.com/articles/1029/20100830/wenjiaboa-riqi-gongzi-daiyu.htm 
8
 21CN.com, May 30, 2010. http://auto.21cn.com/news/hangye/2010/05/30/7559782.shtml 
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1.3 State-centric Approach 
 
The potential role of the state in shaping social voices is the focus of the third 
approach to policy-making, namely the state-centric approach. Influenced by 
Skocpol's pioneering work that in social revolutions, the state is an autonomous 
structure “with a logic and interests of its own” (1979, 27), studies of the economic 
policy-making in developing countries have developed a state-centric approach, and 
contended that the societal group approach exaggerates the power of social actors and 
underestimates the state's capacity in defeating their influences (Haggard 1990; Wade 
1992). For them, states can employ strategies to overcome societal interest groups. For 
example, liberalization-minded officials can make use of compensation mechanisms to 
break down the social resistance against privatization (Shleifer and Treisman 2000), or 
they can maneuver the speed of reform to generate enough support (Roland 2000). 
The most common tool for authoritarian governments to manipulate societal 
voices is to establish corporatist associations. Studies of state corporatism find that 
many states create associations that exercise monopoly rights in representing a 
particular social group (P. Williamson 1986). The major function of these associations 
is to serve as a regulatory apparatus on behalf of the state, rather than as a 
representative for their members. For example, corporatist trade unions in Latin 
America help the states to keep workers quiet for working at a low wage and to ensure 
stable industrial production (Collier and Collier 1991). Some argue that in China, most 
occupational and business associations are also part of the state's corporatist control 
(Unger 1996; Unger and Chan 1996). In addition to establishing associations to 
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supervise the potential loser of a policy reform, states can also work with specific 
societal groups that will be the winner of reform. Evans proposes the concept of 
embedded autonomy (1995) to capture the linkages between states and societies in 
economic development. According to East Asian experiences, a committed, coherent, 
and meritocratic bureaucracy successfully builds a reciprocal relationship with societal 
allies such as pro-reform entrepreneurial groups. Through industrial corporatist 
associations, these governments exchange information and coordinate policies with 
the business circle who is in favor of the reform.  
An autonomous state with strong capacity can easily employ these tactics to 
put policy changes into practice. Some scholars come to the conclusion that 
institutions with a more concentrated authority will be beneficial to reform, because 
decision makers can be shielded from the pressure of short-term concentrated societal 
losers (Nelson 1993; Haggard and Kaufman 1992). Following this line of thought, the 
authoritarian Chinese government will be very powerful in carrying out the labor 
policy reform in the 2000s. Some researchers employ this state-centric approach and 
contend that the regulation of the labor condition in the non-state sector was 
introduced by the Chinese government to facilitate the move of its economy to a 
higher-wage and higher-technology future (Chen and Funke 2009; Chou and Tung 
2009; Wang et al. 2009). A more rigid labor regulatory regime significantly hinders 
the development of labor-intensive industries and hence can speed up the economic 
upgrading. As Guo Jun, the deputy director of the Legal Department of the All China 
Federation of Trade Union, said in a press conference on May 10, 2006, “The LCL is 
geared toward ensuring workers' rights and enhancing the quality of the workforce 
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when China is advocating a new development strategy that focuses on technology and 
creativity.”9 By introducing tougher labor standards, the Chinese government put 
forward the agenda that China's economic development would no longer rely on low-
skilled, low-cost, and low-margin manufacturing. 
There are, however, some questions left to be answered in applying this 
argument to China's labor policy reform. First, the state-centric approach tends to 
romanticize the government's determination to reform. Much of the literature assumes 
that decision makers are social welfare maximizers and planners who have a 
preference for initiating reform. But this is hardly the case in the real world. In his 
study on sub-Saharan Africa's failure of building state capacity to implement structural 
adjustment programs, van de Walle (2001) finds that post colonial political elites 
create a neopatrimonial order that has taken over from colonial periods for their 
pervasive rent-seeking purposes. In China, government officials' rent seeking 
behaviors are not rare either. Many studies find that, as local governments are the de 
facto owner of many coal mining enterprises, market entry barriers are put up to target 
at potential competitors from other localities (Wright 2009). In addition to local 
protectionism, the Chinese tradition of personal ties (guanxi) is also thought of as a 
hotbed of rent seeking (Sapio 2009). The state-centric argument does not give an 
explanation of the Chinese government's commitment to utilizing the labor policy 
reform to achieve economic upgrading. 
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 China Labor Bulletin, “Disputes over New Labour Contract Law, Foreign Business Groups Threaten 
to Withdraw Investments,” China Labor Bulletin, June 07, 2006. http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/38245 
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Some studies emphasize the role of apolitical technocrats in carrying out policy 
reforms. For example, regarding monetary and fiscal policies, arguments are made in 
favor of concentrating power in the hands of independent technocrats of the central 
bank (J. Williamson 1994). In the literature on China, students of her foreign and 
security policy find that the decision making has become more professionalized as 
experts and technocrats are allowed to play a role in the process (N. Lu 2001). Many 
Chinese scholars, especially those from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS), are consultants to decision-makers (Carlson 2005). However, the inclusion of 
technocrats into the political process highly depends on top leaders' resolution to 
reform. There are no institutional arrangements to guarantee the status of professional 
technocrats in China's policy-making structure. The argument focusing on the role of 
technocrats still does not provide an answer to why top leaders open the process to 
technocrats.  
Other studies argue that China's political elites in the reform era are themselves 
a group of technocrats (H. Lee 1990). The fourth generation of top leaders are no 
longer revolutionary veterans. Many of them are from the “Tsinghua clique”, majoring 
in engineering at Tsinghua University, including the current president Hu Jintao (Li 
2001). This study, however, provides little information about the top leaders' 
inclination to labor policy changes. A similar argument is also to look at the 
characteristics of China's current political leaders. Some emphasize that Hu and Wen 
are both benign authoritarian leaders and care much more about socially 
disadvantaged groups than former elites did. But again, this statement alone does not 
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tell us any information about the preference formation of the top leaders and where the 
reform plan emanates. 
Another unanswered question of the state-centric approach is that most of the 
studies do not provide adequate analyses on how the politics within the state structure 
influences a government's policy outcome. This approach generally assumes that, 
when facing varieties of social pressure, the state has only one interest and will act 
unitedly, either having skills to overcome societal losers, and hence able to reform, or 
being handcuffed by the power of these groups, and hence unable to reform. It does 
not recognize that individual political elites in the state structure may cultivate their 
own relations with different social actors, and the interaction of these individual 
relationships may lead to different policy outcomes. While some researchers are aware 
of the internal bureaucratic conflicts within the government, such as Chalmers 
Johnson's classic study on the struggle between the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Finance in Japan's economic development 
(1986), their argument still centers around how the state acting as a whole exerts its 
influence over the society. Perhaps because the focus of this approach is on states' 
crafts of overcoming societal forces, it does not treat the dynamics within the state as a 
variable to explain policy outcomes. As van de Walle points out, the state-centric 
approach will encounter analytical difficulties when commitments to reform vary 
within the government (2001: 41).  
In many countries, special interest politics within the state itself are no less 
intensive than those between the state and the society, and the dynamics between 
different political elites within the state apparatus are likely to lead to different policy 
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outcomes. The impact of internal politics of various and overlapping bargaining games 
on a government's policy has long been recognized by the literature that covers 
bureaucratic politics (Allison 1969; Halperin 1971). The classic model of Chinese 
Fragmented Authoritarianism (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Lieberthal and 
Lampton 1992) shows that in China, interest representation and competition happens 
within the government bureaucracy. Competition among different political elites 
within the state structure will change the path and direction of policy reforms. 
Studies on institutional fragmentation in democracies also find that policy 
decisions do not directly reflect societal demands or the state's united interest vis-a-vis 
the society, but are highly influenced by how different political elites are placed in the 
political system. For example, Tsebelis's veto player theory argues that policy 
outcomes are a function of the number of veto points within a political institution 
(1995). For him, veto players are “individual or collective actors whose agreement is 
required for a change of the status quo” (Tsebelis 1995, 289-325). In the theory, the 
number of veto players is critical in predicting the change of status quo in a democrat 
regime. Excessive veto players lead to policy fragmentation and impede policy 
changes because each player has a leverage over the policy-making process and each 
preference must be taken into account. Thus, more veto players contribute to policy 
stability or “resoluteness” and reduce the degree of flexibility or “decisiveness” (Cox 
and McCubbins 2001). 
This argument that the preference of each veto player needs to be taken into 
consideration in the decision making process echoes the viewpoint of the Fragmented 
Authoritarianism framework that China's fragmented government structure creates 
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bargaining arena where every ministry and local government can exert her influence. 
As Shirk points out, inter-ministerial bargaining and negotiation, namely 
“departmentalism”, is particularly serious in China, because China's ministerial 
structure was basically industry-based before the government restructuring in 1998 
(1993, 98-106). At the same time, China's local governments have also gained much 
influence in the political system in the reform era. The allocation of authority and 
responsibility to local governments has an institutionalized degree of durability and 
can not be changed unilaterally by the central government (Montinola et al. 1995, 53-
4). The rise of these new actors complicates China's decision making process, similar 
to the perdition of the veto player theory.  
This prediction, however, has been challenged by empirical studies on the 
economic reform in transition countries. Hellman's study (1998) reveals that further 
reform is less likely to be captured by winners from earlier partial reform when other 
actors are also well represented in the decision making process. Gehlbach and 
Malesky (2007) also show that adding a new veto player in the decision making body 
does not necessarily make policy changes harder. Their conclusion is supported by 
Frye and Mansfield's work on trade liberalization (2003), which argues that 
fragmented political power is associated with more reform. In addition, Mertha's work 
on China's intellectual property rights (2006) demonstrates that inter-bureaucratic 
competition actually creates a policy enforcement market, and thus contributes to 
efficient and effective policy implementation outcomes. These studies illustrate that 
competition among more political actors in the decision-making process does not 
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necessarily block policy shifts. The impact of the internal politics between different 
officials on a government's policy reform requires more investigation.  
In the next section, I will give an alternative explanation of China's labor 
policy reform in the 2000s. I propose the concept of “socio-bureaucratic synergy” to 
capture the bargaining and competition between various political actors in the state as 
well as how these elites cultivate their own relations with different social actors in the 
reform process. This new framework also provides an answer to the source of 
autocrats' determination to reform. I argue that the narrow bureaucratic interests of 
Chinese officials substantially determine China's labor policy reform direction. The 
incentive of these bureaucrats also explains why some social voices, such as non-state 
workers, are brought into the policy-making while others, such as non-state labor 
intensive manufacturers, is not influential in the process.  
 
1.4 Towards a New Approach to China's Labor Policy-making:  
      The Socio-bureaucratic Synergy  
 
The state-centric approach is helpful in revealing the strong role of the Chinese 
government, but a more careful examination on the politics within the state structure is 
needed to understand the policy reform process. On the other hand, the societal group 
approach informs us that China's decision making process is now more pluralized and 
open to the society. But whether a social voice can have a say in the policy process 
still highly depends on the state's attitude. To have a better framework to analyze how 
the different political elites in the state interact with each other and how they 
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incorporate social actors into the policy-making process, this dissertation proposes a 
new explanation based on the concept of “socio-bureaucratic synergy”. Unlike “state-
society synergy” discussed by Evans (1997), socio-bureaucratic synergy does not treat 
the state as a unitary actor when facing social pressures. Rather, I argue that only some 
bureaucracies in the state, and not the state as a whole, can successfully link 
themselves to some societal actors and put forward these officials' desired reform 
agenda.  
The framework of socio-bureaucratic synergy provides a different 
understanding from the state-centric and societal group approaches in ways of how to 
examine the politics within the state as well as state-society relations. First, the 
framework regards the interaction between Chinese bureaucracies in the state structure 
as the major factor of China's regulation of the non-state sector in the 2000s. 
Bureaucratic politics within the Chinese government provides a good example to 
illustrate how internal politics within states set the path for policy reforms in 
authoritarian regimes. As Chapter Three will demonstrate, in the 2000s, the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) and the All China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) strongly advocated the regulation of the workforce in the non-state sector, 
because the new policy helped enhance the two bureaucracies' power and status in the 
Chinese governing structure. These two bureaucracies successfully defeated the 
resistance of the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), who 
served as the major representative of non-state enterprises to fight against the rigid 
labor regulations. At the regional level, Labor Departments and Provincial Federations 
of Trade Unions also had critical impacts on how provincial governments built their 
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own labor regulatory regimes. My study will reveal that China's labor policy reform 
did not directly come from apolitical technocrats or competent top leaders equipped 
with high state capacity to overcome societal oppositions of the business community, 
or from workers' threats of revolution or demands for preferential policies, but was a 
result of bargaining among bureaucracies who successfully made use of the rising 
labor unrest to make policies for their own purposes.  
To have a good grasp of the politics between Chinese bureaucracies, the 
dissertation precedes to examine the incentive structure of Chinese officials, 
particularly those related to the regulation of the non-state sector, in the labor policy 
reform to illustrate under what conditions these bureaucracies will support the new 
regulation. The major motivation for a government official to propose or to implement 
a policy is to use that policy to increase his bureaucratic power, or to enhance his 
chance of political promotion. Two types of bureaucracies, namely the central 
ministries and the provincial departments, are the major actors in China's national and 
regional labor policy-making respectively. On the one hand, their behavior is 
influenced by their historical status and organizational features. Bureaucracy itself can 
thus be regarded as a unit of analysis. On the other hand, because leaders of central 
ministries and provincial departments usually have huge impacts on how these 
bureaucracies stand in the controversies over policy directions, I will also analyze 
these individual leaders' incentive structures in the labor policy-making process.  
As an organization, it is clear that the major concern of a bureaucracy, either at 
the central or regional level, is to maintain its bureaucratic power. Traditionally 
speaking, indicators of bureaucratic power include budget, number of personnel, and 
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multiplicity of administrative functions (Mertha 2006, 301). Strong bureaucratic 
power guarantees the status within the government. In China, ministries' budget 
information at the central level is not opened to the public until 2010. At the regional 
level, most departments in the provincial-level governments do not publicize this 
information either. Only a few local governments, such as Wenling City (a county-
level city (xianjishi)) in Zhejiang Province and Baimiao Township (xiang) in Sichuan 
Province, allow the local people to participate in the budget discussion (Hsu 2010).  
On the other hand, number of personnel refers to the authorized number of 
established posts in the Party apparatus or governmental administrative organ (jiguan), 
namely bianzhi in Chinese (Brødsgaard 2002). There are two kinds of bianzhi: 
Administrative posts (xingzheng bianzhi) and public service posts (shiye bianzhi). The 
former refers to civil service officials. Most staff in the public service unit (shiye 
danwei) belongs to the latter category. The number of personnel that a central ministry 
can have is officially assigned by the State Commission Office for Public Sector 
Reform (zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui).10 If a ministry receives more quota of 
posts, it usually means that the ministry is stronger and more important to the CCP's 
governance.  
At the same time, a bureaucracy equipped with more administrative functions 
usually has more monetary resources and numbers of personnel. Multiplicity of 
administrative functions is thus a good indicator of a bureaucracy's power. In fact, 
inter-ministerial competition for more tasks is often very fierce in the central 
                                               
10
 The official English translation of the Office's name does not precisely express its major function. 
The office, led by the Premier of the State Council, is in charge of assigning the authorized number of 
personnel (the number of established posts) in the Party apparatus or governmental administrative organ 
(jiguan), namely bianzhi in Chinese. 
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government. For example, regarding which ministry should be in charge of China's 
pension and social insurances program, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, the 
Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs have long engaged in battles 
with each other (Frazier 2010, 22). Losing this kind of game is fatal to a bureaucracy's 
power. As Mertha writes, “loss of an established portfolio can be devastating to a 
bureaucracy, demonstrating weakness, a decline in relevance, or a loss of political 
favor with the ruling elite”. The outcome of the battle is zero-sum and winner-take-all 
(2006, 306). The change of administrative functions is thus a good indicator regarding 
the ups and downs of a bureaucracy's status in the Chinese government.  
Inter-bureaucratic competition has become even more cut-throat since China 
launched several rounds of government restructuring and downsizing. The most 
critical reform took place in 1998. In that year, the State Council had several industry-
based ministries merged into a larger ministry which represented two or more 
industries.11 Regarding the Labor Ministry, in 2008, the then Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security and the Ministry of Personnel were merged into a “super-ministry” 
(Frazier 2010, 22), namely the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. In 
the process of restructuring, when a new ministry is created, it needs to define its 
function (zhineng), internal divisions (neishe jigou), and number of established posts 
(renyuan bianzhi), which are summarized as three tasks (sanding) in Chinese. In many 
cases, if a ministry is already strong before the government restructuring, it will be 
more powerful in getting favorable quota on these three tasks, which in turn will 
                                               
11
 For example, the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, the Ministry of Machinery Industry, the Ministry 
of Electronics Industry, the Ministry of Chemical Industry, and the Ministry of Coal Industry were 
transformed into different bureaus subordinate to the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC).   
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strengthen its bureaucratic status. In some situations, a powerful minister can even 
stay out of the restructuring. For example, in the 2008 government restructuring, the 
Ministry of Railways successfully resisted the amalgamation into the Ministry of 
Transport.  
The incentive to strengthen bureaucratic power shapes China's labor policy 
reform. As will be shown in Chapter Three, starting from the 2000s, to regain the 
bureaucratic power that had been relinquished under marketization, the MOLSS and 
the ACFTU pushed the top leaders to adopt policies to regulate the labor condition in 
the non-state sector in a way that particularly favored skilled workers' job security.  
As for the heads of the central Labor Ministry and the Trade Union, most of 
them also care about the power and status of their own bureaucracies. Based on their 
different career paths, there are three types of political elites that have served as the 
heads of the Labor Ministry and the Trade Union Federation. First, some of them only 
stay in the lower-level track and will never become members in the top leadership 
group. However, they might be promoted to other professional positions such as a 
different ministry. Second, some have chances to be promoted to the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo as core top leaders. Third, others have already reached the 
highest level in their political careers, and hence will no longer be granted important 
positions after serving for the Labor Ministry or the Trade Union Federation. That 
being said, in some cases, these ministers and chairmen still have chances to be put in 
symbolic positions such as the leadership positions in the National People's Congress 
(NPC), even if they already reach the retirement age.  
35 
For the first type of ministers and chairmen, they can be regarded as members 
in the “technocrats faction” in Shih's work (2009). Their incentive is to “link 
promotion and jurisdictional expansion with their ability to solve pressing problems 
confronting the regime” (Ibid., 5). These officials' interests are closely tied to their 
bureaucracies, and they usually share the same policy preference as if “where you 
stand depends on where you sit” (Allison, 1971: 176), because good performance in a 
strong bureaucracy demonstrates their competence and will be helpful for their future 
bureaucratic career in the technocrats track. On the other hand, for the last type of 
officials, who will not be promoted to critical positions in the future, they will be less 
interested in expanding the power of their current bureaucracies because they are 
going to retire soon. But if they have chances to serve in symbolic positions in the 
future, they will be more active because a powerful bureaucracy will be helpful in 
bargaining for such positions after leaving the current bureaucracies.  
For the second type of officials, they have promising political careers to be 
included in the top leadership group. Their interests might be less linked with their 
current bureaucracies but more with top leaders. In this sense, these officials might not 
be very interested in empowering the bureaucracies under their current jurisdictions, 
because their expectation is at the higher level and their major concern may be more 
related to top leaders' general governance and maintenance of social stability. Unlike 
ministers who are in charge of special industrial policies, in the process of regulating 
the labor condition in the 2000s, the policy preference of the heads of the Labor 
Ministry and the Trade Union Federation did not run against that of their fellow 
bureaucrats to empower their bureaucracies, because regulating the labor market was a 
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policy that was of help for enhancing the bureaucratic power as well as stabilizing 
labor relations at the same time. 
As far as China's state-society relation is concerned, the framework of socio-
bureaucratic synergy adds a new perspective to the study. Drawing on the state-centric 
approach, I find that the Chinese state is equipped with skills in manipulating societal 
voices. But unlike this approach which assumes the state as an unitary actor in the 
interaction with the society, my framework argues that different political elites usually 
explore their own connections with different social forces. More specifically, in China, 
the labor departments and trade union federations usually seek support from the 
working class, while departments of commerce and industries have closer relations 
with the business community. In the labor policy reform in the 2000s, the MOLSS and 
the ACFTU took advantage of the increasing labor unrest to put forward their desired 
labor regulations. At the same time, the ACFIC also acted on behalf of non-state 
labor-intensive industries. Therefore, different bureaucracies in the state usually have 
their own ties with certain social groups.  
This also reveals that Chinese officials do not shy away from incorporating 
social grievances into their policy-making processes. Representing social voices or 
even mobilizing mass movements is widely used as a tool to legitimize their actions. 
Accordingly, the state-society relations are not always confrontational in China. As 
Perry points out, the way in which the Chinese state governs the current society has a 
root in the revolutionary period in the 1950s. In today's China, the authoritarian 
regime still periodically engages its citizens to express their private criticisms publicly 
(Perry 2007). For a top Chinese leader, mass movements serve to legitimize the entire 
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regime and hence are helpful in ensuring his political survival. Indeed, students of 
China's state-society relation have found that the Chinese autocrats tend to utilize 
domestic public opinions or even mass protests for their own purposes. They can 
deliberately give tacit consent to anti-Japanese protest to gain international leverage 
such as undermining Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council (Weiss). Or they can tolerate narrow economic protests in order to identify 
and defuse dissidents. Social protests are also useful for the central government to 
monitor local governments and to control local corruption (Lorentzen 2008). In 
addition to the top leaders, lower-level officials may also join the camp of representing 
social voices to fight for what these officials want. Similar to Mao's use of mass 
mobilization to boost up his political legitimacy, the current Chinese bureaucrats also 
find that it is useful to make use of social opinions to justify their actions. This makes 
the bureaucracies' desired policy a “rightful” one.  
Therefore, bureaucracies and social forces might sometimes have the same 
policy preference, although for different reasons. Whether a social force can have a 
say in the policy-making process depends on whether there are some bureaucracies in 
the government thinking that it is in their interests to act on behalf of the social force 
in order to strengthen their own political power. Accordingly, having a well-organized 
structure is not the reason why social voices can wield their influences on the 
government. As O'Brien and Li (1999) find, local officials do not necessarily make 
more efforts to implement policies for which there is more mass-based demand. On 
the contrary, there are many cases where least popular policies are selected to be 
enforced. This argument echoes Gehlbach's conclusion that politicians do not 
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necessarily favor groups that are organized over those that are not. In his study on the 
tax systems in post-communist countries, Gehlbach finds that political elites are likely 
to be more responsive to some industries, just because these industries are easier to be 
taxed and thus are more politically valuable (2008). My framework of socio-
bureaucratic synergy also illustrates a top-down decision making style. In China, the 
policy-making was not driven by how social forces seek for being represented by 
bureaucracies in order to be integrated into the decision making process, but by how 
bureaucracies take advantage of social forces to enhance their political status. When 
some bureaucracies wish for the same policy outcome as a social force, we can say 
that there is socio-bureaucratic synergy between these bureaucracies and the social 
actor in the policy-making process. The concept provides the answer to why the voice 
of the working class can be heard in the policy-making process, even when workers 
are not able to represent themselves in the Chinese government. 
 
1.5 Central-local Relations and Local Socio-bureaucratic Synergy in the Reform 
Process  
 
Central-local relations provide another example to examine the impact of 
internal politics on the state's labor-policy-making. Not every Chinese province was 
willing to carry out the central reform in the 2000s. The implementation process was 
significantly influenced by the provincial governments. To construct a provincial labor 
regulatory regime, similar to the national process, Provincial Labor Departments and 
Trade Union Federations were the major actor. Top provincial leaders, including 
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provincial CCP secretaries and governors, also had a role in the process in the sense 
that they could intervene in the policy-making if they did not see eye to eye with these 
labor officials. As Chapter Four will illustrate, different provincial governments 
reacted to the central policy to promote labor rights in different ways according to 
their own concerns. The dissertation precedes to investigate the incentive structure of 
these local officials in their regional labor policy-making processes.  
Studies on China's local development have long recognized local governments' 
economic incentive under fiscal decentralization in promoting economic growth (Oi, 
1992; Montinola, Qian, Weingast 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1997). The economic 
interest sometimes also drives local governments to improves the quality of 
governance, because under fiscal decentralization, different jurisdictions need to 
compete with each other for more resources either from the central government or 
from foreign investments. As Tiebout's classic study indicates, competition among 
sub-national governments may lead to more efficient public goods provision (1956).  
But decentralization is a double-sword for authoritarian regimes. Fiscal 
decentralization reduces local governments' reliance on the central government's fiscal 
transfer, and thus might pave the way for local protectionism and grant local 
governments the opportunities to distort the central government's policy principles 
(Ngo and Wu 2009). In addition, localities with more resources are likely to challenge 
the central government (Treisman, 1999; Bunce 1999). As Landry's study points out, 
fiscal decentralization is strongly associated with democracy, and autocrats are usually 
reluctant decentralizers (2008). But in China, while the fiscal capacity of the central 
government has become weak, the CCP still maintains a high degree of political 
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control through the cadre management system (Ibid). The central government can 
affect the probability that local officials stay in power in order to supervise their 
behavior. This is to say, local officials are not only motivated by their economic 
incentive under fiscal decentralization. The cadre management system under political 
centralization also significantly determines their political incentive in the process of 
implementing the central policy reform.  
In a democratic decentralized system, local officials' political aspiration is 
likely to drive them to invest in policy innovation. Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006) 
find that innovative policies help local leaders to signal to the electorate their capacity 
for serving as a federal leader. Local leaders' competition for running a successful 
national campaign leads them to pay attention to policy innovation to show off to 
citizens that they are competent candidates. In an authoritarian regime such as China, 
local elites do not need to attract citizens' attention to be promoted, but they are 
obligated to keep good relationships with the central government in order to have a 
better political career. Many studies have recognized the political concern of Chinese 
local elites in their policy-making processes. For example, Blanchard and Shleifer 
(2001) argues that unlike in Russia, the political interest of Chinese local officials 
under political centralization guarantees local economic growth and reduces the 
degree of local rent seeking. This provides an answer to why fiscal decentralization in 
China does not create as serious local predatory states as in many other developing 
countries. This argument is confirmed by Li and Zhou (2005), who find that a 
provincial leader's political turnover is sensitive to the economic performance of his 
province. At the same time, Y. Huang (1999) finds that China's cadre management 
41 
system forces local officials to comply with the central government's inflation-control 
policies that in fact run against their own economic interests. According to this view, 
the Chinese central government successfully uses political promotions to persuade 
provincial officials to cooperate on its policy principles.  
Therefore, local officials' political incentive is one of the major factors to 
explain local policy outcome. In fact, the role of political elites in local development 
has been emphasized in many studies on developing countries' decentralization. As in 
Grindle's study on Mexico, individual leadership is the best predictor of the quality of 
local governance and “the most important source of change in local governments” 
(2007, 170). In China, individual elites' behavior is largely influenced by the central 
government's personnel control. In the field, studies have tried to figure out the major 
evaluation criteria of elites' political promotion and mobility. Some of the works focus 
on national or provincial-level political elites (Li and Bachman 1989; Oksenberg 
1968), while recent studies have begun to use survey data to examine general 
bureaucratic career patterns (Walder 1995; Walder, Li, and Treiman 2000; Zhou 1995; 
Zhou 2001). University education and seniority among party membership have proven 
to be useful in increasing a cadre member's chance of promotion (Zang 1998; Li and 
Walder 2001). Economic performance is also found to be on the evaluation list 
(Whiting 2001). Among the criteria, most studies agree that political loyalty is a 
precondition for political promotion. There are several ways for local officials to 
signal their political loyalty to the central government. They can either nauseatingly 
display their loyalty through echoing an ideological campaign launched by the top 
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leaders (Shih 2008b), or, as this dissertation will argue, credibly signal to the central 
leaders their loyalty by complying with the central government's new reform agenda.  
Cooperating with the central government on the pro-labor policy reform and 
acting on behalf of workers' grievances is supposed to be a credible way to 
demonstrate local officials' political loyalty, because labor policy reform is a costly 
policy, and the central government, as well as the local governments, will always incur 
resistance during the reform process. Having the ability to counter the resistance 
conceivably shows that the local government is seeing eye to eye with the central 
government. Moreover, labor policy is constantly a core issue on the central 
government's reform agenda. In the 2000s, the policy to improve labor conditions in 
the non-state sector is one of the crucial measures for building a "harmonious society," 
the new ideological campaign launched by the Hu-Wen regime, which focuses on the 
rhetoric of improving living conditions of the socially disadvantaged. It is thus a good 
example to examine the relationship between political promotion and local policy 
implementation in China. When promoting a more rigid labor market regulatory 
regime is on the central government's agenda in the 2000s, the action of a lower-level 
official to speak for workers' voices can serve as a credible signal to the top leaders 
that he is loyal to the new reform direction. 
Local governments' cooperation is even more important to the central 
government in the sense that it enables the central government to observe local 
officials' competence. If the authoritarian government cares about not only regime 
stability but also effective governance of the country, it should not only judge a local 
official's political loyalty, but also his competence in achieving the central 
43 
government's policy goals when the central government means them. Surprisingly, 
few existing studies have analyzed whether political promotion is a function of, or 
sensitive to local officials' compliance with the central government's reform agenda. 
This dissertation argues that, in order to assure that the central policy is implemented, 
local officials' management of the policy implementation is included into the 
evaluation criteria considered as part of the political promotion process. On the other 
hand, for a local official who wishes to be promoted, cooperating with the central 
government on its reform agenda becomes a credible way to demonstrate his loyalty 
and competence. 
The dissertation will thus proceed to examine how local officials' political 
incentive affects their choice to act on behalf of workers in carrying out the central 
pro-labor reform in the 2000s. Similar to the central counterparts, the behavior of a 
regional Department of Labor and Social Security (DLSS) and a Federation of Trade 
Unions (FTU) is also largely determined by their incentive to empower the 
bureaucracies in the provincial governing structure. But unlike the central politics, 
regional officials need to deal with the supervision of the central government while 
managing the power structure at the provincial level. The central government wields 
its influence over the regional policy-making mainly through affecting the probability 
that the local officials stay in power. In this regard, officials in a regional DLSS or 
FTU care about not only their bureaucratic status in the provincial governing structure 
but also how much they can get from the central government. A bureaucracy who puts 
more emphasis on the latter will find ways to attract the central government. 
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Empirical findings show that among those provinces who achieve socio-
bureaucratic synergy to promote the central pro-labor reform, their implementation is 
crystallized in two patterns: either drawing up detailed provincial guidelines and 
measures to implement the central government's general policy principles, or 
restructuring the provincial bureaucracies and/or establishing new governmental 
agencies to strengthen the provincial labor-regulatory regime. The choice of one of 
these avenues over the other can often be explained by the different political 
aspirations of the heads of the DLSS and the FTU. For those who wish to take 
advantage of implementing the central pro-labor policy to empower the bureaucracies 
at the provincial level, they are inclined to choosing the second avenue to build the 
provincial labor regulatory regime. For those who pay more attention to the central 
government, they tend to follow the first pattern to enlarge their political chances to be 
promoted to the central level, that is, to make local regulations to signal the loyalty 
and competence to carry out the central policy. 
This dissertation studies two types of local officials. In addition to top 
provincial leaders, namely Provincial Party Secretaries, who can be regarded as the 
generalists (Shih 2009), I include a study of the career patterns of a particular sub-
level of provincial political elites, who enjoy a status called “zheng di ting ji,” 
signifying that they hold a director-level position within a provincial department. 
These particular bureaucrats usually falls into the “technocrats faction” (Shih 2009). In 
provincial policy-making processes, this level of officials who are in charge of 
Provincial Labor Departments and Provincial Federations of Trade Unions are 
frequently critical to establishing provincial labor regulatory regimes. Due to the 
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tradition of “departmental legislation” (bumen lifa),12 the final version of most 
provincial labor regulations directly reflects the interests of these bureaucracies. While 
these “technocrats” have a say in shaping actual policy reforms, few of the existing 
studies have focused on the incentive structure of these officials. One of the 
contributions of this dissertation is to fill this gap.  
 
To sum up, my dissertation argues that the pro-labor policy reform is set up 
and implemented by the bureaucracies within the state apparatus to take advantage of 
workers' grievances to promote their own bureaucratic and political interests. At the 
central level, the pro-labor policy-making is strongly shaped and pushed by the Labor 
Ministry and the Trade Union Federation. These two bureaucracies make use of their 
access to top leaders and successfully defeat the resistance from the All China 
Federation of Commerce and Industry that tends to speak for the non-state business 
community. At the same time, similar to the central policy-making, labor departments 
and trade union federations in the provincial governing system are also the critical 
drafters of provincial labor regulatory regimes. The bureaucratic and political concerns 
of these local elites explain why they choose to speak for workers in the labor policy 
implementation process. Accordingly, in China, self-interested bureaucracies may 
make use of some social voices and act on behalf of them when they see representing 
                                               
12
 Departmental legislation in China refers to the situation where the administrative department has 
taken advantage of the discretion to make enormous administrative decrees which do not need the 
approval of the People's Congress. These decrees include Regulations (guiding), Ordinances (tiaoli), 
Circulars (tongzhi) and Measures (banfa), that appear to supplement a national law, but in fact help 
maximize the administrative department's bureaucratic power in the law implementation process. 
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these voices beneficial for their own bureaucratic and political interests. When this 
relationship is successfully established, we say that there is socio-bureaucratic synergy.  
 
1.6 Outline of the Dissertation  
 
The dissertation will first examine China's labor policy reform in the early 
transitional period before the regulation of the non-state sector in the 2000s. The next 
chapter traces the process of how China employed an experimentalist strategy to 
introduce the labor contract system in the 1980s and the 1990s to deregulate and 
flexibilize the SOE workforce. In this stage, local experiments were conducted to 
muster support for the new system. While the reform was gradual, its full 
implementation was facilitated by China's agenda of SOE restructuring. The pace of 
reform has sped up since the mid-1990s. Accordingly, the SOE workforce was 
successfully flexibilized.  
 After the deregulation of the state sector, the Chinese government launched 
several programs to re-regulate the labor market in the 2000s. The new reform was 
instituted by the expansion of the labor contract system from the state to the non-state 
sector. Chapter Three examines this stage of reform. Contrasting a positive case with a 
negative case, I demonstrate that having a bureaucracy wishing for the same policy 
outcome as a social voice is a prerequisite for that voice to have a say in the policy-
making process. When the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions saw regulating the workforce in the non-state sector as a 
way to regain their power, the social grievances of some workers, especially those of 
47 
skilled workers, could become influential in the labor policy-making process. This 
argument is verified by the negative case of the study, namely the resistance to the 
reform from non-state labor-intensive enterprises. In the policy-making process, these 
enterprises faced difficulties to change the direction of the pro-labor reform. The lack 
of strong bureaucracies representing their grievances in the government disabled them 
from transforming their wealth into political influence.  
The central government's reform agenda needs the provinces to carry out. The 
focus of Chapter Four is to examine the impact of provincial officials' bureaucratic 
concerns on their regulation of the labor condition. Through case studies of three 
provincial-level regions, namely Beijing Municipality,13 Hunan Province, and 
Guangdong Province, the study brings to light under what conditions a bureaucracy 
becomes a “representative” for some social voices in the government's policy-making 
process.  
More specifically, I find that when local labor officials have better chances to 
be promoted to the central level, constantly drafting rigid labor regulations serves as a 
signal that they are loyal and competent as shown in the Beijing case. When the 
chance is low, a local bureaucracy in charge of labor affairs who is not going to retire 
soon will be interested in taking the opportunity to implement the central reform in a 
way that can enhance his bureaucratic power in the provincial government. As in the 
Hunan case, the implementation of the labor contract system centers its efforts around 
bureaucratic restructuring such as creating the Small Leading Group to integrate the 
different departments in the provincial government, and establishing the Liaison 
                                               
13
 Beijing is a direct-controlled municipality. Its administrative status is provincial. 
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Mechanism to coordinate all the local governments below the provincial level. In these 
two cases, even if the potentiality of labor unrest is not high, these local officials still 
act as a “bureaucratic representative” for workers to promote pro-labor policies, 
although the major motivation behind this action is not to protect workers, but to 
increase their bureaucratic power.  
On the other hand, a labor official might choose to speak for the business 
community and not for the working class when he will retire from the office very soon. 
As in the Guangdong case, the officials in the Labor Department and the Trade Union 
Federation can be captured by the personal ties with the local business community 
when the latter exerts pressures on the labor policy implementation process. This 
inclination is intensified by the fact that labor-intensive industries have strong 
leverages in Guangdong, given that these enterprises account for almost 40% of the 
province's GDP growth. The high degree of flexibility of the labor regulatory regime 
in Guangdong only starts to decrease when the top provincial leaders, who have strong 
aspirations and good opportunities to be promoted to the central government, 
intervene in the current system, and initiate pro-labor administrative activities to send 
signals to the central leaders of their loyalty, competence, and will to comply with the 
pro-labor reform direction. The conclusion drawn from these case studies provides a 
foundation for the hypothesis testing in Chapter Five.  
The three cases inform us that local officials' concerns about their bureaucratic 
status and political promotion stimulate them to act on behalf of workers to implement 
the central agenda of regulating the labor condition. Chapter Five tests the effects of 
provincial officials' political aspirations on their cooperation with the central 
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government's pro-labor policy in the 2000s. Using the strength of provincial 
regulations as well as the records in provincial yearbooks as indicators of the degree of 
cooperation with the central pro-labor policy, I conduct a large-N study covering the 
31 provincial-level regions in China on how they implement the central policy of 
regulating the labor condition in the 2000s. Collecting the political resumes of 
provincial party secretaries as well as the heads of provincial labor departments and 
federations of trade unions, through ordered logistic regressions, I examine whether 
these officials tend to make efforts to regulate the labor market when they are still 
young and have good opportunities for more bureaucratic or political power.   
This dissertation concludes that China's regulation of the labor market in the 
2000s is mainly driven by government officials' bureaucratic and political aspirations 
for more bureaucratic power and higher political status. Social grievances from the 
working class can only become influential in the policy-making process when some 
bureaucracies in the government seeing representing these social voices beneficial to 
their political power. When the two actors wish for the same policy outcome, although 
for different reasons, there is synergy between the social voice and the bureaucracy. 
My conclusion is thus somehow provocative, in the sense that it points out that, 
although the thirty years of reform have pluralized China's political arena, social 
voices do not enjoy systematic power in the policy-making process. Whether a social 
voice can be heard in the government is still largely dependent upon the various 
bureaucracies' interests. Accordingly, China's national and regional labor policy-
making processes are still dominated by the special-interest bureaucracies within the 
government.  
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Chapter Two 
 
The Introduction of the Labor Contract System in the State Sector: 
The Experimentalist Style of Policy-making 
 
Ever since the “Reform and Open-door Policy” was announced in the 11th 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in December 1978, 
invigorating the economy through liberalization and introducing market-oriented 
mechanisms have been the major agenda for the Chinese government. In order to 
transform the socialist labor system and to make the labor regulation more flexible, the 
first step was to end the iron-rice-bowl practice in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
to allow these enterprises to hire workers through labor contracting based on their own 
needs. Implementing the labor contract system in SOEs became a national policy in 
1986 when the State Council issued the “Provisional Regulations on the 
Implementation of the Labor Contract System in SOEs” on July 12, 1986. 
Before this document was announced, many local cities had already 
experimented with the new system on a small scale in the early 1980s. This chapter 
examines this experimentalist style of policy-making. As for the debates in the process 
of introducing the labor contract system, White's study has already provided 
comprehensive discussions (1987). In this chapter, I focus on the question of how 
policy experimentation was initiated and implemented. Section one briefly describes 
the background of the central reform. In the second section, I analyze how the central 
government promoted local experimentation, and how local sites were chosen to test 
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the effects of the central proposed new plan. The third section discusses local attitudes 
about the reform. While many SOE managers and workers were against the labor 
contract system, the implementation was not stopped. The agenda of flexibilizing the 
labor regulation was successfully carried out in the mid-1990s. The chapter is 
concluded in section four.  
 
2.1 Central Policy Definition: The Genesis of a National Plan 
 
Under China's planned economy before the 1980s, the labor ministry was in 
charge of allocating workers into SOEs. All entrants to China's urban labor market 
received their jobs directly through the labor ministry's “centralized allocation” (tongyi 
fenpei). The philosophy behind this practice was egalitarianism. Education and tenure, 
not labor productivity, guided the reward system (Becker and Gao 1989, 413-4). In 
practice, these workers were usually called fixed workers (guding gong). There were 
very low levels of inter-enterprise, inter-sectoral or inter-regional mobility among 
them. Seniority was the most important criterion for promotion within an enterprise. 
Approval from the labor ministry was required for a fixed worker to be moved to 
another working unit (danwei). Alongside the system of administrative allocation 
evolved a de facto system of lifetime tenure of these fixed workers (White 1987). 
Workforces in SOEs were very stable and fixed workers are in fact permanent 
employees.  
With a high level of job security, overmanning and “unemployment on the job” 
were prevalent (Kornai 1980, 254). But open unemployment was still a major problem 
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in China. Right after 1978, when those who had been “sent down to the countryside” 
during the Cultural Revolution came back to cities, urban unemployment skyrocketed. 
Table 2.1 shows the number of unemployment in the early 1980s. 
 
Table 2.1 Urban Job Waiting Rates,* 1978-1987  
 
Source: China Labor and Wage Statistical Data (1978-1987),  p. 109. Beijing: China 
Statistics Press.  
* Job waiting (daiye) literally means that job allocation is pending. It exactly refers to 
a status without any jobs. In Chinese, the term was created to avoid the use of the term, 
unemployment (shiye), because under the socialist system, everyone should have been 
guaranteed a job.  
 
The number of unemployed youth in 1981 was almost as twice as that in 1978. 
This high unemployment rate forced the government to consider new policies and to 
reform the labor market regulations. In order to expand employment, in 1980, the 
Chinese government held a National Conference on Labor and Employment, and 
issued the document of “Improving the Task of Urban Employment,” which 
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introduced a labor policy framework named “three-in-one” (sanjiehe) to allow job 
placement through three venues: the local labor bureaus, worker's voluntary 
organizations, and self-employment.14 This policy broke the rule of administrative 
“unified allocation”. 
At the same time, the government also made efforts to establish more labor 
service companies to help workers to find jobs.15 In August 1986, the People's Daily 
(Renmin Ribao) published an article recognizing the importance of labor service 
companies in the labor market. The article uncovered the unrealistic idea of full 
employment in the socialist system and urged the government to encourage the 
development of labor service companies to deal with the surplus of labor.16 In China, 
labor service companies were either established by local labor bureaus, enterprises, or 
public service units (shiye danwei). As Table 2.2 shows, in the 1980s, a large amount 
of unemployed youth went to these companies for help.  
Table 2.2 Number of Labor Service Companies, 1980-1984 
 
Source: Jiashu Liu and Fenghua Mao, China's Reform of its Labor Institution, p. 90, 
1988. Beijing: Economic Science Press.  
 
                                               
14
 See China Labour Net. On-line available at http://www.labournet.com.cn/english/gener1.htm 
15
 In October 1981, the State Council published the “Decisions about Opening the Ways, 
Bolstering the Economy, and Solving the Urban Employment Problem”. The document laid out the 
principle of these three tasks. 
16
 Renmin Ribao, August 11, 1986, p. 5. (Author: Cen Lian). 
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In addition to unemployment, low labor productivity was another problem of 
the iron-rice-bowl system. In practice, many enterprises found that the labor ministry's 
allocation could not match their needs. This created many management difficulties. To 
deal with these problems, the Chinese government gradually reduced state 
administrative control over labor allocation and to enable firms to recruit workers by 
themselves. In the new plan, the traditional heredity system (zinv dingti) should be 
suspended to make the hiring process more transparent. Enterprises were to hire 
workers through contracting, and these labor contracts were designed to be signed by 
workers and enterprises themselves.  
When a labor contract was signed, the definition of worker's and manager's 
rights and responsibilities should be made clear. This helped concentrate workers' 
minds on performance. As White points out, those who supported the reform argued 
that the labor contract system could help improve labor productivity, given that it was 
the only criterion to determine whether the contract would be renewed (1987, 367). 
Moreover, if the performance of a contract worker (hetong gong) was not good and 
could not be improved through education, the factory director had the right to change 
her status to temporary worker (linshi gong),17 or to delay the renewal of her contract, 
or to put her into three-month probationary period.18 Contract workers thus became 
“the point of production” (shengchan dian). Their productivity was much higher than 
fixed workers.19 Many government reports reveal that for most joint ventures who 
already implemented the labor contract system, their contract workers generated huge 
                                               
17
 Temporary workers only had wage incomes and did not receive any welfare benefits. 
18
 Informant 12. Interview conducted in Beijing on March 09, 2008. 
19
 Informant 12. Interview conducted in Beijing on March 09, 2008. 
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returns to these companies. While technology transfer from foreign countries might be 
the major reason why these joint ventures were more profitable than SOEs, higher 
flexibility of internal and external labor markets also mattered a great deal.20 
The aforementioned problems of the iron-rice-bowl system, ranging from 
rising open unemployment rates to low labor productivity, were the major background 
of central government's decision to reform the socialist labor practices. But 
introducing the labor contract system was not easy. In the early 1980s, there were 
intensive debates over the priority of the reform. Was it more important to create jobs 
or to enhance productivity?21 For those who emphasized full employment, the 
implementation of the labor contract system was not an urgent task. In order to muster 
support for the latter, the central government incorporated local governments into the 
stakeholders of the new system through including them into the reform. Local 
experimentation was initiated.  
 
2.2 Top-down Policy Experimentation through Selecting Local Test Sites 
 
To advertise the labor contract system, the central government selected several 
local experimental sites to demonstrate the new system's benefits to local economic 
development. The first test site that was chosen by the central government was 
Shanghai. In the early 1980s, most foreign-invested enterprises in Shanghai had 
already recruited employers through contracting. The reason why Shanghai was 
                                               
20
 Renmin Ribao, July16, 1991, p. 2. 
21
 For the debates about whether solving the unemployment problem or enhancing labor productivity 
should be the government's priority, see the detailed discussion by White 1987. 
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chosen over others resides in that the central government expected the experiment in 
Shanghai would be successful, given that Shanghia had already experienced labor 
contracting in foreign enterprises, and the job waiting rates in Shanghai were lower 
than many other cities. In September 1980, the experimentation was first implemented 
in the Shanghai Semi-conductor Factory (now Shanghai WeiWu Electronics Co., Ltd.) 
and the China Textile Machinery Manufacturing Works (now China Textile 
Machinery Co., Ltd.). At the same time, Shanghai Municipal People's Bank and 
People's Broadcasting Station were also allowed to recruit skilled workers from the 
society by themselves.22 In these companies, contract workers were formal employees, 
not temporary workers. Employing a contract worker had to follow the annual national 
labor plan issued by the then Ministry of Labor and Personnel.  
The experimentation was concluded in 1982 when the Shanghai Municipal 
Labor Bureau  issued the “Opinions about Experimenting with the System of 
Recruiting Contract Workers rather than Fixed Workers in Shanghai Municipal SOEs.” 
The document asked to expand the reform to other SOEs. In addition to Shanghai, 
more provinces were gradually included in the experimentation. At the end of 1982, 
there were totally nine provincial-level regions experimenting with the new system. 
They were coastal regions such as Shanghai, Beijing, Guangdong and Shangdong, and 
inland regions such as Guangxi, Henan, Hubei, Anhui and Gansu. These localities 
were selected to be the test sites because compared to others, they succeeded in 
reducing urban unemployment. For the central government, implementing the labor 
                                               
22
 See Shanghai Local Gazette (edited by the Editorial Committee of the Shanghai Labor Gazette, 
1998). 
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contract system in these regions helped change the focus of public discourse from 
unemployment to productivity (White 1987: 375). At the end of 1982, the number of 
contract workers reached 160,000.23 
The Ministry of Labor and Personnel held a conference to review these 
experiments in February 1983. The conference recommended that successful 
implementation of the labor contract system required other policy changes such as 
reforms on the wage and the welfare system. For example, if a contract worker made 
more contributions in an enterprise than a fixed worker, she should receive a better 
wage.24 The conference was concluded by issuing the “Notice of Actively 
Experimenting with the Labor Contract System,” which asked to extend the 
experiment to more provinces. For those provinces who had already implemented the 
system, they should pay more attention to wage and welfare reforms. For those who 
had not, they needed to select several cities within their regions for experimentation 
this year.25 By the end of 1983, all provinces had implemented the labor contract 
system in some cities. The number of contract workers totaled 657,000 in SOEs and 
collective-owned enterprises across regions.26 
In 1986, the State Council asked for nationwide implementation of the labor 
contract system in the state sector by issuing the “Provisional Regulations on the 
Implementation of the Labor Contract System in SOEs”. From now on, any new 
recruits in SOEs were hired through contracting. The heredity employment was thus 
                                               
23
 See “Chapter 18: The Scale of Employment is Larger and the Structure is Better,” in Analytical 
Report of the 50 years of the New China (Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1999). 
24
 Renmin Ribao, Feb 02, 1983, p. 4. 
25
 See Big Events of the Chinese Government, 1980-1984. On-Line Available at China Net: 
http://china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/273595.htm 
26
 Xinhua News Agency, August 17, 1984. 
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suspended. According to the rule, however, workers who were employed under the 
planned system before 1986 were not included in the new system. These workers were 
thus still permanent workers and did not have to sign any contracts with their 
employers. In addition to this document, there were three other regulations supporting 
the reform: the Provisional Regulations on the Hiring of Workers in SOEs, on the 
Dismissal of Workers and Staff in SOEs, and on the Unemployment Insurance for 
Workers and Staff in SOEs. After these National Regulations were promulgated as a 
guideline, almost all provinces issued their own detailed rules for local 
implementation. For example, Beijing passed the “Detailed Rules for Implementing 
the Provisional Regulations” on September 15, 1986. 
The introduction of the labor contract system witnessed China's gradualist style 
of policy-making. Four years after its implementation in the state sector, the Ministry 
of Labor decided to expand the system to all enterprises regardless of their ownership 
structures by issuing the 1990 “Opinion about Continuing the Experimentation of 
Optimizing the Composition of Labor”. It also asked all employers to prepare 
contracts with all workers including those whose jobs were assigned through 
administrative allocation before. To facilitate this reform, the central government did 
not select local test sites. Instead, it delegated the power to provincial governments to 
choose their own places for experimentation. All provinces were encouraged to 
experiment with the policy in selected cities within their own jurisdictions. 
In general, China's labor policy reform in the 1980s was characterized by the 
prevalence of various experimental regulations. From 1978 to 1994 when the first 
Labor Law (Laodong Fa, LL) was promulgated, there were more than 160 labor 
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regulations and rules issued by the government (Ngok 2008, 49). However, the 
percentage ratio of contract workers to total employees did not significantly rise until 
1994. Figure 2.1 shows that it was only after 1994 that workers on contracts rose 
rapidly. 
 
Figure 2.1 The Percentage Ratio of Contract Workers to Total Employees in China, 
1983-1997 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks, various years.  
 
According to the Figure, the reform in the 1980s was not very successful. The 
major reason why the percentage of contract workers was low in the 1980s is that in 
the early stage of reform, local governments generally had doubts about fully carrying 
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out the new system. In the next section, I will illustrate why the implementation was 
delayed at the local level.  
 
2.3 Local Implementation of the Labor Contract System 
 
Local governments' implementation of the labor contract system can be 
divided into two stages. In the 1980s, the initial experimentation was modest while 
after the mid-1990s, the local implementation became wider and deeper. At the 
beginning of reform, the experimentation was largely a top-down process without 
strong supports from local governments. At that time, unemployment was the major 
pressure for local labor bureaus (White 1987, 373). Moreover, grievances of SOE 
managers and workers about the new system also hindered its full implementation. 
Since the mid-1990s, however, further reforms in SOE restructuring gave new impetus 
for local governments to promote labor contracting. Bottom-up supports from local 
governments became more intensive.  
The initial experimentation of the labor contract system encountered much 
local resistance. Neither SOE managers nor workers were happy about the reform. For 
managers, the increased cost of labor management incurred by the new system 
undermined their willingness to implement the new policy. For workers, as White 
points out, the status of contract workers was not as attractive as that of fixed workers 
(1987, 384). In many localities, although the central government had already started to 
reform the heredity system, SOEs still faced strong requests from workers to have 
their children inherit their positions. Some SOEs even needed to establish urban 
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collective enterprises to place their employees' family members.27 The pressure 
against flexibilization was intensive and most SOEs were reluctant to carry out the 
labor contract system.  
The resistance of SOE managers to the reform was particularly serious in some 
less-developed provinces such as Hunan. This is mainly because Hunan is an inland 
province, and growing labor market flexibility was likely to jeopardize enterprises' 
ability to prevent workers from flowing to coastal cities. Compared to fixed workers, 
contract workers were less dependent on their enterprises, and the possibility of their 
mobility to other enterprises was higher. For many SOEs in Hunan, contract workers 
left their factories and went to coastal cities for more profitable jobs once they had 
learned the skills. According to a report from Yiyang Daily on the practice of labor 
contract system in 1987,28 many contract workers left the factories before their 
contracts ended. Yiyang Municipality in Hunan province started to experiment with 
the labor contract system in 1984. In 1986, there were 13 enterprises implementing the 
system and the number of contract workers was about 2,700. Among them, there were 
more than 100 workers leaving their enterprises without any notification beforehand. 
Many of these workers quit their jobs in SOEs and went to coastal cities to do private 
business.29 
                                               
27
 Informant 12. Interview conducted in Beijing on March 09, 2008. 
28
 Yiyang Daily, February 20, 1989. 
29
 One of the reported cases shows how contract workers used various kinds of excuses to escape 
from their factories. A contract worker joined a machine tools factory in Yiyang in 1984. Two years 
later he suddenly disappeared. The manager went to the workers' home and his father responded that the 
worker had left Yiyang already because he was menaced by a bandit. Several months later however, he 
was found doing business in Guangzhou, a coastal city in southern China. 
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In the 1980s, complaints about contact workers' sudden leave were prevalent 
across the country. Many local labor bureaus made policies to regulate workers' 
mobility. For example, in Hunan, several municipalities announced that if a contract 
worker left her job without authorization, she would not receive any job waiting 
insurance or medical compensation. Moreover, labor service companies would not 
provide any employment information to her within two years. However, in practice, 
local labor bureaus still encountered great difficulties to implement these regulations. 
In Changde municipality in Hunan, the total job waiting people in 1986 were about 
200, but there were more than 3,000 people applying for jobs in the following year. 
The discrepancy between these two numbers shows that many of the latter were 
actually contract workers leaving their original employers without notification and 
then applying for a second job. This is why the number of people applying for jobs 
was much higher than that of job waiting people.30 Since many SOEs did not report 
missing contract workers to the Municipal Labor Bureau,31 the Labor Bureau did not 
have any information about who these missing contract workers were, and thus it was 
impossible to implement the aforementioned regulations to penalize them. Moreover, 
even if SOEs found that they had hired missing contract workers from other 
enterprises, the Labor Bureau usually tolerated these workers, given that they had 
worked in the new SOEs for a while.32 Therefore, for enterprises, while the labor 
contract system enhanced the autonomy of their labor use, it also raised the cost of 
managing these laborers.  
                                               
30
 Binhu Daily, May 26, 1988. 
31
 Enterprises did not want to spend time and resources in finding out these missing workers. 
32
 Informant 13. Interview conducted in Yiyang in Hunan province, May 16, 2008.  
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On the other hand, in the 1980s, for most SOE workers, being hired by the old 
system was more appealing than by contracting. The socialist system used to have a 
slogan that fixed workers were the “host” of SOEs. For those who grew up in the iron-
rice-bowl system, they regarded contract workers as an inferior status, even if 
reformers had made efforts to persuade them that there was no difference between the 
two. In practice, many contract workers reported that they were often being 
discriminated by SOE managers. A female manufacturing worker in a mechanics 
factory in Beijing reported that her manager sued her for making fake stories to take a 
sick day off when her eyes was truly wounded on the job. She mentioned that this was 
exactly the reason why she only stayed in the factory for one year and then quit the 
factory without notification.33 For many SOE workers, they did not want to stay as 
contract workers. If they did, they usually wished to be “promoted” to the status of 
fixed workers later.  
This resistance to the labor contract system complicated the process of local 
experimentation but did not stop the reform. As discussed, the grievances of SOE 
managers were very serious in Hunan as SOEs in the province encountered significant 
cost regarding labor management. However, the magnitude of implementing the labor 
contract system in Hunan was still greater than many other provincial-level regions 
including Beijing, where the cost of preventing contract workers from leaving for 
coastal regions was lower because Beijing was a coastal city. As Figure 2.2 shows, in 
the early 1990s, the percentage ratio of SOE contract workers to total employees in 
Hunan was higher than that in Beijing. While there were no data on the number of 
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 Beijing Daily, October 19, 1988. 
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contract workers before the early 1990s, the number in the year of 1992 shows that the 
reform in Hunan was deeper than the national average, given that the ratio of contract 
workers in Hunan (22%) was higher than the national ratio (19%). This reveals that 
strong social resistance did not necessarily impede local governments' continuation of 
the experiment. In fact, the Hunan government made more efforts to implement the 
system. Beijing, on the other hand, did not make as much effort to carry out the reform 
as Hunan did until 1995 when the Labor Law was promulgated.  
 
Figure 2.2 The Percentage Ratio of SOE Contract Workers to Total Workers in 
Beijing and Hunan, 1992-1997 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks, various years. 
 
From Figure 2.2, we also see that the implementation of the labor contract 
system had become more effective from the year 1994 as the total ratio of contract 
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workers grew quickly from then. In fact, the labor contract system was largely 
facilitated by the Chinese government's agenda to liberalize the state sector. Before the 
SOE restructuring, SOEs were work units providing comprehensive social welfare to 
their employees. The work-unit-based welfare system under the planned economy 
placed an enormous financial burden on SOEs and reduced their competitiveness. 
Many SOEs facing financial difficulties were unable to perform their welfare function 
and meet their social insurance commitments. In the 1990s, the Chinese government 
urged SOEs to change from their multifunctional roles as producers, regulators, and 
redistributors to be clearly focused on their economic roles (Smart and Smart 2001, 
1855). The SOE reform gave new impetus for enterprises and local governments to 
promote labor contracting, because implementing the labor contract system helped 
flexibilize the workforce in the state sector. Moreover, contract workers were 
generally more productive and could stimulate more economic growth for enterprises.  
In addition to the increased flexibility in the state sector, the 1990s also saw a 
diversification of labor relations. Employment in SOEs gradually declined while the 
share of employment in private and foreign-invested enterprises doubled. As labor 
relations increasingly diversified, different kinds of labor contracts were widely used 
in the labor market. However, at that time, there were no governmental documents 
recognizing the varieties of labor contracts. In February 1992, the Ministry of Labor 
announced the “Notice on Expanding the Experiment of Labor Contract System in All 
Workers”, and it was the first national document differentiating labor contracts into 
three categories: non-fixed-term labor contract, fixed-term labor contract, and labor 
contract with time limits for the completion of a specific task. 
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While the 1992 Notice introduced the three kinds of labor contracts, it did not 
specify the conditions under which a particular kind of contract was supposed to be 
signed. The 1994 Labor Law is the first document explicitly stating this condition. The 
Law stipulates that an employer needs to sign a non-fixed-term labor contract with 
employees who have worked continuously for more than ten years (LL Article 20). In 
the “Notice of the Ministry of Labor on Implementing the Labor Contract System 
Nationwide” (issued on August 24 in 1994 right after the Labor Law), the government 
added new rules that when an employee is going to retire within ten years, a non-
fixed-term labor contract should be concluded.  
The 1994 Notice clearly stats that the 1994 Labor Law is the conclusion of all 
the previous experiments conducted in the 1980s. In addition to local experimentation, 
many ministries of the State Council such as the Ministry of Electronic Industries, the 
Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, the Ministry of Railways, and the China National 
Petroleum Corporation had also implemented the new system in their supervised 
enterprises. The process to experiment with the labor contract system first and to make 
the Labor Law later reveals that in the 1980s and 1990s, policy always comes first, 
and then law follows (Ngok 2008, 48).34 Only those policies that have been 
successfully experimented with would be codified into written laws.  
 
 
 
                                               
34
 The experimentalist style of policy-making can be found in China's making of other policies. For 
example, the introduction of the re-employment service center for SOE laid-off workers also follows 
this experimentalist logic. The policy was a bottom-up innovation from the Shanghai experience (Lee 
and Warner 2004). 
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2.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter describes China's gradual introduction of the labor contract 
system through selecting local test sites for small-scale experimentation. In the 1980s, 
the rising unemployment and low labor productivity led the central government to 
initiate the new policy. To muster support for the reform, the Chinese government 
chose several localities where the unemployment rate was relatively low and economic 
growth was already robust to experiment with the labor contract system. By doing this, 
it included these localities into the stakeholders of the reform. Successful 
experimentation of the new system in these localities served as an advertisement for its 
full implementation.  
The implementation of the labor contract system, however, was still delayed. 
This is because in the 1980s, most SOE managers and workers were against 
contracting. The reform was speeded up in the 1990s when the government launched 
further reforms for SOE restructuring. In order to make SOEs more profitable, 
deregulating the SOE workforce became one of the major tasks. The number of 
contract workers were thus significantly increased. When the system was effectively 
implemented nationwide, the government concluded all the experiments with the 
promulgation of the 1994 Labor Law.   
While the ratio of contract workers rose from the mid-1990s, we find that in 
Figure 2.1, the ratio of contract workers to total workers in 1995 was still under 50%. 
This is because although most SOE workers had transformed their status from fixed 
workers to contract workers in the 1990s, many employees in the non-state sector 
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were not recruited through contracting. In the non-state sector, most enterprises did 
not sign any contracts when hiring their workers. After the labor contract system was 
successfully carried out in the state-sector, the next step of labor policy reform 
centered around restructuring the workforce in non-state enterprises. Chapter Three 
will focus on the process of expanding labor contacting to the non-state sector.  
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Chapter Three 
 
The Expansion of the Labor Contract System to the Non-state Sector: 
A Positive and Negative Case Analysis 
 
The previous chapter examined China's introduction of the labor contract 
system in the 1980s and 1990s to reform the SOE iron-rice bowl system. In that period, 
restructuring SOEs toward market-oriented functions was the first priority on the 
central government's economic agenda. I demonstrated that in the process of 
deregulating the SOE workforce, policy experimentation through decentralization was 
the major tool used to promote flexibilization. In the 2000s, however, when the central 
government initiated a series of policies to expand the labor contract system to 
regulate its non-state sector, the pace of policy change became quicker and the 
gradualist and experimentalist style of policy-making was replaced with larger-scale 
and more expedited reforms. This new policy-making style manifested itself in the 
surprisingly low number of experimental regulations that were applied to the endeavor. 
Moreover, the promulgation of the 2007 Labor Contract Law (Laodong Hetong Fa; 
henceforth LCL) was widely thought of by many businessmen as a sudden move, 
conducted without any appreciable experimentation beforehand. The new rapid policy 
change demonstrated that the central government was eager to regulate the labor 
condition in the non-state sector.  
While the new reform was celebrated for its comprehensive protection of the 
working class, it also gave rise to a variety of controversies both in business and 
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academic communities over its potential negative economic impacts. For instance, 
business leaders in labor-intensive industries worried that the LCL would undermine 
China's comparative advantage in labor costs, and economists warned about 
consequent increase in unemployment. To explain why the voice from the working 
class was more influential than the business community in the labor policy reform in 
the 2000s, this chapter conducts a positive and negative case analysis to illustrate 
under what conditions workers' grievances could have a say in the government's 
policy-making process.  
I find that workers' voice was more influential because there were some 
important bureaucracies in the Chinese governing structure seeing that acting on 
behalf of workers could be beneficial to enhancing their bureaucratic status. The pro-
labor policy aiming at regulating non-state enterprises was set off by two Chinese 
bureaucratic institutions, namely the then Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
(MOLSS) and the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), to take the 
opportunity to regain the portion of their power that had been relinquished under 
marketization since the 1980s. With these bureaucracies wishing for the same policy 
outcome, workers' voice became critical in directing the policy change. On the other 
hand, the lack of strong bureaucracies sharing the same policy preference as the non-
state business community disabled their voice from being powerful in changing the 
pro-labor policy reform.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the background 
of China's regulation of the non-state sector in the 2000s. I argue that while the 
increasing labor unrest has justified the improvement of the labor condition, there is 
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no yardstick for gauging how serious a threat that the unrest has posed to the regime. 
Section two traces the process of how the central government initiated several national 
acts to expand the labor contract system to the non-state sector. This section also 
provides a closer look at these policies and analyzes the skilled-worker-biased 
regulations. In the third section, I examine the incentive structures of the MOLSS and 
the ACFTU and discusses under what conditions the socio-bureaucratic synergy was 
developed between skilled workers and these two labor bureaucracies. The fourth 
section uses non-state entrepreneurs' low political leverage as what Mahoney and 
Goertz call a negative case (2004) to show that there was no strong bureaucracy in the 
government acting on behalf of non-state enterprises to delay or change the direction 
of the pro-labor policy reform. Based on the discussion, I argue that socio-bureaucratic 
synergy was the necessary condition for a social voice to fulfill in order to have a say 
in China's policy-making process. I conclude my paper in the fifth section. 
 
3.1 Background of Regulating the Non-state Sector 
 
As Chapter Two pointed out, the implementation of the labor contract system 
in the state sector successfully liberalized the workforce in China's SOEs. Now, state 
workers are no longer permanent ones but are hired through contracting. In fact, 
China's liberalization of the state labor market is one of the most successful economic 
transitions seen during the reform era. In addition to transforming fixed workers to 
contract ones in the state sector, the relaxed household registration system and the 
socialization of the welfare system also facilitated the flexibilization agenda (Liu 
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2009). In the non-state sector, the employment flexibility is even much higher than in 
SOEs. During the 1990s, most enterprises in the non-state sector did not have any 
trade unions. Managers did not sign any labor contracts with their employees either.  
Without any labor contracts, many workers were not protected by the 1994 
Labor Law. The Law was simply not applicable even to those cases where workers' 
rights were de facto violated. In many situations, even if a worker was hired via 
contracting, his contract might still be invalid. According to the 1994 LL, labor 
contracts are to be concluded in written format, and are to contain the following 
clauses: time limit of the contract, content of the work, labor protection and conditions, 
remunerations, labor disciplines, conditions for the termination of the contract, and 
liabilities for violations of the contract (LL, Article 19). However, in practice, 
managers usually found ways to bypass these rules. According to a lawyer I 
interviewed in Beijing,35 among those cases concerning labor disputes with which he 
dealt before, many labor contracts were unclearly written and lacked certain required 
clauses. For example, one worker signed a contract with her employer, but the contract 
did not specify the job's location. The worker received a notice three months later that 
she was assigned to another branch of the firm located in a different district in Beijing. 
The worker was reluctant to move, because the branch was far away from where she 
lived. However, she was also afraid of being dismissed if she did not accept the 
assignment, given that her contract did not identify a specific job location. In fact, 
many enterprises deliberatively omitted specifying job locations in order to maintain 
flexibility when the need for dismissals arose.  
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 Informant 21. Interview conducted on November 05, 2007. 
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In addition to the prevalent flaws within labor contracts, employees usually 
signed their contracts in a rush, and did not understand the full implications of what 
they were signing. For instance, a worker in a non-state manufacturing enterprise in 
Changsha Municipality (Hunan Province) told me that he was allowed only three 
minutes to peruse and sign his contract, and that it was totally impossible to carefully 
read and understand the details. The worker also complained that he did not receive a 
copy of the contract. The only copy was given to the enterprise.36 In another interview, 
a worker reported that he did not realize that he actually had a contract until he got 
injured on the job. His manager came to him with the contract to deal with the 
compensation issue. Apparently, the contract had not even been signed by the worker. 
The employer had only prepared the contract to avoid possible repercussions from the 
local Labor Bureau's inspectors.37 
In fact, the 1994 LL itself was insufficient for the government to correct labor 
abuse in the non-state sector. First of all, most of the clauses in the 1994 LL regarding 
labor contracts merely focus on contract termination. The inadequacy of the law in 
regulating the process of labor contracting inhibited effective enforcement of the 
system within the non-state sector. The LL also lacks adequate clauses to punish 
employers if they fail to sign contracts with their employees. It does not clarify a 
position regarding invalid contracts either. This left the Labor Bureaus with very few 
weapons to regulate the non-state sector.  
                                               
36
 Informant 31. Interview conducted in Changsha, Hunan on May 21, 2008. 
37
 Informant 22. Interview conducted in Beijing on November 16, 2007. 
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The inadequacy of the LL, however, was not the whole story. While protecting 
the legitimate rights and interests of laborers is included in the 1994 LL, and the law 
does not exclude the non-state sector from the labor contract system, the major 
purpose of the law is still not to regulate the non-state sector but to readjust labor 
relationships and to establish a system accommodative to the market economy (LL, 
Article 1). As one of the retired officials of the Hunan Labor Department said, “having 
all SOEs hire workers through contracting was the major policy (zhuyao zhengce). We 
also paid attention to the non-state sector, but we wanted to make sure that there was 
no problem in SOEs. It's a gradual reform. You cannot make everything successful at 
the same time.”38  
The extreme flexibility of the non-state labor market caused a great amount of 
labor instabilities in China. The problem has become even more serious as the share of 
employment increased within non-state enterprises since the late 1990s. Figure 3.1 
shows that, in urban areas, employment in SOEs substantially declined, while the 
share of employment in non-state enterprises in the mid-2000s doubled from levels in 
the early 1990s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
38
 Informant 36. Interview conducted in Changsha, Hunan on May 15, 2008. 
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Figure 3.1 Urban Employment, by Enterprise Ownership, 1995-2008. 
 
Note: State refers to state-owned enterprises. Private refers to the private sector. 
Foreign refers to foreign-funded enterprises including Hong Kong-, Macao-, and 
Taiwan-funded ones. Joint refers to joint owned, limited corporations, and 
shareholding units.  
Sources: CEIC China Premium Database (Zhongguo Jingji Shujuku) 
 
The widespread use of laborers without any contracts or with very short-term 
ones led to the extremely high degree of numerical flexibility in China's non-state 
labor market. Numerical flexibility refers to “the ease with which the numbers of 
workers employed can be adapted to meet fluctuations in demand or technological 
innovation”. In practice, it includes employers' capacity to lay off employees for 
downsizing and to use new forms of employment, such as part-time and temporary 
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to be dismissed anytime at the will of their enterprises. The degree of job security in 
China's non-state labor market was thus very low.   
The achievement of high numerical flexibility usually sacrifices other types of 
labor market flexibility, especially the functional flexibility, which refers to managers' 
ability to redeploy workers and to move them from one position to another (i.e. 
horizontal and vertical mobility within enterprises), or to change the jobs' content 
through retraining workers (Regini 2000). Since redeployment within a company and 
firm-specific retraining both require long-term employment relations, if the ease of 
dismissing workers is high, firms tend to under-invest in human resource development, 
and employees also do not have strong commitments and attachments to a single 
company.  
As a matter of fact, firms' adoption of functional flexibility was much rarer 
than that of numerical flexibility in China. Some studies find that many enterprises 
thought that the most effective and productive way to organize workers was to 
promote the rule of “fixed person and fixed post” (dingyuan dinggang), namely 
dividing assembly processes into separate sections and attaching each employee to a 
specific task (Liu 2009). Most workers did not have multiple skills, and job rotations 
were not common in China. Because the use of workers could be very flexible, 
enterprises did not have incentives to provide vocational training to their workers.39  
While numerical flexibilization facilitated the liberalization of China's socialist 
system, the low degree of employment security and the increasing number of 
temporary and atypical workers as well as informal employment instabilized the labor 
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 Informant 48. Interview conducted in Guangzhou, Guangdong on June 13, 2008. 
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relations in many enterprises. Moreover, in the non-state sector, other problems such 
as wages falling into arrears and the withholding of employees' social insurance 
payments were also prevalent. The problem of wages arrears jumped to prominence 
when a female migrant worker, Xong Deming, stopped Premier Wen Jiabao when he 
was on his way to visit Chongqing Municipality in 2003, as mentioned in Chapter One.  
In addition to wage withholding, the decline of labor contract length, coupled 
with excessive work hours, also revealed a worsening scenario of labor conditions. In 
the 2000s, the number of labor disputes in the non-state sector skyrocketed. According 
to the Beijing Labor Dispute Arbitration Committee, among the 40,523 cases received 
by the Committees at all levels within Beijing from January to June in 2009, those 
concerning non-state workers constituted 88% of the total cases, while the disputes 
involving SOEs and collective enterprises were 5%.40 Nationwide, as Figure 3.2 
shows, the total number of labor dispute cases accepted by the Labor Dispute 
Arbitration Committees at all levels of the Chinese government has increased as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
40
 See “The Analysis of the Task of Labor Dispute Arbitration of January to June of 2009”. 
http://www.ldbzfx.org/show.asp?articleid=493 
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Figure 3.2 The Number of Labor Dispute Cases Accepted by the Labor Dispute 
Arbitration Committee, 2002-2008.  
 
Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbooks, 1999-2009.  
 
According to the Figure, among these cases, wage arrears were a serious 
problem (as the long dash line indicates). Many disputes arose when enterprises went 
broke and did not pay any economic compensation to their former employees. For 
example, Guidong County in Hunan Province, facing the financial crisis in 2008, saw 
many construction and processing (lailiao jiagong) industries either stop their 
production or go bankrupt. A knitting and garment factory only paid one month salary 
to their workers, and went bankrupt after three months, which resulted in defaulting on 
the payment of RMB 45,700 to forty workers.41 In addition, issues related to change, 
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 See the official website of the Hunan Labor Department. 
http://ldt.hunan.gov.cn/pub/govweb/gzdt/2010/hn10/t20100529_54426.htm 
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relief, or termination of labor contracts were also a constant cause of labor disputes (as 
the short dash line in the Figure shows). Many employers were unwilling to prepare 
non-fixed-term contracts when they had to. Others did not negotiate with their 
employers before changing the content of labor contracts.  
While some workers went to the local Labor Dispute Arbitration Committee to 
deal with their disputes, many others chose to petition the local People's Congress or 
the Labor Bureau. At the same time, strikes also erupted in many labor-intensive 
manufacturing factories. For example, in April 2009, workers in Wintek Corporation 
(Shenghua Keji), a Taiwan-funded LCD (liquid crystal display) manufacturing 
company, went on strike when they found the earning for their overtime work on the 
payment sheet was reduced from double to one and half of the normal salary. This 
lighted the fuse for the protest against the company's wage adjustment without any 
notification beforehand. These disputes indicate that, while flexible firing practices 
generated a large amount of economic growth, the unregulated labor relation in the 
non-state sector has reduced the stability of labor relations.  
However, even though labor disputes have been reported as increasing in the 
2000s, there were no yardsticks for gauging how serious a threat they have posed to 
the regime (Tanner 2004). Unlike SOE workers in the 1990s who targeted the 
government to stop the flexibilization of job security rules, the current protests sparked 
by non-state workers in the 2000s focused more on fighting against their enterprises 
than criticizing the government. For most non-state workers, “the enterprise was the 
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one to blame.”42 In most cases, these protests did not escalate to a degree where the 
government was regarded by workers as the cause of their miseries. Many workers 
kept their eyes on the wrongdoings of their managers, and did not accuse the 
government of failing to correct the business community. This claim was echoed by 
the Chinese academia. In June 2010, after a series of workers suicides in Foxconn's 
factories in Shenzhen, many Chinese scholars collectively blasted Foxconn and 
launched several petitions against the company.  
Given that the Chinese government was not the target, it could somehow stay 
away from the criticisms of most protests organized by non-state workers against their 
enterprises. Workers' grievances found in the Chinese society might be serious, but the 
mere existence of these disputes did not amount to real threats to the regime survival. 
That being said, workers' complaints were not totally absent from the policy-making 
process. As will be demonstrated in the following discussion, while labor instability 
did not inflict vital damages on the Chinese government, they gave the officials in 
charge of labor affairs an opportunity to initiate policies for better protection of 
laborers' legitimate rights. In the 2000s, labor officials in the Chinese government 
launched several programs to facilitate the regulation of the non-state sector. Next 
section illustrates how these officials promoted the expansion of the labor contract 
system to the non-state sector.  
 
 
 
                                               
42
 Informant 43. Interview conducted in Guangzhou, Guangdong on June 07, 2008.  
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3.2 Steps for Regulating the Non-state Sector  
 
Without adequate regulations, the Chinese labor bureaucracies lacked tools to 
correct the deteriorating labor condition in the non-state sector. Starting from the late 
1990s, these bureaucracies began to make specific and detailed regulations to facilitate 
the labor contract system in the non-state sector. The first target was town and village 
enterprises (TVEs). In June 1996, the then Ministry of Labor (MOL)43 and the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) together announced the “Notice of Implementation of 
the Labor Contract System in TVEs.” The Notice states that one of the goals in 
promoting the labor contact system is to stabilize labor relations in these enterprises. It 
asks all the key enterprises within the collective sector to implement the labor contract 
system by the end of 1996. Those who are not on the list of key enterprises also have 
to foster an environment for implementing the system.  
At that time, private enterprises had even less satisfying records of 
implementing the labor contract system than collective-owned enterprises.44 In May of 
1996, the MOL, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), and the 
                                               
43
 The Ministry of Labor was the predecessor of the MOLSS. In 1998, the State Council launched the 
Government Restructuring Program and abolished fifteen ministries including the MOL. At the same 
time, four new ministries were established including the MOLSS. This restructuring reduced the 
number of ministries in the State Council from forty to twenty-nine. In 2008, the MOLSS was merged 
with the Ministry of Personnel. The new ministry was named the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security. See the official website of the Central People's Government of the PRC. 
http://www.gov.cn/test/2009-01/16/content_1207000.htm 
44
 Collective enterprises exist in both urban and rural areas. The term “collective-owned” means that the 
assets of these enterprises are de jure collectively owned by the people of a given locality. These 
enterprises are different from state-owned enterprises, which are de jure owned by all the Chinese 
people.  
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China Enterprise Confederation (CEC)45 jointly announced the “Notice of 
Implementation of the Labor Contract System in All Private Enterprises and 
Individual Industrial and Commercial Households.” This Notice obligates all levels of 
the CEC to help advertise the labor contract system. It does not, however, set up any 
deadline for full implementation of the system. Together these two Notices were 
promulgated as part of the central government's campaign for the expansion of the 
labor contract system to the non-state sector. However, these documents were only 
policy suggestions and not binding regulations, and there were no significant follow-
up administrative campaigns to promote them in the late 1990s.  
Regulating the non-state sector became a major issue for the central 
government in the early 2000s. Several policies were initiated to support the expansion 
of the labor contract system to the non-state sector. In the reform process, the first step 
was to force all employers to sign individual labor contracts with their workers. The 
then Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) made efforts into inspecting 
enterprises' actual contracting procedures. Official records show that the number of 
enterprises being inspected by the MOLSS has been increased year by year since 2002 
(See Table 3.1). Moreover, as Table 3.1 indicates, the MOLSS also successfully 
helped some workers to sign labor contracts with their employers. In 2007, there were 
more than 1,500 contracts signed after enterprises were inspected.  
 
 
                                               
45
 The China Enterprise Confederation along with the China Enterprise Directors Association are two 
mass-representative organizations for Chinese non-state entrepreneurs. The All China Federation of 
Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) is another mass-representative organization for the non-state sector. 
The role of the ACFIC will be discussed in Section 3.4.  
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Table 3.1 Labor Inspection by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
 
Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbooks, various years.  
 
The implementation of the labor contract system was also facilitated by several 
administrative programs. In order to help the labor contracting process, the MOLSS 
publicized several standardized or “boiler-plated” types of labor contracts for 
enterprises to follow. In addition to the MOLSS, China's single official trade union, 
namely the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), also actively participated 
in the process of promoting the labor contract system in the non-state sector. In March 
2006, a “Three-year Action Program of the Labor Contract System” was initiated by 
the national tripartite meeting for coordinating labor relations. The national tripartite 
mechanism, consisting of the MOLSS, the ACFTU, and the China Enterprise 
Confederation/China Enterprise Directors Association, was formally set up in August 
2001 and consistently an advocate of improving labor conditions in the non-state 
sector. The major theme of the 2006 Program was to achieve a 100% of labor-contract 
usage from 2006 to 2008 in all kinds of enterprises. 
The resolution to achieve full percentage of labor hires via contracting was 
further brought to light when the campaigns of organizing trade unions in the non-state 
sector and making a labor contract law were launched. The former set up the 
Employing Units Inspected Laborers Involved Number of Labor Contracts signed for Inspection
(10,000 households) (10,000 persons) (10,000 persons)
2002 98.4 7171.5 730.9
2003 110.7 7987.4 895
2004 115.2 8162.7 1102.9
2005 118.5 9161.3 1127.6
2006 141.3 9198.3 1243.4
2007 160.2 9869.7 1652.5
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foundation for a collective contracting system, while the latter provided the Chinese 
government with stronger tools to inspect the labor market. Through these two 
programs, the Chinese government extended the rights under the labor contract system 
(and protected by the 1994 LL) that were already enjoyed by most SOE workers to 
those employed in the non-state sector.  
 
3.2.1 Organizing Trade Unions in the Non-state Sector  
 
The campaign for organizing trade unions in the non-state became a prominent 
issue for the ACFTU in the late 1990s. Before that, the ACFTU did not have firm-
level trade unions established in most non-state enterprises. This policy was publicly 
announced in a national conference held by the ACFTU in 1999 in Ningbo 
Municipality (Zhejian Province). The slogan was “where there is a worker, there 
should be a trade union.” The conference set up a goal to establish local branches of 
the ACFTU in 80% of the “newly established enterprises” (xinjian qiye), namely the 
non-state sector. This desire was also clearly illustrated in the 2001 Trade Union Law 
(TUL). As the Law states, any enterprises with 25 or more members shall establish 
grassroots trade unions (Article 10).  
To implement the campaign, the ACFTU assigned quotas to local Federations 
of Trade Unions at all levels in the Chinese administrative system.46 The formal 
procedure to organize a firm-level union was as follows. First, a preparation group of 
                                               
46
 According to the 1992 Trade Union Law, the ACFTU operates uniformly at the national level. A 
locality at county level or above establishes a local Federation of Trade Unions. Several enterprises 
operating in the same industry, or in industries of a similar nature, may establish a national or local 
specific-industry Federation of Trade Unions.  
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three to five people was set up to take charge of organizing a union. The upper-level 
Federation of Trade Unions should approve the preparation group's request to organize 
the union within three days. Second, the preparation group was responsible for 
advising the union to all employees and for recruiting as many members as possible. 
Third, all the members were divided into several subgroups within the union. A 
subgroup usually had seven to twenty people, and the leader was elected by its 
members. Fourth, a trade union representative assembly was held to select members of 
various trade union committees and the fund inspection committee.47 
Establishing the ACFTU branches at the firm level met with violent resistance 
from employers. Some managers complained that “we actually do not see it is 
necessary to have our workers unionized. We are abiding by all the government labor 
regulations. Our workers are fully protected. Why do they need a union?”48 Right after 
the revised TUL was promulgated in 2001, the ACFTU recognized that there were 
“three difficulties” (san nan), namely the difficulties to organize unions, to protect 
workers' rights and to collect fees for union activities, down the road to implement the 
Law.49 To combat enterprises' resistance, the ACFTU linked the campaign for 
organizing unions with the goal of defending workers' rights. Moreover, the ACFTU 
deliberately selected large foreign-owned enterprises as the target to implement the 
campaign. Focusing on foreign companies evoked Chinese people's nationalist 
sentiments (Gallagher 2002) and helped legitimize the movement. On July 29, 2006, 
Wal-mart established its first trade union in China in Quanzhou (Fujian Province) 
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 Informant 30. Interview conducted in Tianjin on March 25, 2008. 
48
 Informant 24. Interview conducted in Beijing on November 23, 2007. 
49
 Renmin Ribao, September 22, 2004, page 13. 
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under the Chinese government's pressure. By the end of 2006, the Director of the 
ACFTU's Grassroots Organization Department, Guo Wencai, announced that there 
were about 6,000 of Wal-mart's 30,000 employees in China who were already union 
members. In general, the ACFTU was successful in formally establishing grassroots 
unions in many non-state enterprises.  
 
3.2.2 The Making of the Labor Contract Law 
 
Improving government regulations to implement the labor contract system was 
another major approach toward regulating the non-state sector. As discussed, the 1994 
LL helped achieve the goal of deregulating the SOE workforce, but there were severe 
deficiencies in the Law as it attempted to regulate the labor condition in the non-state 
sector. According to an interview with an official in the Legislative Affairs Office of 
the State Council, it was considered a matter of fact that right after the 1994 LL was 
enacted, the Labor Ministry began to mull over the possibility of making a law 
specifically regarding labor contracts. The drafting process, however, was 
subsequently discontinued, because then Premier Zhu Rongji viewed the SOE 
restructuring as the top priority on the government's economic reform agenda, and a 
law that might create additional complications in the industrial relationships was 
apparently an impediment for the government when dealing with layoff issues.50  
The legislation process of the Labor Contract Law was first initiated by the 
MOLSS in the early 2000s. A limited number of academic experts formally 
                                               
50
 Informant 1. Interview conducted in Beijing on March 15, 2008. 
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participated in the drafting process (Gallagher and Dong 2009). In 2004, the ACFTU 
joined the group to collectively propose the first draft of the LCL to the State Council 
(Jiang 2007). The principle of the first draft of the LCL was passed by the Standing 
Conference of the State Council led by Premier Wen Jiabao in October 2005, and was 
then put on the agenda of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
(SCNPC) on December 24, 2005. The SCNPC immediately conducted a 
comprehensive investigation of the implementation of the 1994 LL at the grassroots 
level. The focus of the investigation was to know the rate of contract usage within all 
kinds of enterprises. The results were, not surprisingly, extremely unsatisfactory. As 
Zhang Shichen, the Vice-director of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the 
Working and Administrative Bodies of the SCNPC, said, “SCNPC's investigation 
directly led to the promulgation of the LCL.”51  
The SCNPC worked closely with the MOLSS and the ACFTU in the 
investigation. In fact, the Chairman of the ACFTU, Wang Zhaoguo, is one of the 
Vice-chairs of the SCNPC. Many members on the SCNPC have good relations with 
the MOLSS. One of the then Vice-ministers of the MOLSS, Hua Fuzhou, had worked 
for the SCNPC before being promoted to the position in August 2003.52 The MOLSS 
and the ACFTU had critical impacts on how the law was discussed on the SCNPC. 
Later more actors were included in the process. In March 2006, the SCNPC released 
the first publicized draft, and this draft was recognized as the only fifth law in the 
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 Sina Finance News, December 27, 2007. http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20071227/22104344693.shtml. 
52
 According to the Organic Law of the NPC, members on the SCNPC are not eligible to serve as 
officials in the administrative branch (Article 23). But some of them have promising political careers to 
be promoted to the State Council. Hua Fuzhou is one of the cases. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-08/27/content_1047441.htm 
88 
Chinese history that openly sought out public opinions. In total, it received more than 
190,000 instances of public feedback. Not every opinion from the feedback was useful 
for the legislation, however. As my interviewee released, “some of the pieces were 
only complaints or trying to tease the government.”53 
The making of the LCL was different from that of many other Chinese laws in 
the sense that the degree of “departmental legislation” (bumen lifa) was less serious in 
the process. In China, many government regulations only reflected the interests of 
those who initiated them. They were used to confirm the results of experiments and to 
codify the existing policies (Ngok 2008, 49). But in the making of the LCL, several 
articles in the draft fell under intensive debate. The inclusion of controversial “hot 
points” in the law-making process deviated from China's conventional decision-
making trajectory, wherein drafters tended to exclude contentious policies from a law. 
According to my interview with a member on the SCNPC,54 the LCL was one of the 
most eye-catching laws during SCNPC's discussion sessions. The interviewee pointed 
out that when the SCNPC was discussing other laws, only those who were specializing 
in those laws would be interested in the discussion. In the case of the LCL, however, 
almost every representative was motivated to share his or her own thoughts.  
Before the final version was unanimously passed by the SCNPC in June 2007, 
there was one draft for public consultation and three drafts for SCNPC's internal 
discussion.55 Some researchers find that the controversial and polarized drafting 
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 Informant 1. Interview conducted in Beijing on March 15, 2008. 
54
 Informant 2. Interview conducted in Beijing on April 10, 2008. 
55
 The three LCL drafts for SCNPC's internal use were not made public until the final version was 
promulgated. For these drafts, see Appendix in Chang Kai ed., The Legislation of the Labor Contract 
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process of the LCL represented conflicting viewpoints from various “pro-worker” and 
“pro-business” lobbying groups, and the outcome witnessed a compromise between 
them (Cooney et al. 2008, 788; Gallagher and Dong 2009). For the pro-business voice, 
some economists were worried that the new reform to promote workers' rights, 
especially the making of the 2007 LCL, would damage the sustainability of China's 
economic growth. For example, Wuchang Zhang claimed that “the LCL is made for 
lazy people.” Being the major loser of the 2007 LCL, many non-state enterprises 
cultivated discourses to legitimize their resistance. Some of them directly criticized the 
quick pace of the policy-making and argued that the passage of the LCL ran against 
the long experimentalist tradition in China. During the annual meeting of the NPC in 
March 2008, one representative from Guangdong Province, Li Shuguang, openly 
suggested to experiment the LCL at local sites before its national implementation. As 
Li stated, “The implementation of the LCL could be beneficial to employees. I don't 
think the law is overly pro-employee though. However, to promote such an important 
law as the LCL, we should consider to experiment on it in some localities first... Is the 
LCL suitable for China's current situation? The central government should be more 
cautious.”56 This comment was echoed by a lampoon made by Chen Ping of Peking 
University that the LCL obviously violated the experimentalist tradition that had 
brought China both prosperity and stability. “The most successful story of our 
economic reform is experimentalism. But now, we want to implement the LCL 
                                                                                                                                       
Law (Laodong Hetong Lifang). Beijing: China Labor and Social Security Publishing House, 2008, pp. 
301-366. 
56
 See China Social Security. http://www.cnss.cn/xwzx/zl2/ldhtf/rdjj/200803/t20080303_179475.html. 
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without any experimentation. This violates our most important experience. It is 
nothing but an imitation of Western failed welfare state,” said by Chen Ping.57 
The debates involved not only a range of Chinese actors, but also international 
business lobbyists. In fact, foreign enterprise associations such as the American 
Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Shanghai and the US-China Business Council 
were among the most outspoken agencies. The AmCham, for example, petitioned the 
government to revoke the new rule about dismissal procedures. It argued that the 
improvements designed to protect workers from arbitrary firings would significantly 
raise labor costs for employers. At a time when the appreciation of the RMB has 
already discouraged the development of export-oriented enterprises in China, 
especially labor-intensive firms, the LCL would adversely impact China's economic 
growth (Chen and Funke 2008).  
While the line of the LCL was pro-worker, the policy-makers were not totally 
reluctant to compromise with pro-business voices as long as they did not run against 
the general direction of regulating the labor condition in the non-stat sector. For 
example, as far as the use of labor dispatch arrangements (laowu paiqian) was 
concerned, Article 12 of the first draft asked labor dispatching agencies to deposit at 
least RMB 5,000 into a bank account designated by a local labor administrative 
department for every employee dispatched. Moreover, it also stipulated that when an 
one-year contract with a dispatched employee ended, the employer would have to hire 
the employee directly. If not, the employer would not be allowed to use a labor 
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 See Research Seminar on the 2008 Session of the NPC and the People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), held by the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) at Peking University 
on March 20, 2008. http://finance.jrj.com.cn/news/2008-03-20/000003432093.html. 
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dispatching agency to hire a different person for the same position (Article 40 of the 
first LCL draft). Many enterprises strongly opposed these articles, alleging that it 
diluted both managers' discretion and flexible employment. For example, the US-
China Business Council openly issued its comments against these articles.58 However, 
the second draft (drawn up in December 2006 for SCNPC's internal deliberation) still 
kept the clause that, when a labor contract with a dispatched employee ends, the 
employer must renew the contract (Article 57 of the second LCL draft). These rigid 
regulations on labor dispatch arrangements were not removed until the third draft, 
which was drawn up in April 2007 for SCNPC's internal use.  
Overall, the pro-worker and pro-business voices were asymmetrical in the law-
making process. The pro-business group was powerless in altering the pro-labor policy 
direction. Its weak political leverage could be illustrated by the debate related to one 
of the most controversial clauses of the LCL, that is, the non-fixed-term contracts 
(wuguding qixian hetong). A non-fixed-term labor contract refers to the type of 
contract in which employers and employees stipulate no certain termination date. In 
other words, the term is indefinite and the contract can only be ended for cause. In 
comparison with the 1994 LL, the 2007 LCL significantly lowers the threshold for 
making a non-fixed-term labor contract. Under the 1994 LL, a contract without a fixed 
term can only be requested after an employee has worked continuously for the same 
employer for ten full years (Article 20). But in the 2007 LCL, in addition to keeping 
this rule, the LCL has another provision stating that a labor contract without a fixed 
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 US-China Business Council, “Comments on the Draft Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic 
of China,” March 20, 2006. http://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2006/04/uscbc-comments-labor-
law.pdf 
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term shall be offered to a worker after two fixed-term contracts have been concluded 
consecutively (Article 14). The LCL substantially promotes the use of non-fixed-term 
contracts.  
Almost the entire business community ranging from foreign-invested to 
domestic private firms openly opposed the rule when it was under deliberation in the 
SCNPC. For them, non-fixed-term contracts amounted to the return of “iron-rice 
bowls”. As one manager said, “they are an amulet for workers because we almost have 
no discretion to dismiss them.”59 In August 2007, Zhang Shicheng, the Vice-director 
of the Administrative Law Office of the SCNPC, made a comment which again 
heightened the managers' concern. He said, “The new Labor Contract Law helps 
workers to regain their iron-rice bowls, because it provides detailed regulations on 
non-fixed-term labor contracts.”60 This aroused another round of criticisms from the 
business community. Several months later in November 2007, Zhang Shicheng had to 
rephrase his old comment and rejected the equation of non-fixed-term contracts with 
the old system.61 Ultimately, the clauses about non-fixed term contracts were not 
changed in the final version.  
Other articles also demonstrate that the policy-makers put more emphasis on 
protecting workers. When the third draft of the LCL was on SCNPC's agenda in April 
2007, the law makers added a new clause to require employers to construct worker 
recruitment lists when an employment relationship is established (Article 7 of the third 
LCL draft). This new rule was a reaction to a serious coal mine accident in Shanxi 
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Province in early 2007, wherein the employers concealed the death toll. This reveals 
that sometimes the Chinese government would use regulations as a response to critical 
social events. As a Chinese lawyer said, “China's law-making process contains many 
contingencies. A broadcast social event might have a great impact on the content of a 
law.”62 
The LCL making process shows that the Chinese government was willing to 
take into consideration social grievances. Nowadays, many Chinese bureaucracies are 
not necessarily opposed to listening to societal voices. When conducting my field 
research in China in 2008, I observed that the central government had sent many low-
level officials, especially those technocrats, to various occasions to get feedback on its 
policies. These occasions include workshops in many universities in Beijing and other 
provinces, which usually attracted not only college students but also ordinary citizens. 
Many citizens who attended these meetings, however, did not see that the government 
was responsive to their needs. In a workshop I attended at Tsinghua University in 
Beijing where the speaker was an official of the Legislative Affairs Office of the State 
Council, a male worker stood up at the Q and A session to voice his disappointment 
that the LCL did not reflect the needs of most migrant workers. “I think I don't really 
need to be on a job for a long time. I'm pretty mobile. I'm more worried about 
insurance though. I want to have an insurance that can cover me wherever I move. But 
right now if I sign a labor contract, I myself need to deposit part of my salary into 
various insurance funds here. The problem is that if I move to other provinces or even 
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other cities, I cannot bring this money with me. I think the government just doesn't 
know what the real situation is.”63 
The reason why the government was still unable to be aware of many real 
grievances was that societal voices could not represent themselves in the policy-
making process. While social actors were allowed to express their opinions, they did 
not have any votes in shaping the direction of policy changes. Societal voices were 
generally not the major force in China's policy-making, especially at the stage of 
policy initiation. In the following discussion, I will illustrate that the current labor 
policy reform to protect workers' rights in the 2000s actually centered its efforts 
around promoting skilled workers' job security. The skilled-worker-biased regulations 
were put on the government's agenda because the reform were initiated by the MOLSS 
and the ACFTU for the purpose to enhance their bureaucratic power. The major goal 
was not to respond to workers' grievances but to enable the two bureaucracies in 
regulating the non-state labor market.   
 
3.2.3 Protecting Insiders or Outsiders?  
 
The 2007 LCL provides more comprehensive and stringent protection of 
workers than the 1994 LL. In addition to ensuring that every worker had a written 
contract with detailed terms of employment, the MOLSS also urged the business 
community to standardize the content of labor contracts. It asked all provinces to draft 
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boiler-plated copies of contracts for different industries to follow.64 A labor contract 
should contain the length of employment, working time, wages, and terms for changes, 
renewal, and termination of the contract. In most provinces' standardized copies for 
hiring urban workers, social security benefits such as insurance for work-related 
injuries, pension, and medical insurance were included. Some provinces also prepared 
contracts specific to short-term workers or migrants, and the rules about social 
insurance were generally different from those in urban workers' contracts. For 
example, Tianjin Municipality announced the “Labor Contract for Enterprises to 
Employ Migrant Workers”, and the Contract did not require the submission of pension 
for migrant workers. 
Among the biggest changes of the reform were the new termination provisions. 
The LCL significantly increased the degree of job security. According to the Doing 
Business report, in 2009, compared to the difficulty of hiring (which scored at 11) and 
the rigidity of hours (which scored at 33), China's redundancy difficulty was 
particularly high (which scored at 50). The overall high rigidity of its labor market 
regulation was mainly caused by the difficulty of terminating a labor contract. 
Job security is guaranteed by several clauses in the LCL. First, the Law 
prohibits the illegal use of temporary workers without any written contracts. Every 
temporary worker should be hired through contracting and there is no distinction 
between contract workers and temporary workers. Second, any extensions of 
probation periods are subject to penalties. This new rule aims to prevent managers 
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from arbitrarily dismissing workers without any compensation. Third, in order to 
combat the decline of contract length in practice, the LCL encourages the use of non-
fixed-term contracts and urges against any short-term ones. On the one hand, 
employers need to pay economic compensation when a fixed-term labor contract 
expires if they do not renew it with the worker, which makes the use of short-term 
contracts less cost-efficient. On the other hand, the LCL no longer allows the use of 
series of fixed-term contracts as the 1994 LL does. According to the LCL, a labor 
contract without a fixed term shall be offered to a worker after two fixed-term 
contracts have been concluded consecutively. Moreover, there exists a retraining or 
reassignment obligation before an employer can make a worker redundant. For group 
redundancy dismissals, an enterprise needs to inform the trade union or all the 
employees within thirty days and to report to the local labor bureau where the 
enterprise is located. 
These rigid termination provisions, however, only protect core skilled workers' 
jobs, and are not useful in reducing much of the numerical flexibility practice among 
low-level unskilled workers. Employing Lindbeck and Snower's concept (2002), I use  
insiders and outsiders to describe these two types of workers. By inside workers, I 
mean those incumbent employees with medium-level skills or above. They usually 
occupy core positions in the company. In comparison, outsider groups include those in 
the periphery positions with low skills, the unemployed, the new entrants to the labor 
market such as the youth, and those working in the informal economic sector.  
In China, the percentage of inside workers, namely those with medium-level 
skills or above, is extremely low in the labor market. According to China's 2004 
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Economic Census65, the percentage of workers that are at least medium-skilled is only 
9.05%. If we count the number of workers with senior, medium and junior 
professional titles, we find that the percentage of skilled workers is slightly higher at 
19.57%. But still, a vast majority of workers are unskilled in China's labor market. As 
a human resources manager told me, in some industries, such as the construction 
industry, almost 90% of employees were in peripheral positions.66 Table 3.2 and 3.3 
show the official data from the 2004 Economic Census.  
 
Table 3.2 Number of Workers by Technical Level, Unit: 10000 Persons 
 
Source: The 2004 China Economic Census 
 
Table 3.3 Number of Workers by Professional Title, Unit: 10000 Persons 
 
Source: The 2004 China Economic Census 
 
In reality, many Chinese enterprises have increasingly adopted the Japanese 
style of employment, that is, high functional and temporal flexibility for a core group 
of permanent and skilled employees and extreme numerical and wage flexibility for 
the large periphery of temporary and contingent jobs. To circumvent the regulation on 
non-fixed-term contracts, many enterprises chose to dismiss unskilled workers before 
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Number of Technical level Number of workers The percentage of workers
all workers Senior Technician Senior Medium with medium with medium skills or above
technician skilled skilled skills or above in the labor market
National total 21261.66 51.73 162.93 618.13 1090.98 1923.77 9.05%
Number of Professional level Number of  The percentage of 
all workers Workers Workers Workers workers with workers with
with senior with medium with junior professional professional titles 
professional title professional title professional title titles in the labor market
National total 21261.66 398.66 1535.36 2226.68 4160.7 19.57%
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the conclusion of two fixed-term contracts. Several newspapers reported that before 
the LCL was enacted in 2008, many managers forced their workers to resign their 
posts first, and then rehired them as new employees. This action was aimed to suspend 
the seniority of their workers in the enterprise.  
Moreover, many companies also took advantage of labor dispatch practices 
that are permitted in the LCL to recruit lower-level workers. The LCL grants 
enterprises the right to use dispatched workers for “temporary, auxiliary or substitute 
job positions” (Article 66). Workers under labor dispatch arrangements are not hired 
by the enterprises they work for, but by labor dispatching agencies. These agencies are 
responsible for matching up employees with employers who need them, and paying 
employment benefits for these workers. The major benefit for enterprises to hire 
workers through labor dispatch agencies is that enterprises only use these workers but 
are not the one who signs their labor contracts. 
A widely-reported case, Huawei, reveals how companies adopted this strategy 
to keep lower-level workers flexible. Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd., headquartered in 
Guangdong, is the largest non-state-owned telecommunications equipment supplier in 
China. To dodge issuing non-fixed-term contracts, the company announced a new 
policy named “Transforming All Temporary Workers to Dispatched Workers” by the 
eve of the effective date of the LCL. According to this policy, all temporary workers 
had to sign contracts with the Chengchuang Labor Dispatching Agency, and hence to 
change their working status from temporary workers of the company to dispatched 
laborers of the dispatching agency. By doing so, these workers' seniority was forfeited 
in the enterprise. If they chose not to do so, their original contracts would 
99 
automatically be terminated. A female worker, Huang Xiurong, who worked for the 
company for twenty-four years and decided not to transform her status. When her 
original contract ended at the end of 2007, she lost her job.67 This practice was also 
prevalent in foreign enterprises. For example, more than 100 employees who worked 
in Wal-mart's procurement offices were dismissed during autumn 2007, about 40 in 
Shanghai and 60 in Shenzhen (Wang et al. 2009). For many lower-level laborers, the 
Law was actually not very welcome because of the immediate loss of jobs.  
The Huawei case shows that companies could still flexibly use their non-core 
workers. According to my field research in China in 2008, many enterprises tended to 
fill their non-core positions with dispatched workers. “Dispatching workers has lots of 
benefits. We use these workers but we don't manage them. It is the dispatching 
agencies that need to take care of these workers' contracts, insurance, and even wage 
offering.”68 This trend has been reinforced since the promulgation of the LCL. The 
number of dispatched workers significantly increased from 20 million before the 
enactment of the LCL in June 2007 to 27 million at the end of 2007 (Chen 2008). 
On the other hand, the rule about non-fixed-term contracts substantially 
strengthens the job security of core workers. In addition, the regulation on severance 
pay (Article 46 of the LCL) provides these workers with more power to bargain with 
their employers against dismissals. The increased dismissal price discouraged 
enterprises to lay off workers, and the new turnover cost equipped the employed with 
more leverage to negotiate a wage raise. The Law was thus widely praised by higher-
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level laborers. For some enterprises, the Law was also beneficial to their labor 
management, because it helped keep these core workers in their companies. In fact, 
the problem of skilled worker shortage was widespread in China in the 2000s. As one 
of my interviewees stated, “In our industry, a common problem is to keep workers. 
Many of them moved to other companies in the same industry after they received full 
training from us and earned the skills... The LCL helps reduce the mobility of these 
workers to some degree.”69 
Some Chinese labor law scholars have also noticed this problem. As Dong 
points out, the LCL provides steady employment protection to core workers, but it is 
useless in preventing low-level unskilled ones from being exploited or even dismissed 
at managers' discretion (Dong 2008). In enterprises' labor management, there was a 
clear distinction between core and flexible workers. The lowered threshold of non-
fixed-term contracts and increased severance pay only enhanced the job security of a 
certain portion of laborers. Numerical flexibility practices were still prevalent among 
lower-level workers. The Chinese labor market increasingly segmented into “good 
jobs” with relatively high wages and job security, and “bad jobs” such as the position 
which Huang Xiurong had in Huawei.  
The insider-biased regulation had another impact on China's labor market, that 
is, the potentiality of rising unemployment among outside workers. Although 
unemployment is an outcome of many factors, a more rigid rule on employment could 
lead to managers' unwillingness to hire new workers. In the literature, many labor 
economists have found that labor turnover costs associated with dismissal of 
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incumbent employees and with hiring and training of new recruits give insiders their 
market power (Lindbeck and Snower 2002). These costs come in many guises, 
including hiring costs, such as firms' search for new workers, and firing costs, such as 
severance pay and other legal protection against dismissal. Due to these costs, firms 
are reluctant to replace their high-wage inside employees by low-wage new workers 
because it is costly to do so. Insiders can thus protect their jobs and keep their wages 
from being underbid by potential new workers (Ibid.). Accordingly, new entrants to 
the labor market are usually the direct victim of insiders' market power. With high 
labor turnover costs, companies tend to secure insiders' jobs when facing economic 
shocks and are unwilling to hire new entrants, such as the youth or the low-skilled in 
the labor market. Employment inertia and privileged treatment of insiders under rigid 
employment protection are likely to cause unemployment among outsider groups. 
In China, rising unemployment among outside and unskilled workers was 
widely reported after the promulgation of the LCL. In addition to the aforementioned 
practices that some enterprises chose to dismiss workers before the renewal of their 
contracts, the increased rigidity of the job security rules under the LCL discouraged 
managers to hire the youth and the unskilled. In some situations, managers even 
tended to recruit retired workers. As several newspapers reported, a large number of 
enterprises began to hire the retired or SOE laid-off workers and not to fill the 
vacancies with new workers. The advantage of recruiting retirees resided in the fact 
that according to the State Council's “Interim Measures for Retirement and Leaving 
One's Job,” any person who is above the retirement age cannot be the subject of labor 
relations. Retirees are thus not laborers in the legal sense, and their relations with 
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enterprises are no longer labor contract relations. When a worker meets his retirement 
age, he is supposed to receive his pension from the social pension fund, and is no 
longer eligible for many kinds of insurance such as those for work injuries. There is 
thus no need to pay any insurance fee for these retirees who come back to work. These 
rules reduce the cost of hiring an retiree in comparison to young workers under the 
LCL. As a local newspaper in Hunan Province reported, a 61-year-old laid-off worker 
who lost his job due to the original employer's bankruptcy was hired by a new 
company in 2007. His wage was about RMB 3,000 per month, higher than many 
young people in the same position. The company said that, “older workers are better. 
They have the skills and we don't need to train them. Moreover, these old workers 
usually have more commitments. They won't leave our company to [go to] another 
one.”70 
The trend of hiring retired workers sacrificed the employment opportunity for 
outsider groups. In China, unemployment among the youth and new entrants to the 
labor market was already very serious in the early 2000s before the LCL was 
promulgated. By September 2007, there were about 1,440,000 college graduates 
unable to find any jobs. The problem was so acute that many universities had no ways 
to show a better employment record of their graduates except to cheat on the number 
reported to the Ministry of Education. This practice was ridiculed by many Chinese 
college students as a phenomenon of “I am employed without my permission” (bei 
jiuye). That is, universities unilaterally assigned a company to a graduate on his 
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Employment Agreement (jiuye xieyishu),71 but the company actually did not exist. 
Universities might also ask a graduate to try to put a stamp on his Employment 
Agreement without any examination on whether the stamp was true or not. 
While unemployment problem was severe, the focus of the LCL was not to 
create more jobs. On the contrary, the increased level of job security for core workers 
was likely to reduce the employment opportunity for outsider groups such as the youth. 
During the debate of making the LCL, concerns about the impact of increasing labor 
market rigidity on outsiders' employment were usually triumphed over by arguments 
based on protecting insiders' rights. Many legal scholars who participated in the law-
making process used sentimental rhetoric such as “worker's golden ages are used up 
by enterprises” to justify their proposal to protect insiders (Dong 2008). The emphasis 
of the dominant discourse was to improve the labor condition of those who were 
already employed. When there were discussions about whether the LCL would 
increase the unemployment rate, most law-makers' response was that the LCL would 
only weed out enterprises which illegally used laborers, and there was no reason to 
keep these enterprises in the market. Reducing unemployment was not a critical issue 
for the LCL makers, and the potential negative impact on unemployment among 
outsiders was not a concern either. It is thus not surprisingly that much of the 
regulation in the LCL systematically favors inside workers' job security and ignores 
outsider groups' employment opportunity. 
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Moreover, some local Labor Bureaus' initial response to Huawei's action of 
laying off workers also reveals that the MOLSS did not see unemployment among 
lower-level workers caused by the LCL as a serious problem. As an official in the 
Labor Bureau of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone stated, “The large-scale 
resignation in Huawei company was a voluntary negotiation between the laborers and 
managers. The company's new policy and the procedure to dismiss workers did not 
violate the Law.”72 Only when the event was widely reported by many Chinese 
newspapers and generated fierce social criticisms toward the Labor Bureau's original 
decision did the government start to draft new rules to criticize the action. The Labor 
Department of Guangdong Province issued the “Guideline on the Application of the 
Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law and the Labor Contract Law” on June 
23, 2008, and then invalidated the enterprise's arbitrary circumvention of the 
regulation on non-fixed-term contracts. The Guideline states that it is illegal to force 
laborers to resign from their positions first to make their seniority forfeited to zero and 
then to write another labor contracts to rehire them to the company. 
The insider-outsider analysis informs us that the Chinese government did not 
intend to use the LCL to deal with the problem of increasing unemployment among 
outside workers. The focus of the legislation was to protect job security, especially 
that of insiders. In the next section, I will analyze the incentive structure of the 
Chinese bureaucracies in the labor policy-making process. The study will shed light on 
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the question of why inside workers' grievances were more influential than those of 
outsiders and the non-state business community in the labor policy-making process.   
 
3.3 Positive Case: Social Voices Who Win: Socio-bureaucratic Synergy and 
Inside Workers 
 
As discussed, in the process of making the policies to regulate non-state 
enterprises, including the making of the LCL and the campaign for organizing trade 
unions, the then Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) and the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), were the two major bureaucracies promoting 
these policies. How did these government agencies become activists in drafting 
policies to represent the voice of the working class in the 2000s? In China's policy-
making processes, bureaucracies usually had their own interests, either organizational 
or political. In some cases, they may want to take advantage of the new policies to 
maximize these interests. In the rest of the section, I will demonstrate that for these 
two bureaucracies, it was in their best interests to expand the labor contract system and 
to regulate the labor condition in non-state enterprises, because these policies helped 
regain their political power and bureaucratic status that had been relinquished by 
marketization since the early 1980s.  
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3.3.1 The Ministry of Labor and Society Security  
 
China's central ministry of labor affairs has undergone several rounds of 
restructuring since the  establishment of the PRC. The government restructuring, along 
with the changing economic environment, has significantly affected the ministry's 
bureaucratic power. In general, the ministry enjoyed the highest de facto political 
power in the pre-reform period in comparison with other industry-based central 
ministries, and the 1990s witnessed its declining influence in the political system. The 
ministry did not regain its bureaucratic strength until it was empowered by the LCL to 
regulate the labor condition in the non-state sector.  
In the pre-reform era, the ministry was one of the major actors supervising the 
central-planned economy. During 1956-1966, the then Ministry of Labor (laodong bu; 
MOL) was the main government agency responsible for labor allocations in SOEs. 
Initially, the Ministry, along with other fifteen ministries related to economic affairs, 
was under the direction of the Central Finance and Economic Commission in the first 
five years after the establishment of the PRC. The Commission was established in 
1949 and Chen Yun was the first director.73 The task of the Commission was to restore 
economic order and to coordinate the management of related affairs. The Commission 
was abolished when the State Council was built in 1954. Then the MOL was assigned 
to the Fourth Office of the State Council.  
Under the planned economy, the MOL enjoyed de facto higher status among 
the various ministries related to economic affairs in the central government, although 
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their de jure bureaucratic status was all the same. The power of the MOL largely came 
from the fact that it could, in practice, supervise the then industry-based ministries and 
their SOEs through the intervention of their labor allocations. At that time, a SOE 
equipped with more workers usually implied that it was bigger and hence its 
supervising ministry was more important in comparison with other ministries in the 
government. In order to receive a higher quota of workers, these industry-based 
ministries in the central government usually needed to involve themselves in 
negotiations and bargaining sessions with the MOL. As one of the retired officials in a 
provincial Labor Department informed me, “The MOL was critical to any economic 
decision of the central government. How laborers should be allocated affected how an 
industrial policy was implemented.74 In most cases, industries that had been selected 
as the target for development would receive more quota of staff and workers. While 
the selection was made by the top leaders and the MOL was unlikely to alter the 
decision, it still had leeway to manage the actual number of labor allocations.” The 
MOL was thus practically empowered at that time, given that it was in charge of how 
many workers a SOE could have. 
During the Cultural Revolution, most central ministries stopped functioning. 
The MOL was merged with other ministries to the State Planning Commission (SPC). 
At the end of the Revolution, the General Bureau of Labor (GBU) was established and 
detached from the SPC. In May 1982 during the first government restructuring in the 
reform period, the Chinese government integrated the management of cadres (ganbu) 
and that of workers, and had three bureaus, the then GBU, the National Bureau of 
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Personnel and the Bureau of Technocrats and Managers merged into the Ministry of 
Labor and Personnel (MOLP).75 This was the first time when the Chinese government 
assigned a ministerial-level bureaucracy for managing cadres. Before then, the 
Communist Party was the major supervisor of cadre management and there were only 
a bureau, not a ministry, for cadre management in the government's side.76 In the 
second round of government restructuring in 1988, the supervisor of cadre 
management was separated from that of workers again. The MOLP was divided into 
the Ministry of Labor (MOL) and the Ministry of Personnel. In 1998, the MOL was 
abolished to establish the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS).  
Since market-oriented reforms were introduced in the early 1980s, the Ministry 
significantly lost its power over other ministries due to the introduction of the labor 
contract system in SOEs. Without the power to intervene in the labor force in most 
SOEs, the Labor Ministry was unable to maintain its higher bureaucratic status in the 
government. As Chapter One already pointed out, multiplicity of administrative 
functions is one of the three major indicators to know the ups and downs of a 
bureaucracy's power. The weakening bureaucratic status of the Labor Ministry in 
comparison to most industry-based ministries can be illustrated by the delayed process 
of transforming industry-based pension funds to a geography-based system in the mid-
1990s.  
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In the mid-1990s, when SOE privatization was in progress, the MOLSS 
initiated programs to build a new pension system for urban workers.77 The progress of 
establishing this new system was largely delayed due to the existing industry-based 
pension funds. In the early 1990s, SOEs with nationwide operations were permitted to 
set up their own pension and other kinds of social insurance funds. Eleven industry-
based pension funds were accordingly set up at the national level. These eleven funds 
included funds of electronics industry, water conservancy, railways, post and 
telecommunication, transport, coal industry, finance, petroleum industry, aviation 
industry, metallurgical industry, and construction.  
The existence of these industry-based pension funds led to the fragmentation of 
pension administration and hindered the development of a nation-wide pension fund 
(Frazier 2004). Many SOEs chose to stay in the industry-based system and refused to 
make contributions to the geographic pool formed by city governments. One 
prominent example, the Panzhihua case, revealed how enterprises protested higher 
contribution rates by refusing to pay to the local pension fund. Panzhihua Iron and 
Steel was a major producer in the iron and steel industry located in Sichuan Province. 
It joined the local pool in 1986, but as the iron and steel industry began to set up its 
own industry-based pool in 1992 which offered a better deal with lower contribution 
rates, the enterprise refused to pay to the local pool. This resulted in a debt of 300 
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million RMB owed to the local pension fund between 1993 and 1998 (Zhao and Xu 
1999; Saich 2004).  
In 1998, the MOLSS started to call for unification of public pillar benefits. One 
of the major tasks was to transfer the industry-based pension funds over to provincial 
administration.78 However, the prior industry-based pension system with lower 
contribution rates had complicated the process of setting up provinciaized pension 
funds (Frazier 2004, 55). As Frazier points out, most SOEs, benefiting from the 
industry-based pension system with lower contribution rates, were reluctant to join the 
geographic pool. 
The slow process of transforming industry-based pools into provinciaized 
pension system reveals that the MOLSS lacked the power to force industry-based 
ministries to cooperate. The MOLSS became even weaker when many SOEs went 
bankrupt, privatized or corporatized in the late 1990s. Because the MOLSS was not 
equipped with policy tools for regulating the labor usage in non-state enterprises, the 
function of the Ministry was substantially eroded and its bureaucratic significance was 
largely reduced. As a retired official of a provincial Labor Department stated, “In the 
late 1990s, my major task was to help SOE laid-off workers to be re-employed. The 
Labor Department announced several policies including tax cut for non-state 
enterprises if they hired a certain rate of SOE laid-off workers. These policies, 
however, did not provide us with much power to regulate the non-state sector.”79 
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Without strong relevance to the regulation of the non-state labor market at a time 
when employment in the sector already skyrocketed, the MOLSS lost the bureaucratic 
status which it used to enjoy before the SOE restructuring. 
The situation has been changed since the 2000s. When labor disputes in the 
non-state sector were widely reported by Chinese media, the MOLSS, acting as a 
policy entrepreneur (Kingdom 1995), took the opportunity to claim its importance in 
protecting workers' rights through regulating the labor condition in the non-state sector. 
Speaking on behalf of the working class and promoting their labor rights strengthened 
the legitimacy of the MOLSS in the government. Moreover, the action of regulating 
the non-state sector enabled the Ministry to have a say in drafting China's general 
economic plan. As many researchers have recognized, the direction of China's labor 
regulations was naturally tied up in other issues of economic reform, including SOE 
restructuring and the development of private and foreign enterprises (Gallagher and 
Dong 2009). Protecting workers' rights became an uncontroversial standpoint when 
the Chinese leaders drafted the “Five-year Development Plan” (wunien fazhan jihua) 
every five years to mark the top goals of China's economic development. Until 2005, 
China had finished ten Five-year Plans since 1953.80 In the “CCP Proposal of Making 
the Eleventh Five-year Plan for 2006-2010”, establishing a sound labor market in the 
non-state sector was a core issue.81 In addition, the State Council issued the “Outline 
                                               
80
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of the Eleventh Five-year Plan for the Development of Labor and Social Security” in 
2006 to support the MOLSS's action of regulating the non-state sector.82 
Regulating labor conditions in the non-state sector helped the Ministry to 
participate in drafting the general direction of China's economic reform. Given that the 
MOLSS's major goal was to empower itself to regulate the non-state labor market in 
order to enhance its bureaucratic power, it only focused on making rules that 
facilitated this task. To intervene in the non-state labor market, the first step was to 
have all non-state enterprises to sign labor contracts with their employees. The new 
dismissal procedures also enabled the MOLSS to inspect the labor usage in the non-
state sector. The rules promoting insiders' job security were thus put on the policy-
making agenda. On the other hand, because the MOLSS's original purpose was not to 
promote workers' rights but to have a say in regulating the non-state labor market, 
outside workers' needs were selectively ignored, although a high degree of labor 
unrest was caused by their grievances.  
The new labor policy reform also substantially brought more tasks, and hence 
more budget, into the Ministry. In order to achieve a full rate of labor contracting in 
the non-state sector, the Ministry needed to be equipped with more street-level 
inspectors to supervise managers' behavior. The MOLSS thus emphasized the 
importance of establishing local institutes for labor inspection all over the country. At 
the end of 2002, there were 3,223 local institutes for labor inspection established. The 
number of full-time inspectors was 19,000 in total.83 The number of local institutes for 
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labor inspection was increased to 3,271 at the end of 2006, and the full-time inspectors 
became 22,000 persons.84 
The increased number of local institutions and inspectors do not amount to 
better implementation of the labor contract system in the non-state sector. In fact, as 
many reports indicate, these new equipments were still not strong enough to combat 
enterprises' resistance.85 But the recruitment of more labor officials itself still shows 
that promoting the usage of labor contract in non-state enterprises enhanced the role of 
the MOLSS in regulating the labor market. Before the policy of regulating the labor 
condition in the non-state sector was initiated in the 2000s, the bureaucratic power of 
the MOLSS mainly came from its regulation of SOEs. Regulating the non-state sector 
in the 2000s enabled the MOLSS to regain its bureaucratic importance in directing 
China's economic reform at a time when the employment in the non-state sector had 
been significantly expanded. Pursuing its own interests, the Ministry promoted the 
policies to regulate the labor condition in the non-state sector.  
 
3.3.2 The All China Federation of Trade Unions  
 
The ACFTU was another major actor promoting the regulation of the non-state 
sector. In China, trade unions operated more as an arm of the state bureaucracy than as 
workers' representative organization. The ACFTU, being a mass-representative 
organization (qunzhong zuzhi) for Chinese workers, is led and supervised by the 
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Communist Party. It situates in both the state and in society, and serves a dual-
function role: that of state instrument and also of labor organization (Chen 2003). 
Firm-level trade unions are the messenger for the central government to reach into the 
working society at large, and to detect where potential labor unrest might come. The 
ACFTU's staff is recruited through national civil servant exams, and many of the 
positions require CCP membership.86 In addition, the trade union system is a top-down 
bureaucratic structure. Firm-level unions are under the control of a local Federation of 
Trade Unions, and the local Federation of Trade Unions should follow the guidance of 
the Communist Party at the same level. For example, the trade union of an enterprise 
in Yiyang Municipality in Hunan Province is supervised by the Yiyang Federation of 
Trade Unions, and the Yiyang Federation is a mass-representative organization for the 
Party in Yiyang Municipality.  
This is the fundamental reason why labor conditions were not significantly 
improved, while many enterprises already established trade unions. Most of these new 
unions only existed on paper and were extremely powerless in protecting workers' 
rights in practice. In many situations, grassroots trade unions' major role was not to 
bargain with managers, but to keep employment relations stable and harmonious. 
According to the 1992 Trade Union Law and the revised 2001 Trade Union Law, the 
function of a trade union in China is to “observe and safeguard the Constitution.” 
While unions are obliged to “express employees' viewpoints, negotiate with employers 
and propose a resolution,” they also have to help managers achieve better productivity, 
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and to “resume production as quickly as possible while restoring work discipline” 
(2001 TUL, Article 27). Representing employees was merely a tool used to help 
maintain industrial peace and to stabilize labor-management relationship. 
Accordingly, the ACFTU does not have significant concerns about managers' 
influence on these grassroots trade unions either. In fact, many of these unions are for 
all practical purposes subjected to management at the firm level. In the pre-reform era, 
the primary roles of unions were to allocate welfare benefits, mediate intra-firm 
disputes, and maintain production order (Taylor et al., 2003: 103-7; Cooney 2007, 
681). SOE managers usually occupied senior positions in the firm-level unions. When 
employment relations became more market-oriented in the 1990s, these positions were 
still not fully controlled by workers. In some cases, even if the unions were not 
charged by managers, they were usually run by workers who had kinship ties with the 
managers,87 although the 2001 TUL prevents relatives of management from running 
for election to firm-level union positions (2001 TUL, Article 9).  
Being a quasi-bureaucracy of the state, the ACFTU cares less about workers' 
rights than its own bureaucratic power. In fact, the ACFTU is not interested in 
promoting workers' rights until it realizes that there is a need to do so for the purpose 
to maintain its bureaucratic status in the Chinese government. Similar to the Labor 
Ministry, the ACFTU lost much of its bureaucratic power in the mid-1990s due to the 
decreasing number of SOEs. Before the SOE restructuring, the ACFTU used to be 
very powerful in regulating China's labor market, through its firm-level branches 
within SOEs. Starting from the mid-1990s, privatization and corporatization of SOEs 
                                               
87
 Informant 27. Interview conducted in Beijing on April 25, 2008. 
116 
significantly eroded the importance of the ACFTU within the role of managing the 
industrial relation in the Chinese labor market. Without grassroots branches in most 
non-state enterprises, the ACFTU was not helpful for the Chinese government to 
achieve industrial harmony.  
SOE restructuring not only reduced the relevance of the ACFTU in regulating 
the Chinese labor market, but also raised the question of whether the trade unions were 
an useful mechanism for the government to reach into the society. Before the mid-
1990s, the widespread grassroots SOE trade unions made the ACFTU one of the most 
important mass-representative organizations for the CCP to control over the society. 
Starting from the mid-1990s, as the number of SOEs declined, the overall ACFTU 
membership also decreased. Table 3.2 demonstrates how union density was 
particularly low in the late 1990s.  
 
Table 3.4 Trade Union Membership Densities in China 
 
Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of China, various years; Trade Union Statistical 
Yearbooks of China, various years, and the author's calculation. 
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When the ACFTU lost its wide coverage of workers, its importance for the Chinese 
state to control over the society and more importantly, to monitor non-party members 
also declined. As trade unions did not enjoy any representation in most non-state 
enterprises during the 1990s, the relevance of the ACFTU for maintaining social 
stability was significantly decreased. The ACFTU thus lost much of its importance in 
the Chinese political system. 
The eroding status of the ACFTU gave a strong impetus for the officials of the 
organization to engage in activities to regain its importance. The most useful way to 
enhance its power was to re-emphasize its role as an important mass-representative 
organization to the Party, and to cooperate with the MOLSS to demonstrate its 
function as the major organization representing workers' voices within the bureaucracy. 
The ACFTU thus asserted that protecting workers' rights was its major obligation, and 
then actively engaged in initiating programs to regulate the labor market.  
Similar to the MOLSS, the ACFTU was a direct winner of the movement of 
regulating labor conditions in the non-state sector. The increased number of ACFTU 
cadres above the firm-level gave the evidence that the bureaucratic status of the 
institution was increasingly enhanced, given that it received more quota of staff from 
the State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform. As Figure 3.3 reveals, in the 
years right after the 1997 SOE restructuring, the number of trade union cadres above 
the firm level, namely those in the Federations of Trade Unions at various levels of the 
Chinese administrative system, was the lowest. Starting from the 2000s, the ACFTU 
began to be equipped with more bureaucrats. In 2003, the number increased 
dramatically to a level that was much higher than before the SOE privatization. With 
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the campaign of organizing unions in the non-state sector, the ACFTU successfully 
strengthened its bureaucratic status. 
 
Figure 3.3 Number of Trade Union Cadres above the Firm Level in China, 1995-2006 
 
Source: Trade Union Statistical Yearbooks of China, various years.  
 
The direct benefits for the ACFTU to work with the MOLSS to promote the 
labor contract system also came from the new power under the collective contract 
regulation. According to the 2007 LCL, employees may negotiate a collective contract 
with employers regarding matters of remuneration, work hours, breaks, vacations, 
work safety and hygiene, insurance, and benefits, as well as various other concerns 
(LCL, Article 51). Collective contracts are designed to be signed by trade unions on 
behalf of enterprises' employees. This requires the establishment of trade unions at the 
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firm level first, which again provides an important rationale for the campaign of 
organizing unions launched by the ACFTU. On December 5, 2007, the ACFTU held a 
press conference in Beijing to broadcast the LCL. Liu Jichen, the Minister of the 
Department of Legal Work of the ACFTU, openly condemned several 
countermeasures against the LCL.88 In addition to using the new Law as the basis for 
the campaign for organizing unions, as one researcher points out, the ACFTU also 
sought to win for itself one of the measures of institutional and ideological legitimacy 
(Wang et al. 2009).  
The ACFTU's campaign for organizing unions was highly supported by the 
Chinese top leaders because it also strengthened the autocrats' social control. The top 
leaders had publicly expressed their eagerness to establish unions on many occasions. 
In March 2006, the CCP General Secretary, Hu Jintao, voiced his support of the union 
organizing campaign in foreign enterprises in an official document, “Policy Analysis 
and Suggestion about the Unsuitability in Foreign Enterprises along the Coastal Cities” 
drafted by the Stability Maintenance Leading Small Group of the CCP. Hu's 
comments were thought of as a major contribution to Wal-mart's unionization.89 
At the same time, organizing ACFTU branches was an alternative to allowing 
workers to form their own, independent trade unions. In China, independent unions 
were banned, and official documents seldom used the term, “collective bargaining.” 
Instead, the government usually chose “collective negotiation” to describe the process 
of collective contracting. When I conducted my interview with a local official of a 
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trade union federation, I was corrected several times for inappropriately mentioning 
the phrase collective “bargaining.”90 For government officials, providing workers with 
the right of collective bargaining was less desirable than establishing firm-level 
ACFTU branches to handle collective negotiation.  
 
Based on these discussions, we identified the incentive structure of different 
actors in the labor policy-making process. Their relations are illustrated by Figure 3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4 Labor Policy-making at the Central Level  
 
 
 
Note:   
MOLSS: Ministry of Labor and Social Security  
ACFTU: All China Federation of Trade Unions 
ACFIC: All China Federation of Industry and Commerce  
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In the process of making the pro-labor regulations, both inside and outside 
workers had strong grievances to push the MOLSS and the ACFTU to make policies 
protecting their labor rights. But these demands were not influential to shape the 
direction of reform because on the one hand, workers were not able to represent 
themselves in the government and on the other hand, the intensive intra-competition 
within the working class for jobs has substantially eroded their collective identity to 
fight against the government (Gallagher 2002). Most labor protests today were all 
cellular, lacking a larger regional base of organization (C. Lee 2007). Cross-factory 
labor movements were very rare in China. For outside workers, collective actions were 
even more difficult because geographical mobility of most unskilled workers was 
extremely high. These all impeded the working class to form strong alliance to pass 
their demands to the government.  
However, from the viewpoint of the supply side, we see that the MOLSS and 
the ACFTU still voluntarily launched the pro-inside worker policy reform. This is 
because the two bureaucracies found that supplying this new policy could enable them 
to regulate the non-state labor market and hence was useful in enhancing their 
bureaucratic power. Outside workers' demands were left out in the policy making 
because the two bureaucracies' major goal was to have a say in regulating the non-
state labor market and they did not find that supplying policies responsive to outside 
workers was helpful to achieve this purpose.  
On the other hand, businessmen in the non-state sector also had strong 
grievances to delay the pro-labor policy reform. However, as will be discussed in the 
next section, these demands were unsuccessful in lobbying the central bureaucracies 
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due to the fragmentation of China's business associations. In addition, while the 
business community opposed the pro-labor policy, they were more desperate to block 
the actual implementation of the reform in their enterprises than to put efforts in the 
national policy-making process. This is because it would be more efficient to directly 
intervene in the process of how their own enterprises were actually inspected by local 
governments than to pressure the central government to alter the reform direction due 
to the externalities of changing a national policy. As a matter of fact, the pressure that 
the central government needed to face from the non-state business community was not 
particularly intense.  
But from the supply side, some bureaucracies, especially the All China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), were motivated by the desire to 
demonstrate their ability to foster the development of the non-state sector, and thus 
were eager to delay the making of pro-labor policies in order to help non-state 
enterprises. This empowered the grievances of the non-state business community to be 
heard in the policy-making process. However, when competing with the MOLSS and 
the ACFTU, the ACFIC lost the game and were unable to stop the pro-labor policy 
reform. As the next section will demonstrate, the ACFIC was traditionally less 
powerful than the ACFTU, and the bureaucratic structure of the ACFIC was highly 
fragmented. This hindered the ACFIC's ability to delay the reform.  
As for Chinese top leaders, their major concern was to maintain regime 
stability. Due to the lack of a regular mechanism to clearly tell them which social 
voice posed the most serious threat to the government, top leaders essentially wanted 
to buy off the support of all kinds of social forces. But when the MOLSS and the 
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ACFTU along with inside workers achieved socio-bureaucratic synergy, they defeated 
the alliance of the ACFIC and the non-state business community in the central labor 
policy reform process. They successfully persuaded the top leaders to regulate the 
non-state sector. The outcome was the promulgation of several pro-labor policies in 
the 2000s.  
Accordingly, in the 2000s reform, the Chinese autocrats sounded more willing 
to compromise with the working class than with the business community. This was a 
result of the fact that there were important bureaucracies in the governing structure 
seeing representing workers' voice beneficial to enhancing their bureaucratic power. 
This argument provides an answer to why the pro-labor reform was launched when 
most of the nation's economic growth and employment opportunities were still largely 
contributed by non-state labor-intensive industries. In the next section, I will discuss 
the role of the bureaucracies in charge of the non-state sector's development in the 
reform process.  
 
3.4 Negative Case: Social Voices Who Lose:  
      The Weak Political Leverage of Non-state Enterprises 
 
While regulating the non-state sector was highly praised by pro-worker voices, 
they encountered resistance in the business community. But the voice of non-state 
enterprises was not powerful enough to change the policy direction. Why did workers' 
grievances seem to be more influential than those of the business community in the 
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process of making these policies? How could the Chinese government successfully 
defeat the grievances of non-state enterprises against the reform?  
As the last section discussed, the MOLSS and the ACFTU worked together to 
make policies to expand the labor rights which most SOE workers had already enjoyed 
to non-state workers. The voices of the working class in these enterprises were thus 
“represented” by the bureaucracies, and hence became influential in the policy-making 
process. The socio-bureaucratic synergy between the two labor bureaucracies and 
inside workers gave a way for the latter's voices to be heard, even if they were not able 
to represent themselves in the government. This section follows the Possibility 
Principle introduced by Mahoney and Goertz (2004) to conduct a negative case study 
on how non-state entrepreneurs lost the battle against the pro-labor reform. By 
contrasting the weak political leverage of non-state entrepreneurs with the positive 
case of my study, namely the stronger voice of the working class in the government's 
policy-making process, this dissertation will illustrate that only those social voices 
whose preferences are the same as some strong bureaucracies in the government can 
become critical to the policy outcome.  
The inability of non-state enterprises to change the policy direction serves as 
an important negative case for the dissertation. According to the Possibility Principle, 
only cases where the outcome of interest is possible should be included in the set of 
negative cases (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). In the 2000s, the non-state sector was 
already a critical source of economic growth and employment in China. However, the 
increasing importance of the non-state sector to China's economic and employment 
development did not provide these enterprises with more political leverage in the 
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government's economic policy-making. On the contrary, non-state enterprises were 
generally powerless in directing the government's economic policies, although they 
were outspoken in many situations. In the following discussion, I will demonstrate that 
unlike the MOLSS and the ACFTU, who aimed to promulgate regulatory policies to 
enhance their bureaucratic power, and hence acted as government agencies to 
represent the voice of inside workers, non-state enterprises did not have such powerful 
bureaucracies which wished for the same policy outcome, that is, delaying the pro-
labor campaign. This answers the question of why voices from non-state enterprises 
were not influential in the policy-making process. 
In China, the government agencies that were in charge of issues related to the 
development of non-state enterprises included the State Administration for Industry 
and Commerce (guojia gongshang xinzheng guanli zongju, SAIC), and the then 
Department of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (DSME) in the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).91 I will illustrate that none of these 
bureaucracies shared the same policy preferences as non-state enterprises. That is to 
say, there was no socio-bureaucratic synergy between these government agencies and 
the non-state business community. These bureaucracies did not act on behalf of 
enterprises in the labor policy-making process. In the Chinese ruling structure, the 
only quasi-bureaucracy that acted on behalf of non-state enterprises was the All China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC). But as this section will indicate, the 
ACFIC was not powerful enough to put its preference on the government's policy-
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making agenda. Given that there were no strong bureaucracies wishing for the same 
policy outcome as the non-state business community, the resistance from non-state 
enterprises could not defeat the pro-labor policies that were supported by the MOLSS 
and the ACFTU in the 2000s.  
 
3.4.1 SAIC and NDRC 
 
As the last section indicated, bureaucracies do not have the same interests as 
their supervised social actors. For the MOLSS and the ACFTU, their major goal is to 
enhance their bureaucratic power. But government officials' desire to enhance their 
bureaucratic power can sometimes drive them to be a “bureaucratic representative” for 
the social groups under their supervision. This is to say, although bureaucracies and 
their governed social actors have different interests, they might share the same policy 
preference and wish for the same policy outcome. From this point of view, when 
examining the bureaucrats that are likely to speak for non-state enterprises, we should 
include all the bureaucracies that supervise or control over the development of the 
non-state sector to see if these officials have a preference for acting on behalf of non-
state enterprises for the purpose to enhance their bureaucratic power.  
In China, one of the major bureaucracies in the central government involving 
the development of the non-state sector is the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC). According to the “Provisional Regulations for Private Enterprises” 
issued by the SAIC in 2000, private enterprises need to register with the SAIC to 
receive their licenses (Article 15). However, as discussed, being the supervisor of 
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these enterprises does not mean that the SAIC has the same interest as their governed 
private enterprises. The major function of the SAIC is about market supervision and 
management, and its bureaucratic power does not come from the flourishing 
development of the non-state sector. At the same time, enterprises seldom go to the 
SAIC for help when there is an issue coming up.92  
While the SAIC was not an institution to reflect non-state entrepreneurs' 
grievances, some policies made by the SAIC can still be preferred by non-state 
enterprises. For example, to facilitate market competition, the SAIC was one of the 
major promoters to implement anti-monopoly regulations. In 2005, when the State 
Council issued the first national regulation in the PRC history regarding the promotion 
of the non-state sector, namely “Some Opinions about Encouraging, Supporting, and 
Guiding the Economic Development of the Non-state Sector”,93 the SAIC announced 
the “Notice about Exercising the Function of Administration for Industry and 
Commerce to Promote the Non-state Sector such as Private Enterprises” to encourage 
private enterprises to participate in some monopolistic industries including 
telecommunication, petroleum, and aviation. In addition, the Department for 
Regulation of the Private Economy (DRPE) in the SAIC drafted the “Opinions about 
Further Promoting the Development of Private Enterprise” in 2009 to support laid-off 
workers and college students to establish small- and medium-sized private enterprises. 
Although these policies were all helpful for the development of non-state 
enterprises, promoting the non-state sector's interests is not the SAIC's task. The focus 
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of the SAIC is to make sure fair market competition, such as the promotion of 
property rights rules.94 It does not see reflecting the grievances of non-state enterprises 
as a way to enhance its bureaucratic power. In fact, in the labor policy-making process 
in the 2000s, the SAIC was not an opponent of the pro-labor policies. As one official 
in a local Labor Bureau stated, “the Industry and Commerce Bureau sometimes works 
with us together to inspect illegal employment service companies who had claimed to 
help workers to match up with jobs but actually cheated on them.”95 At the national 
level, the MOLSS, the SAIC, and the Ministry of Public Security also worked together 
sometimes. For example, they had several inter-ministerial projects on the 
maintenance of the order and stability of China's human resources market.96 
Based on the discussion, we see that the SAIC is not a “representative” for 
non-state enterprises in the labor policy reform. On the demand side, the SAIC is not 
an institution with which non-state entrepreneurs usually contact to express their 
grievances about a government policy. On the supply side, the SAIC's major task is to 
promote fair market competition. It does not focus on promoting the interests of non-
state enterprises. Accordingly, there was no socio-bureaucratic synergy between the 
SAIC and non-state enterprises in the labor policy-making process in the 2000s.  
Another government institution related to the non-state sector's development is 
the Department of Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (DSME) in the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). To promote the development of the 
non-state sector, along with the SAIC, the DSME in the NDRC was another drafter of 
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the aforementioned 2005 “Some Opinions about Encouraging, Supporting, and 
Guiding the Economic Development of the Non-state Sector”. But the NDRC is not a 
bureaucracy that always acts on behalf of the non-state sector. The NDRC is a 
macroeconomic management agency having broad administrative and planning 
control over the Chinese economy. In the State Council, the NDRC stands above those 
ministries whose major task is to supervise a particular sector or social group such as 
the MOLSS. Many of these ministries involve themselves in lobbying activities with 
the NDRC for preferential policies, and the NDRC needs to keep balance between the 
different interests of these ministries. In some situations, the NDRC will make polices 
that favor a particular sector as a function of these ministries' lobby, but the NDRC is 
not established to represent the particular sector. Its major function is to formulate 
policies for the country's general economic and social development. The bureaucratic 
power of the NDRC does not come from representing a particular economic sector, 
such as non-state enterprises. Accordingly, while the NDRC was a powerful institution, 
the NDRC did not have an incentive to act on behalf of the non-state sector to delay 
the pro-labor policies in the 2000s. There was no socio-bureaucratic synergy between 
the non-state sector and the NDRC. 
 
3.4.2 The All China Federation of Industry and Commerce 
 
The All China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) is a 
bureaucracy whose political status is much more closely related to the development of 
the non-state sector than the SAIC and the DSME in the NDRC. Similar to the 
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ACFTU's role as a mass-representative organization to supervise the working class, 
the ACFIC was established by the CCP in 1953 to reach into the business society. In 
the reform period, the major composition of the ACFIC membership is non-state 
enterprises.97 Performing the dual function of representing businessmen to the 
government and empowering the government to control over non-state enterprises, the 
ACFIC is led by the CCP and is a member of the People's Political Consultative 
Conference (PPCC). Same as the ACFTU, the ACFIC's staff enjoys a bureaucratic 
status of civil servant. 
Many studies have found that the ACFIC functions less as a representative to 
express enterprises' opinions than as an institution to pass on information regarding 
government policies to its members. According to a report conducted by the Asian 
Development Bank in 2002, for most businessmen, the major function of the ACFIC 
and its local branches was to help understand government policies (ADB 2002, 26). 
Expressing members' interests was not the focus. Overall, ACFIC's emphasis remained 
on the liaison between the government and the business community, with only a 
secondary concern for providing direct services to its members (ADB 2002, 50). 
Being a quasi-governmental institution, the ACFIC struggled to enhance its 
political status and bureaucratic power as the ACFTU did. To achieve this goal, the 
ACFIC made efforts to promote the development of the non-state sector and to delay 
the expansion of the labor contract system in the process of the labor policy reform in 
the 2000s. For example, the ACFIC urged the government to postpone the 
                                               
97
 See the official website of the ACFIC. 
http://www.acfic.org.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/qggsl/gsljj/index.html 
131 
implementation of the LCL in the annual meeting of the PPCC.98 Some members of 
the ACFIC also spoke directly to the MOLSS that the clauses in the LCL with regards 
to non-fixed-term labor contracts are too rigid and will reduce small- and media-sized 
enterprises' competitiveness.99 
The ACFIC, however, was much weaker in putting its preferences on the 
government's policy-making agenda. The low political leverage of the ACFIC can be 
illustrated in its relationship with various Industrial Chambers of Commerce (hangye 
shanghui, ICCs). At first glance, being the mass-representative organization for the 
business society, the ACFIC should be the supervisor of these Chambers, just as the 
ACFTU being the only representative for workers. But in fact, the ACFTU had very 
vague legal relationships with these organizations, no matter whether they were 
established from top by the ACFIC or were voluntarily organized by non-state 
enterprises themselves. Unlike the relationship between the ACFTU and its local 
branches at different levels, the ACFIC did not enjoy the legal right to supervise these 
non-state enterprises' ICCs. Several government regulations prevented the ACFIC 
from being the supervisor of these ICCs. In 1978, the State Council announced the 
“Regulation on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations”, and 
established the pattern of dual supervision of social organizations: a social 
organization should first register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) to be 
granted the status of social legal person, and then a central ministry of the State 
Council which is in charge of the profession will directly administer the organization. 
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Because the ICCs are one kind of social organizations, each of them is supervised both 
by the MOCA and a central ministry which is in charge of the industry. The ACFIC 
does not have the legal power to oversee them.  
Having no direct control over these ICCs, the ACFIC could not function as an 
important organization for the CCP and the central government to reach into the 
business society. Facing this problem, starting from the early 2000s, many ACFIC 
officials at various levels publicly urged the State Council to make the ACFIC one of 
the supervisors of these Chambers. For example, in Zhejiang Province, a place with 
the most flourishing development of private enterprises, a report was made to call for 
integrating the ICCs into ACFIC's supervision. The ACFIC usually cited the 
“Organizational Principle of the ACFIC” promulgated in 1952 by the then 
Government Administration Council (zhengwuyuan, now the State Council) as the 
evidence that the ACFIC still retained the right to form ICCs (Article 11 of the 1952 
Principle). These requests were also justified by the discourse that the ACFIC should 
serve as the bridge of the government and the non-state sector. If the ACFIC was not 
one of the supervisors of the ICCs, the function of united front (tongzhan) could not be 
carried out. In addition, the ACFIC had also emphasized its role of representing 
Chinese enterprises when interacting with foreign Chambers of Commerce since 
China's participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2002, the ACFIC 
revised its “Constitution of the ACFIC” and Article 24 states that the ACFIC has the 
right to establish ICCs in different industries at all levels, and these ICCs are to be 
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overseen by the Federation of Industry and Commerce at the same level.100 These 
efforts made by the ACFIC, however, were not very successful in achieving the goal.  
The ACFIC's struggle to integrate the various ICCs encountered enormous 
difficulties in 2000 when the MOCA announced the “Notice of Re-affirming the 
Administration of Social Organizations”. In this Notice, the ACFIC is not granted the 
right to become a supervisor of any social organizations. According to Article 4 of the 
Notice, there are twenty-two government agencies or mass-representative 
organizations which enjoy the power to administer social organizations in their own 
professions. Among these mass-representative organizations, the ACFTU, the All-
China Women's Federation, and the Chinese Communist Youth League are all listed 
as the legal supervisors, but the ACFIC is not. This Notice significantly reduced the 
political importance of the ACFIC in regulating non-state enterprises. According to a 
report conducted in Hangzhou Municipality in Zhejiang Province, among the 143 
local ICCs established by the Hangzhou Municipal Federation of Industry and 
Commerce (MFIC), only less than 10 ICCs had received the approval of the status of 
social legal person from the Hangzhou Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs (MBCA). In 
many localities, the local Bureaus of Civil Affairs openly rejected the request by the 
local Federations of Industry and Commerce for the right to supervise local ICCs. In 
Shaoxing Municipality in Zhejiang Province, for example, in 2004, the MFIC filed an 
official petition to the MBCA for administering the ICCs.101 In the petition, the MFIC 
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mentioned the 2002 “Constitution of the ACFIC” to justify its petition. The Shaoxing 
MBCA rejected the request via citing the “Zhejiang Provincial Notice of Re-affirming 
the Administration of Social Organizations”, which excludes the role of the MFIC as 
an administrator of the ICCs.102 Obviously, the MBCA did not recognize the legal 
status of the 2002 ACFIC Constitution in this reply. 
In 2009, the ACFIC was finally granted the right to supervise the various ICCs, 
when the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued the “Notice of the State Council's 
Authorizing the ACFIC to Administer National Social Organizations.” This Notice 
was regarded by the ACFIC as the evidence that the central government started to pay 
attention to the role of the ACFIC in regulating the ICCs. As Quan Zhezhu, the Vice-
chair of the ACFIC, said in an ACFIC meeting in Beijing in July 2009, “with the 
MOCA's guidance, this Notice recognizes the ACFIC's importance.”103 However, a 
closer look at the Notice reveals that some articles will actually erode the ACFIC's 
political status in representing the business society. According to the Notice, all the 
ICCs which were established by the ACFIC need to register with the MOCA within 
two years. Those who fail to register will be disbanded. In practice, when those ICCs 
began to contact with the MOCA to register, they also tried to build connections with 
many other ministries in the government to see if these government could serve as 
their supervisors. Losing many ICCs significantly reduced the importance and 
influence of the ACFIC's role in regulating non-state enterprises.  
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The ACFIC's fighting against the Ministry of Civil Affairs reveals its weak 
political leverage in the Chinese political system. The delayed process of integrating 
the ICCs significantly eroded the ACFIC's function as a mass-representative 
organization for the CCP to control over the business society. In addition to the 
relationship with the ICCs, the bureaucratic status of the ACFIC was even more 
severely eroded when we take into consideration the existence of various Industrial 
Associations (hangye xiehui; IAs) and the ACFIC's inability to control over them.  
In China, Industrial Associations (IAs) are different from the Industrial 
Chambers of Commerce (ICCs) in the sense that the establishment of the IAs is a 
direct result of China's government restructuring to separate enterprises from the 
government (zhengqi fenli). These IAs evolve from previous industry-based ministries, 
and now have close financial relationships with the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC) in the central government. For example, 
the Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association is developed from the Ministry of 
Chemical Industry. In 1997, when the government restructuring resulted in the 
abolition of the Ministry, the Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association was 
established right away to “represent the industry” according to its official statement. In 
practice, the goal was to provide the cadres and staff in the Ministry with new 
positions in the IA. The function of the IA, however, substantially overlaps that of the 
Chamber of Commerce for the Petroleum Industry, which is organized by non-state 
enterprises and approved by the ACFIC in December 2004.104 In some other cases, 
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even if there are no previous industry-based ministries, current ministries may also 
engage in establishing IAs under their own supervision. For example, the China Real 
Estate Association is overseen by the current Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development. The existence of the Association significantly affects the importance of 
the China Real Estate Chamber of Commerce.105 
For the ACFIC, the existence of the IAs is a threat to its power, because the 
ACFIC has no legal as well as no practical ties with any IAs. In general, the ACFIC 
wants to eliminate the role of the IAs in regulating the industries. The battle between 
the IAs and the ICCs becomes more intense when the number of ICCs significantly 
increases. By 2000, there were only fifteen ICCs at the national level. In 2005, the 
number increased to twenty-eight. To counter the development of ICCs, the IAs 
fiercely opposed the ACFIC's campaign for integrating the ICCs, because the 
integration of the ICCs into the ACFIC could provide both the ACFIC and the ICCs 
with more legitimacy. The IAs' proposal was usually quite successful. As one Chinese 
newspaper reports, the opposition from one of the most powerful IAs, the China 
Federation of Industrial Economics (CFIE), severely hindered the ACFIC's integration 
process.106 
Traditionally speaking, the ACFIC is already much weaker than the ACFTU. 
In China, the most powerful mass-representative organizations are the ACFTU, the 
All-China Women's Federation, and the Chinese Communist Youth League. The three 
organizations have enjoyed much higher political status than the ACFIC due to the 
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socialist ideology. More importantly, the Chairman of the ACFTU is always a member 
of the CCP Politburo, while the Chairman of the ACFIC is not. For example, the 
current Chairman of the ACFIC, Huang Mengfu is only the Vice-chairman of the 
People's Political Consultative Conference, and is even not a member of the CCP 
Central Committee, let alone the CCP Politburo. This significantly affected the 
bureaucratic power of the ACFIC in China's central-level policy-making process.  
 The low bureaucratic status of the ACFIC led to the weak political leverage in 
comparison with the ACFTU in the labor policy-making in the 2000s. Being a quasi-
governmental institution, the ACFIC had the preference to enhance its bureaucratic 
power and prestige through promoting the development of the non-state sector and 
delaying the promulgation of rigid labor market rules. The weak political status of the 
ACFIC, however, hindered the crystallization of this preference. In the process of 
making the pro-labor policies, the ACFIC lacked strong bureaucratic status to fight 
against the MOLSS and the ACFTU to put non-state enterprises' requests on the 
agenda. At the same time, the existence of the various IAs and ICCs also reveals that 
China's regulation of the non-state sector was much more fragmented than that of the 
working class. The fragmented organizational nature of the ACFIC inhibited a 
consolidated voice to be heard in the central labor policy-making process. The general 
direction of the pro-labor policies could not be changed. 
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3.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter conducts a positive and negative case analysis on China's 
regulation of the labor condition in the non-state sector in the 2000s. I find that when 
the MOLSS and the ACFTU saw regulating the workforce in the non-state sector as a 
way to regain their bureaucratic power, the social grievances from inside workers 
could be heard in the labor policy-making process. On the other hand, my negative 
case study shows that in China, non-state entrepreneurs were unable to transform their 
wealth into political influence in the pro-labor reform, because there were no strong 
bureaucracies acting on behalf of the non-state sector and fighting against the MOLSS 
and ACFTU. This provides the answer to why the state-led pro-labor policy could 
defeat the resistance from non-state labor-intensive industries.  
Therefore, socio-bureaucratic synergy determines the path of China's labor 
policy reform. For bureaucracies, when they regard “representing” the grievances of 
some social voices as a useful way to enhance their bureaucratic power, they are likely 
to act on behalf of these voices and to make policies whose outcome favors these 
voices. For social actors, they do not have any direct delegation in the government, 
although the government-society relations in China are no longer suppressive today. In 
general, social voices still have no regular avenues to express themselves. The channel 
is only open when some bureaucracies are willing to do it. Accordingly, having a 
bureaucracy in the government willing to act on behalf of them is a prerequisite to 
have a say in the policy-making. When some bureaucracies wish for the same policy 
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outcome as a social force, although for different reasons, we say that the bureaucracies 
and the social voice achieve socio-bureaucratic synergy in the policy-making process.  
This chapter also reveals that Chinese bureaucracies and social forces might 
not always be confrontational. They could sometimes have the same policy preference, 
although for different reasons. But I also disagree with the assumption of equating the 
interest of bureaucracies with that of the social forces supervised by these 
bureaucracies. Chinese bureaucracies have their own interests which are better to be 
understood by their organizational features, historical status, and officials' career 
concerns. Social actors are not the constituents of Chinese ministries. The theory of 
socio-bureaucratic synergy illustrates a top-down decision making style. In China, the 
policy-making is not driven by how social forces seek for being represented by 
bureaucracies in order to be integrated into the decision making process, but by how 
bureaucracies take advantage of social forces to enhance their political status.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The Implementation of the Labor Contract System at the Provincial Level: 
Case Studies on Beijing, Hunan, and Guangdong 
 
Central-local relations provide another example to examine the internal politics 
during the state's labor policy-making. The previous chapter discussed how central 
bureaucracies made use of social grievances in the process of regulating the non-state 
sector. This chapter will analyze how the central reform was perceived by local 
governments, and what accounts for the variations of local implementation. 
Particularly, based on the last chapter's conclusion, this chapter will discuss the 
incentive structure of regional political elites in implementing the pro-labor policy 
reform. Through the investigation of three provincial-level governments, namely 
Beijing Municipality,107 Hunan Province, and Guangdong Province, I will demonstrate 
that local officials' bureaucratic interests to stay more powerful in the localities as well 
as their political aspirations to be promoted to the central government had significant 
impacts on local labor policy outcomes.  
This chapter focuses on China's provincial-level governments.108 The reason to 
choose provinces as the unit of analysis of my study is twofold. First, provincial 
governments determine plans, personnel, and budgets for policy implementation at all 
local levels within the provinces (Chung 2000, 18). The attitudes of provincial 
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governments are critical to the actual formation of local responses to a central policy. 
This importance has been reinforced by the trend of “soft centralization” designed by 
the central government to defeat local protectionism and to achieve a greater degree of 
standardization of policy enforcement. For example, since the late 1990s, authorities 
over the quantity of personnel appointments of many administrative regulatory 
bureaucracies at the township/county level have been centralized to provincial 
governments (Mertha 2005). This new development is summarized into the reform of 
“having the province supervise the county” (sheng guan xian). Under this reform, 
provincial-level governments' influences on grassroots policy implementation are 
significantly strengthened.  
Second, the study on provincial-level governments facilitates our 
understanding of how government officials deal with their local interests under the 
supervision of the central government. As the following discussion will illustrate, 
China's administrative decentralization enabled provincial officials to implement the 
labor contract system in ways that dovetail with their own concerns at the regional 
level. These concerns include bureaucratic interests in the provincial government, and 
the interaction with workers as well as with the business community in the province. 
However, the principle of “implementation according to local conditions” (yindi zhiyi) 
does not amount to a situation where the central government has no role in local policy 
implementation. Under authoritarianism, China's provincial officials are directly 
overseen by the central government through its cadre management system. Being the 
intermediaries between the central government and various levels of local ones, 
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provinces are the direct site to investigate how local officials respond to administrative 
decentralization and political centralization concurrently.  
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one illustrates the different 
patterns of local implementation of the labor contract system in Beijing, Hunan and 
Guangdong. Through the examination of the quality of provincial labor regulations, as 
well as the actual labor contract signing rate and trade union organizing rate, I identify 
the three regions' different degrees of labor regulatory rigidity. Section 4.2 investigates 
the grievances from the working class and the business community in the policy 
implementation processes of the three regions. Section 4.3 analyzes the three cases 
and discusses the provincial officials' political and bureaucratic incentives behind the 
regulation of the labor market. Based on the three case studies, I generate two 
hypotheses to be tested in the next chapter. The chapter's conclusion is provided in the 
fourth section.  
 
4.1 Patterns of Labor Policy-making at the Provincial Level 
 
The central policy of expanding the labor contract system to the non-state 
sector needs local governments' cooperation in practice. In China, provincial 
governments are entitled to promulgate measures, opinions, and rules to facilitate the 
implementation process. Similar to the structure of the central government, the 
bureaucratic status of Provincial Departments of Labor and Social Security (PDLSS) 
and Provincial Federations of Trade Unions (PFTU) in most provincial-level regions is 
much higher than that of Provincial Federations of Industry and Commerce (PFIC). 
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But unlike the central government, provincial officials face stronger demands from 
workers as well as businessmen. Workers' grievances are one of the major concerns of 
the provincial governments because most labor protests remain at the local level and 
seldom target the central government. Moreover, in a country where keeping a high 
level of social stability is one of the most important criteria for the central government 
to evaluate local officials, China's provincial governments usually have deep concerns 
about remedying workers' grievances before they deteriorate into unrest.   
At the same time, unlike the weak political leverage of the non-state business 
community in the central labor policy-making, enterprises are more influential at the 
provincial level, because these businessmen are more desperate to block the actual 
implementation of the pro-labor reform in their own enterprises than to delay the 
promulgation of national policies.109 The externalities of changing the content of a 
national policy results in businessmen's unwillingness to lobby the central government. 
For them, it is more efficient to directly intervene how their own enterprises are 
actually inspected by the local governments than to pressure the central government to 
alter the direction of a national law. The non-state business community are thus more 
eager to empower themselves to overcome the collective action problem to lobby local 
officials. In addition to exerting their influences over the PFIC, the business 
community may also try to lobby the PDLSS, the PFTU and even provincial top 
leaders. When local officials face strong pressure from the business community, their 
economic interests may triumph over the political and bureaucratic incentives, if the 
chances to be promoted or to stay more powerful in the local government are low. In 
                                               
109
 Informant 47. Interview conducted in Guangzhou, Guangdong on June 10, 2008. 
144 
this situation, local officials might choose to speak for the business community to 
promote labor market flexibility, and hence the implementation of the labor contract 
regulation is likely to be delayed. In other scenarios, if officials are strongly guided by 
their political or bureaucratic interests, they will tend to make efforts to build a more 
robust labor regulatory regime. Figure 4.1 illustrates the basic logic of provincial labor 
policy-making.  
 
Figure 4.1 Labor Policy-making at the Provincial Level 
 
 
 
Note:   
PDLSS: Provincial Department of Labor and Social Security 
PFTU: Provincial Federation of Trade Unions 
PFIC: Provincial Federation of Industry and Commerce 
 
As a mediator between the central reform principles and grassroots 
implementation, most provincial governments seldom publicly announced any policies 
that explicitly rejected the central plan of regulating the labor market in the 2000s. 
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However, there were significant variations in the willingness and ability of these 
provincial governments to implement the reform. This chapter conducts case studies 
on a small number of provincial-level regions to have a grasp of the population of all 
Chinese provinces' labor policy implementation. The primary objective of this study is 
oriented toward hypothesis generating rather than testing. To select cases for this task, 
I employ a diverse-case-selection strategy (Gerring 2006, 97-101) to achieve 
maximum variance along my dependent variable (also known as Y), namely the 
degree of provincial efforts in responding to the central reform of regulating the labor 
condition in the non-state sector. These case studies will generate hypotheses about 
how provincial officials' different interests have influenced their reactions to the 
central labor reform agenda. The conclusion shall provide a foundation for my 
hypothesis testing in the next chapter.  
To differentiate the degree of provincial-level governments' labor policy 
implementation, this study first focuses on government regulations. While a labor 
market is not only regulated by written laws (Regini 2000), the regulations and 
administrative activities initiated by local governments directly reveal how these 
governments perceived the central reform principles. In China studies, collecting 
government directives or party documents to examine the decision-making process is 
not a rare approach. As early as in the 1970s, Lieberthal and his assistants investigate 
the “Central Documents” (chung fa) issued by the CCP to understand the politics and 
political decisions within the Chinese Politburo, when these top leaders' meetings are 
not open to the public  (Lieberthal 1978). At the regional level, in the 2000s, the 
legislative processes of most Chinese provincial regulations are still clandestine, much 
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less open than that of national laws in the central government. Top provincial leaders, 
the Director of PDLSS and the Chairman of PFTU usually enjoy the ultimate 
influence over how provincial labor regulations are drafted. Unlike the 2007 LCL 
whose first version was publicized for social feedback, many provincial labor 
regulations were directly announced by the PDLSS and had never been put on the 
discussion agenda of the Provincial People's Congresses. 
This regulation-making practice is categorized by scholars as “departmental 
legislation” (bumen lifa). Departmental legislation has been reported as a serious 
problem in China's regulatory structure. Similar to most other countries, the 
administrative departments in China are the major drafter of most laws, and have the 
discretion to promulgate administrative decrees which do not need to be considered by 
the legislative branch. However, many administrative departments in China have taken 
advantage of this discretion to make enormous administrative decrees, including 
Provisions (guiding), Interim Provisions (zhangxing guiding), Circulars (tongzhi), 
Opinions (yijian) Measures (banfa), and Implementation Details (shishi xize), that 
appear to supplement national laws, but in fact help maximize their bureaucratic 
power in the law implementation processes. Sometimes, even if regulations are subject 
to the approval of Provincial People's Congresses, most of the local Congresses are 
only rubber stamps of the policies proposed by the administrative branch. For example, 
for provincial Ordinances (tiaoli), while the administrative branch usually will put 
them on the agenda of the Standing Committee of the Provincial People's Congress for 
discussion, the final version of these Ordinances still only reflects the interests of 
those who initiate them. In many situations, if an issue concerns more than one 
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government department, all the relevant departments tend to promulgate their own 
regulations. The lack of coordination among these departments is likely to lead to an 
outcome where the departmental regulations are in fact contradictory to each other.  
Accordingly, studying provincial regulations is a direct way to understand how 
provincial officials behave in the labor policy implementation. In fact, students of 
labor market regulations have long recognized the importance of government rules in 
regulating the labor market. Many of them have conducted extensive research on how 
to differentiate stringent labor regulations from generous ones. For example, the 
World Bank assembles a data base of International Labor Office certifications for 119 
countries (Forteza and Rama 2001). Botero et al. collect data on employment, 
collective relations, and social security laws as of 1997 for 85 countries (Botero et al. 
2004). Many of these indexes, however, are not very useful in encapsulating China's 
labor regulatory system. For example, as there is no independent trade union in China, 
the index on the statutory protection and power of unions do not represent the real 
situation in China. Accordingly, I do not use the same criteria to examine the role of 
China's trade unions. In addition, I skip those regulations specifically on social 
security and focus on how provincial governments drafted regulations to implement 
the labor contract system particularly. To conduct a comprehensive survey on the 
various local labor market regulations, policies, and laws related to the implementation 
of the labor contract system, I use several databases, including the Wang Fang Data 
(Policies and Laws of China), the Law Library Online,110 and the collections of the 
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Central Labor Ministry111 and Provincial Labor Departments112 to have a grasp of 
government rules.  
As mentioned in the last chapter, before the 2007 LCL was promulgated, 
China lacked national laws to regulate the process of labor contracting. Most of the 
clauses in the 1994 LL merely focus on termination. At the regional level, however, 
when the national campaign for regulating the labor condition in the non-state sector 
was launched in the early 2000s, most provinces made their own regulations on labor 
contracting process as well as the change, termination and renewal of labor contracts. 
For example, Zhejiang Province announced the Measures for Labor Contracts in 2002 
and Hubei Province introduced its Provisions on Labor Contracts in 2005. These rules 
provided the foundation for provincial-level governments to regulate the labor market 
in their jurisdictions.  
In this chapter, I examine five sets of issues in these labor regulations to 
differentiate their rigidity in regulating the labor contract system (See Appendix 4.2 
for the list of issues for measuring the rigidity of provincial labor regulations on labor 
contracts). In addition to standardizing the process of labor contracting, the reform in 
the 2000s also aimed to reduce the use of short-term contracts and to increase 
employees' job security. Accordingly, I examine the rules on 1) the renewal of labor 
contracts and 2) the promotion of non-fixed-term contracts. A regulation will be more 
rigid if more workers are eligible for contract renewal or non-fixed-term contracts, and 
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if more rules are made to protect the renewal process. Moreover, my indicators also 
include 3) whether the regulation covers collective labor contracts and 4) the role of 
trade unions. In addition, I incorporate 5) the number of articles to measure the overall 
rigidity of a labor regulation. The rationale is that when a regulation has more articles, 
it provides more detailed rules on how labor contracting is regulated.  
Based on the measurement, the rigidity of Chinese provincial regulations on 
labor contracts ranges from 0.0 to 10.5, with 0.0 as the most flexible regulation and 
10.5 as the most rigid. (See Appendix 4.3 for the detailed calculation of rigidity of all 
the 31 provincial-level regions' labor contract regulations.) These regulations can be 
grouped into three categories according to the degree of rigidity as shown in Table 4.1. 
Each category is divided at intervals of three points.  
Table 4.1 The Rigidity of Regulations on Labor Contracts, Unit: Points 
 
Note: * The provincial regulations that cover all the four issues related to labor 
contracting process, the change, termination and renewal of labor contracts cannot be 
found. This is either because these provinces do not make this kind of regulations, or 
simply because the data are missing. If the former is true, the rigidity point of each of 
these provinces is 0.0.  
Source: Author's database and calculations. 
0.0 — 3.0 3.5 — 6.5 7.0 — 10.5
Guangdong 3.0 Hunan 6.5 Beijing 10.5
Jilin 3.0 Heilongjiang 6.5 Liaoning 7.5
Guizhou 3.0 Tianjin 6.0 Zhejiang 7.0
Shaanxi 3.0 Sichuan 6.0 Xinjiang 7.0
Hebei 2.5 Jiangsu 5.5
Hubei 2.5 Hainan 4.5
Anhui 2.0 Yunnan 4.0
Chongqing 2.0 Fujian 4.0
Qinghai 2.0 Gansu 3.5
Henan 0.0* Jiangxi 3.5
Tibet 0.0* Shandong 3.5
Guangxi 0.0* Shanghai 3.5
Shanxi 0.0* Inner Mongolia 3.5
Ningxia 3.5
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To generate hypotheses regarding the causes of Chinese provincial 
governments' implementation of the central pro-labor policy reform, I choose three 
diverse cases from the Table for my study. According to Gerring, if the variable of 
interest is continuous, the researcher usually selects cases that have the highest, lowest, 
and mean or median values (2006). Following the rule, I choose one case from each of 
the group in Table 4.1 to examine how they have built the labor regulatory regimes to 
implement the central reform of expanding the labor contract system since the late 
1990s. The three cases are Beijing Municipality, Hunan Province and Guangdong 
Province. They represent different degrees of provincial labor regulation rigidity in 
China. Before the discussion on the behaviors of the three provincial-level 
governments, some basic information about these three regions is provided in 
Appendix 4.4 and 4.5. In general, Guangdong's economic size has been much larger 
than that of Beijing and Hunan since the early 1990s (See Appendix 4.4). While the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Beijing and Hunan was similar to each other, 
Hunan was a more backward province in terms of GDP per Capita. Hunan's GDP per 
Capita was below the national average, and much lower than Beijing's (See Appendix 
4.5). The following section will detail how the three governments promoted the labor 
contract system in the 2000s.  
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4.1.1 Rigid Labor Market Regulations in Beijing  
 
Beijing's efforts to implement the labor contract system were found in the 
numerous municipal regulations and detailed clauses within these regulations. Just 
after the promulgation of the 1994 Labor Law, Beijing started to draft local rules for 
implementing the LL. In February 1995, the Beijing government announced “Some 
Provisions on Implementing the Labor Contract System,” which required enterprises 
to sign contracts with all workers by 1996. The detailed guideline was subsequently 
laid out in the “Implementation Details of Executing the Labor Contract System,” 
released in March 1995, which asked enterprises to make drafts of labor contracts. 
These drafts would not be validated until trade unions' or workers assemblies' approval, 
and the contracts needed local Labor Bureaus' confirmation. The major targets of these 
regulations, however, were not the non-state sector, because the focus of labor 
contracting was still on deregulating SOEs at that time.  
In the early 2000s, Beijing started to make regulations for expanding the labor 
contract system to the non-state sector. In December 2001, the “Beijing Municipal 
Provisions on Labor Contracts” was passed by the Standing Conference of Beijing 
Government. The document has 53 articles and provides more detailed rules in 
regulating the labor contracting process than the 1994 LL as well as the Hunan and 
Guangdong counterparts (See Appendix 4.8). Several clauses are different from the 
1994 LL. For example, regarding probationary periods, the Beijing Provisions are 
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more strict and detailed.113 Moreover, regarding the eligibility of non-fixed-term labor 
contracts, in addition to those who have worked consecutively for an employer for ten 
years, the Beijing Provisions state that a non-fixed-term contract should also be 
concluded if a worker receives labor awards such as the Wuyi Labor Award. In 
general, this document is more rigid in regulating the labor market than the 1994 LL.  
Besides promoting non-state enterprises to sign contracts and regulating the 
content of these contracts, Beijing also intended to correct the tendency toward short-
term contracts and to promote renewing contracts. In 2000, the Beijing Bureau of 
Labor and Social Security (BBLSS) and the Beijing Federation of Trade Unions 
(BFTU) jointly announced the “Opinion about Further Steps for Renewing and 
Terminating Labor Contracts.” The efforts to use governmental rules to regulate the 
non-state sector have become more intensive since the mid-2000s. In July 2005, 
Beijing announced the “Circular about Further Steps for Stimulating the Non-state 
Sector to Regulate Labor Contracts.” This notice asks the Beijing Federation of 
Industry and Commerce (BFIC), namely the Beijing branch of the central 
government's State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), to work with 
the BBLSS to improve the rate at which labor contracts are signed. Moreover, the 
Committee Conference of the BFTU published the “Guideline for Promoting the Task 
of Labor Contracting.” The Guideline emphasizes the role of firm-level trade unions in 
helping enterprises to draft individual labor contracts, as well as in investigating 
whether the clauses in these contracts adhere to a lower standard than those in the 
                                               
113
 According to the 2001 Beijing Regulation, if the term of a labor contract is less than six months, the 
probationary period shall not exceed 15 days. If the term is sixth months to one year, the length of the 
probationary period should be less than one month. A six-month probationary period is only allowed for 
a labor contract of two years (or longer).  
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collective contracts. In September 2005, the BBLSS organized a large-scale inspection. 
As one of the officials who participated in this inspection informed me, most of the 
labor officials, especially the labor commissioners (laodong baozhang zhuanguan 
yuan),114 actively participated in the inspection, because they had to fulfill the orders 
from the leaders. “We at least should find one factory in a district that failed to sign 
contracts with some of their employees. We then fined the factory for its wrongdoings. 
Otherwise, the chances for us to be promoted within the Bureau or to get a raise would 
be decreased.”115 
In 2006, when the central government launched the Three Year Acting 
Program of Promoting the Labor Contract System, most provinces announced their 
own provincial-level practical schemes to help implement the central agenda. 
According to Beijing's scheme, a Small Leading Group (SLG) was to establish for 
supervising the task. The SLG coordinated several municipal bureaus including the 
Bureau of Industry and Commerce, the Commission of Housing and Urban-rural 
Development, the Commission of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration, 
and the Commission of Transport. At the same time, big enterprises were asked to 
prepare collective contracts for their workers. The BFTU published standardized and 
“boilerplate” copies of collective labor contracts in October 2008, and chose 100 
enterprises within the city to experiment with the standardized contracts.116  
 The Labor Bureau and the Trade Union Federation in Beijing were the major 
advocates of these programs. In fact, they were also the direct beneficiaries of the task 
                                               
114
 Labor commissioners are one kind of grassroots administrators and street-level bureaucrats in the 
Labor Bureau. See later discussion in Section 4.3.2. 
115
 Informant 26. Interview conducted in Beijing on April 16, 2008.  
116
 See Beijing Yearbook 2009.  
154 
of regulating the non-state sector in the municipality. Forcing non-state enterprises to 
sign contracts with workers mandated the use of the Labor Bureau's efforts to inspect 
these enterprises. More fiscal transfers were thus made by the Beijing Bureau of 
Finance into the Labor Bureau's coffers in order to conduct these activities. Lower-
level officials in the Labor Bureau sensed that “the Bureau seems to have been getting 
richer since 2005.”117 Moreover, some officials in the Labor Bureau reported that “the 
Bureau has more authorities than before. Now most enterprises have to pay attention 
to our inspection. Although it is impossible for the Bureau to become as influential as 
it was in the pre-reform era, when it had the ability to directly intervene in enterprises' 
labor allocations, these new activities help enhance the strength of the Bureau.”118 
Regulating the non-state sector not only magnified the reputation of the Beijing 
Labor Bureau, but also enabled the Beijing Trade Union Federation to regain its power 
in the municipal governing system. According to the 2001 Trade Union Law (TUL), 
the implementation of the collective contracting system needs trade union's 
participation. Moreover, organizing unions in the non-state sector also largely 
enhanced its power and prestige, as discussed in Chapter Three, and this was also true 
in Beijing. According to the 2002 Beijing Measure for Implementing the TUL, if an 
enterprise in a street (jiedao) fails to organize a union after half a year from the date 
when the enterprise is established, the upper-level union, namely the one at the district 
                                               
117
 Informant 26. Interview conducted in Beijing on April 16, 2008. As to the question of why the 
Bureau was in possession of greater assets, the informant refused to guess from where the money might 
have come.  
118
 Informant 25. Interview conducted in Beijing on March 11, 2008.  
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level, can (and is directed to) force it to form one.119 Moreover, it also provides that if 
an enterprise has more than 25 female workers, it is to form a female employee 
committee within the trade union. These rules on union organization are much stricter 
than those in the 2001 TUL (See Appendix 4.7). At the same time, regarding financial 
resources, the 2002 Beijing Measure also provides more detailed clauses than does the 
2001 TUL. It states that the fee should be paid to trade unions by the 15th of every 
month. If an enterprise fails to submit the full amount, the penalty will be 5% of the 
outstanding balance (Article 51).  
In addition, to make the policy-making more accessible, the BFTU advocated 
the following policies. First, a tripartite mechanism was established at the municipal 
level in 2005. According to the Beijing Three Year Acting Program of Promoting the 
Labor Contract System promulgated in 2006, Beijing aimed to establish tripartite 
mechanisms in 95% of those streets (jiedao) and towns within districts or counties that 
were close to the core of the city, and in 59% of the streets and towns within districts 
or counties that were far away from the core of the city.120 Second, according to the 
2002 Beijing Measure, any governments above the county level are required to form a 
joint conference (lianxi huiyi) with the Federation of Trade Unions at the same level to 
report any critical economic policy changes that have significant impacts on 
employees (Article 38). This enabled the BFTU to have a say in the government's 
economic policy-making.  
 
                                               
119
 See Appendix 4.1. Streets (jiedao) locate at the 5th level in the Chinese administrative structure, 
while the district level is at 4th.  
120
 See Beijing Yearbook 2009. 
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4.1.2 Restructuring Provincial Bureaucracies in Hunan  
 
As indicated in Table 4.1, the rigidity of “Hunan Provisions on Labor 
Contracts” is lower than that of Beijing. The rules in the Hunan Provisions are less 
detailed (See Appendix 4.8). In addition, in terms of quantities, Hunan promulgated 
fewer labor regulations than did Beijing. The Provisions was passed by the Standing 
Conference of Hunan Government in April 2003, one year after the Beijing Provisions 
came into being. Unlike in Beijing, where several municipal regulations were 
announced before the 2001 Beijing Provisions, this document was the first regulation 
on labor contracts in Hunan since the 1994 LL was promulgated.  
The rules on contracting process in the Hunan Provisions are similar to the 
2001 Beijing Provisions. Apparently, the former treated the latter as its model, and 
learned from the latter's experience when drawing up its own regulation. As an official 
in the Legislative Affairs Section of the Hunan Labor and Social Security Department 
stated, “when we were drawing our own regulations, we carefully studied all the other 
provinces' regulations to make sure that we came up with the best one suitable for 
Hunan.”121 The “best” regulation, however, contains much less detailed component-
rules than does its Beijing counterpart. 
On the other hand, regarding the Provincial Measure for Implementing the 
TUL, Hunan promulgated its rule in 2003, still one year after Beijing. In the Measure, 
the definition of the trade union's function is much less clear than in the Beijing 
document. For example, the Hunan rule does not specify punishments for when 
                                               
121
 Informant 35. Interview conducted in Changsha, Hunan on May 20, 2008. 
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enterprises fail to submit fees to the trade union. Overall, the rules in the Hunan 
Measure are not particularly rigid compared to those in the 1994 LL, and are much 
weaker than those in the Beijing Measure. Indeed, the Hunan provincial government 
did not put much attention to making regulations. In Hunan, more efforts were made 
to organize new bureaucracies to supervise the task of regulating the labor market; 
promulgating regulations was not the focus.  
Hunan started to actively participate in regulating the labor market from the 
year 2005 on by establishing new bureaucratic agencies which supported the 
provincial Labor Department. In 2005, the Hunan government published a black list of 
twenty enterprises that had failed to sign labor contracts. In August 2006, the Hunan 
Labor Department promulgated the provincial Three Year Acting Program, and named 
2006 the “Year of Regulating Labor Contracts.” The program divided the steps for 
promoting labor contracts into three stages. At the first stage, lower levels of 
government were asked to choose some enterprises as “demonstration units.” At the 
second stage in December 2007, the focus was to regulate the content of contracts. 
The government issued standardized copies of contracts for different sectors and 
recommended enterprises prepare contracts similar to them. The standardized 
contracts abolished the division of temporary workers and fixed workers. Employers 
needed to pay social insurances for all workers. Enterprises also were not allowed to 
divide employees into different categories. The goal of the last stage was to have 98% 
of the non-state enterprises sign labor contracts with their workers.  
According to the Hunan Three Year Acting Program, a new bureaucracy 
should be established to coordinate different departments within the Hunan provincial 
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government. Similar to Beijing, the “Hunan Small Leading Group of Labor 
Contracting and Wage Assignment”122 was put into practice in 2006 to promote the 
labor contract system. In comparison with Beijing, more provincial departments were 
incorporated into the Hunan SLG under the leadership of the Labor Department. These 
departments included the Bureau of Industry and Commerce, Departments of Finance, 
Public Security, Housing and Urban-rural Development, Civil Affairs, and 
Supervision. (See Appendix 4.8 for the comparison of SLGs in different provincial-
level regions.) The SLG served as a platform to integrate the relevant departments into 
the project of promoting the labor contract system.  
The Hunan SLG was a powerful institution in the provincial government not 
only because it had the authority to supervise many departments, but also because 
several critical government agencies, including the Public Security and Finance 
Departments as shown in Appendix 4.8, who were in charge of the province's social 
stability and budget allocation respectively, were subject to the leadership of the Labor 
Department in the LSG. For its Beijing counterpart, the two relevant Bureaus were not 
included in the Beijing SLG. For many other provinces, establishing the LSG of Labor 
Contracting was even not required in their Three Year Acting Programs. For those 
who aimed to create LSGs, the new bureaucracy usually only consisted of the 
members in the tripartite meeting for coordinating labor relations, namely the Labor 
Department, the Federation of Trade Unions, and the Enterprise Confederation. Only a 
few provinces' SLGs were granted to supervise other departments, and the Hunan LSG 
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 See Hunan Labor and Social Security Department. 
http://ldt.hunan.gov.cn/pub/govweb/gzdt/2006/t20061108_12462.htm 
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was one of those who could successfully serve as a powerful leader in coordinating 
their critical provincial colleagues in the process of labor policy implementation.  
In addition to the new SLG, which aimed to coordinate the different 
departments at the provincial level, a Liaison Mechanism was established in Hunan to 
generate comprehensive policy guidelines for all the three levels of government below 
the provincial level.123 The mechanism was based on a plan called “uniting three 
levels into one action” (sanji liandong). All the three levels, namely the province 
(sheng), prefecture-level municipalities or autonomous prefectures (dijishi or 
zizhizhou), and counties or city districts (xian or shixiaqu), were to select enterprises 
with differing types of ownership structure as “demonstration units” to implement the 
labor contract system. Usually, only those enterprises with good percentage records of 
signing contracts would be selected as the demonstration units. “This was because we 
wanted to show to other enterprises the positive consequences of signing labor 
contracts with workers. Complying with the Labor Law would not impede profit 
generation. These units had already shown good economic performance.”124  The 
demonstration units were to achieve the end of signing contracts with all their workers 
by 2008. This plan constructed a network among demonstration units at different 
levels so as to expand the system “from a single point to the whole plain” (you dian 
dao mian). By the end of 2007, there were a total of 221 enterprises selected as 
demonstration units in Hunan Province.125   
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 See the official website of the MOLSS. http://w1.mohrss.gov.cn/gb/zt/2006-
08/28/content_130407.htm 
124
 Informant 34. Interview conducted in Yiyan, Hunan on May 30, 2008. 
125
 See the official website of the MOLSS. http://w1.mohrss.gov.cn/gb/zt/2006-
08/28/content_130407.htm 
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The establishment of the Small Leading Group and the Liaison Mechanism 
strengthened the power of the Hunan Department of Labor and Social Security in 
particular in coordinating other administrative branches within the province. This gave 
it the opportunity to enhance its actual ranking among other departments in the 
provincial government. On the other hand, in general, while the activities covering 
regulating the labor market also increased the importance of the Hunan Federation of 
Trade Unions (HFTU), Hunan's policy of establishing new bureaucracies contributed 
little to the improvement of the Trade Union's political power. Unlike in Beijing where 
the Trade Union vigorously participated in the policy-making process to promulgate 
regulations to strengthen its reputation and function, the weaker and less clear 
regulations regarding the role of trade unions in Hunan disclosed that the HFTU was 
not the prime initiator of the reform in the 2000s. The activities centered around 
restructuring the bureaucracy in Hunan particularly favored the Labor Department in 
the province.  
The Hunan Labor Department also registered the attempts to strengthen its 
power through bargaining with other departments for more tasks to be included under 
its jurisdiction. Traditionally, if a department was in charge of more critical tasks, it 
would become more powerful compared to others. In fact, in the 2000s, complaints 
about the heavy workload in the Labor Department were prevalent among grassroots 
labor officials in Hunan. Many of these complaints resulted from the Labor 
Department overstepping unclear boundaries with other departments. A labor 
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assistant126 in the Yiyang Municipal Labor Bureau in Hunan reported that he had to 
deal with some tasks that were originally assigned to other Bureaus, including the 
Civil Affairs Bureau. For him, his primary tasks already included running the 
programs of vocational training and medical insurance for flexible employees as well 
as issuing the “re-employment preferential license” for laid-off workers. He stated, 
“the workload is already huge. We often need to work overtime, but still the 
assignments cannot be completed on time. Still, last year the Labor Bureau asked us to 
take over the management of Subsistence Security System. This should not be part of 
our work. This belongs to the Civil Affairs Bureau, and they also have assistants to 
deal with this kind of insurance. As far as I know, they seldom work overtime. Why 
do our bureau leaders put greater workloads on our shoulders? Maybe there is no need 
for the Civil Affairs Bureau to hire assistants for the Subsistence Security System.”127  
The ministerial struggle for more tasks to be taken up by its own ministry is a 
traditional point of debate in China's bureaucratic battle. A researcher in the Beijing 
Academy of Social Science informed me that the All China Women's Federation and 
the Ministry of Agriculture were usually involved in a conflict of who could speak for 
migrant workers' children.128 The reason why having the right to speak for the group 
was important resided in the fact that the one that was ultimately found eligible to 
represent the voice of migrant workers' children would receive the funding to conduct 
research on the topic, as well as to regulate the group. The same logic is also 
applicable to the Hunan Labor Department. In order to enhance its bureaucratic power 
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 Labor assistants are one kind of grassroots administrators in the Labor Bureau. See later discussion.  
127
 Informant 37. Interview conducted in Yiyan, Hunan on May 25, 2008.  
128
 Informant 23. Interview conducted in Beijing on July 10, 2008. 
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and function compared to other departments, as the interview cited above shows, it 
also engaged in bargaining with others for more tasks to be assigned to its purview.  
 
4.1.3 Weak Labor Regulatory Regime in Guangdong  
 
Unlike Beijing and Hunan, the Guangdong government did not make 
considerable efforts to regulate the labor market until the late 2000s. In the early and 
mid-2000s, the province only had one regulation, namely the 2003 “Guangdong 
Provincial Provisions on Labor Contracts”, to regulate the labor condition in the non-
state sector. Most of the articles in this 2003 Provisions, however, are largely the same 
as its 1995 predecessor, namely the “Guangdong Provincial Provisions on Labor 
Contracts” promulgated in April 1995. But the 1995 predecessor was drafted to 
facilitate the liberalization of SOE labor force, and not for the task of regulating the 
non-sate sector. Still, the 1995 Provisions became the blueprint of Guangdong's main 
document for implementing the central policy of regulating the non-state sector in the 
2000s. There are only two articles that were revised to complete the 2003 version. 
This reveals that the Guangdong government did not invest in drafting provincial 
regulations for the very task of regulating the non-state sector within its justification. 
In comparison with the 1994 LL, some of the rules in the 2003 Guangdong 
Provisions, particularly those about signing and terminating a labor contract, are more 
rigid.129 However, many other articles are more flexible than the 1994 LL. For 
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 For example, Article 7 of the 2003 Guangdong Regulation states that enterprises should sign 
contracts with their employees within 30 days after the employees are recruited. Moreover, if an 
enterprise does not choose to use the normal copy of the contract, its contract needs to be confirmed by 
163 
example, the 2003 Guangdong Provisions restrain the use of non-fixed-term contracts. 
An employee can request a non-fixed-term contract only if he or she is in a regular 
technological position within his or her enterprise. For collective contracts, the 
Guangdong Provisions limit the length of a collective contract to three years. These 
flexible rules are not found in the Beijing or Hunan counterparts.  
On the other hand, regarding the role of the Guangdong Federation of Trade 
Unions, in September 2004, Guangdong announced the “Measure for Implementing 
the TUL,” two years after Beijing and one year after Hunan. According to this 
document, enterprises are to organize their unions within six months. Regarding the 
issue of funding, similar to the Hunan counterpart, the document does not specify the 
punishment if enterprises fail to submit fees to the trade union, as does the Beijing 
Provisions.  
In fact, the Guangdong government did not intend to actively regulate the labor 
market until 2007 when the new Provincial Party Secretary Wang Yang made several 
public announcements to support the pro-labor reform. In November 2008, on his way 
to investigate the economic situation in Zhanjiang Municipality in the province, Wang 
publicly declared that while the implementation of the 2007 LCL had largely 
increased the labor cost of many enterprises in the province, the bankrupted 
enterprises had only become that way due to their own low productivity, and there was 
no need to save them.130  
                                                                                                                                       
the Labor Department. When terminating the contract, the enterprise is to inform the employee 30 days 
prior. Otherwise, it will have to pay one month's wages to the employee as separation compensation. 
These articles are more rigid than those in the 1994 LL in regulating the labor market.  
130
 Xinhau New Agency, November 14, 2008. http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2008-
11/14/content_10356311.htm 
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In addition to Wang's endorsement, the Guangdong government also called for 
a regulation for the implementation of the LCL. In March 2007, it publicized the draft 
of “Measure for Implementing the Labor Contract Law” for public feedback.131 The 
Standing Committee of the Guangdong People's Congress (GPC) and the Guangdong 
Government together marked the promulgation of the Measure as a critical task in the 
2008 Annual Legislative Plan.132 This move encountered strong resistance from many 
labor-intensive manufacturing industries in the province. The making of the Measure 
was finally suspended in November 2008 when the Financial and Economic Affairs 
Committee of the GPC recommended to postpone this legislation until more 
investigation is done to understand the economic consequences of the LCL. Despite of 
this suspension, Guangdong was still one of those provincial governments who 
pioneered a draft to implement the national LCL.133  
 
To sum up, these regulations and administrative activities documented how 
much effort the three provincial-level governments made in the process of 
implementing the labor contract system. In addition to them, the actual outcome of 
labor policy implementation provides us with a supplementary story of whether the 
central reform direction was carried out by the provincial governments or not. To have 
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 The draft of the Measure can be found on the official website of the Legislative Affairs Office of the 
Guangdong Government. 
http://www.fzb.gd.gov.cn/home/article_show1.jsp?act=view&articleID=c11c3131fea4783da992c8336b
7d5055&catalogID=768371d74983e3120bba56cb5b675593&path=%D5%FE%B8%AE%C1%A2%B7
%A8-%C1%A2%B7%A8%D5%F7%C7%F3%D2%E2%BC%FB 
132
 Xihua News Agency, April 10th, 2008. http://www.gd.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-
04/10/content_12924481.htm  
133
 Jilin Province was another pioneer. In November 2007, Jilin announced the “Regulation on Labor 
Contract.” This Regulation took effect on the same date as the LCL did, and was recorded as the first 
provincial rule on the implementation of the 2007 LCL.  
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a glance of how successfully the labor contract system was implemented, the study 
collects the official data about how many workers were hired with written labor 
contracts from provinces' annual yearbooks. Table 4.2 shows the average labor 
contract signing rates in the three regions from 2000 to 2005.  
 
Table 4.2 The Average Labor Contract Signing Rates in Beijing, Hunan, and 
Guangdong from 2000 to 2005*** 
Year Beijing Hunan Guangdong 
Type of enterprises All urban enterprises* All enterprises All enterprises 
Average rate 87.03 88.12 85.92 ** 
Note:  
* refers to the rate of labor contract renewal. The Beijing Yearbooks did not record the 
rate of signing labor contracts. 
** The record in 2003 is missing. This number in Guangdong is the average rate of 
labor contracting in 2000-2002, 2004 and 2005.  
*** See Appendix 4.9 for the original data on each year.  
Source: The Yearbooks (Nianjian) of Beijing, Hunan, and Guangdong, 2001-2006. 
 
According to this official record, from 2000-2005, the average rate of workers 
with written contracts in Guangdong was lower than that in Hunan and Beijing. While 
there were no data on the labor contract signing rate of all enterprises in Beijing, the 
Table shows that Beijing was successful in forcing urban enterprises to renew their 
workers' contracts. These records provide supplementary information and confirm the 
aforementioned discussion that in general, Beijing and Hunan put more efforts to build 
rigid labor regulatory regimes than Guangdong.  
On the other hand, the activities of organizing trade unions also reflected 
whether the provincial governments successfully implemented the central plan of 
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regulating the labor market. Figure 4.2 compares the trade union density in all 
enterprises in Beijing, Hunan, and Guangdong.  
 
Figure 4.2 Trade Union Density in Beijing, Hunan, and Guangdong, 2002-2006. Unit: 
%.  
 
Note:  
1. Union density is calculated from the number of total trade union members in a 
province divided by the number of all employed in the province.  
2. The number of trade union members is collected from the Statistical Yearbooks 
(Tongji Nianjian) of Chinese Trade Unions, 2001-2007, and the number of all 
employed is from the Statistical Yearbooks of Beijing, Hunan, and Guangdong, 2001-
2007.  
 
The Figure shows that in Beijing, the overall trade union density, regardless of 
the ownership structures, was constantly much higher than that in Hunan and 
Guangdong. The fact that Hunan had the lowest union density rate implies that the 
province's action to regulate the labor market was largely dominated by the Labor 
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Department, and not the Trade Union. As Section 4.2.2 already illustrated, in Hunan, 
the construction of the labor regulatory regime was centered around the issue of 
restructuring the government bureaucracies led by the Labor Department. The Hunan 
Trade Union was much weaker in the process, and hence the campaign of organizing 
trade unions favored by the Hunan Federation of Trade Unions was not very 
successful.  
In a nutshell, the various provincial regulations and administrative activities, 
together with supplementary data such as the labor contract signing rates and trade 
union organizing rates, reveal that different provincial governments have invested 
different efforts to implement the central pro-labor reform. The following sections will 
investigate how social grievances and bureaucratic interests may play a role in these 
variations. 
 
4.2 Social Grievances in the Provincial Labor Policy-making Processes  
 
The last chapter informs us that the potential unrest from workers itself is 
inadequate to indicate the direction of labor policy reform. This section will look into 
the provincial policy-making processes to see whether workers' grievances are still not 
the determinant factor in explaining provincial labor policy outcomes.  
In China, workers' political influence can hardly be judged by their ability to 
get organized because the possibility to have collective voices pressing the 
government is constantly very low and in today's China, almost all labor protests 
remain cellular  (C. Lee 2007). But sometimes, even when there are no organized 
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labor protests, the government might still act preemptively to promulgate pro-labor 
policies in order to prevent workers' grievances from deteriorating into protests. If this 
is true, a government should be more willing to regulate the labor market if potential 
labor unrest is likely to take place. Given that we can barely know the potential 
damage of these protests to the local stability through observing workers' ability in 
organizing themselves, we need to find other indicators to examine the potentiality of 
labor unrest sparking off in a certain locality.   
In theory, this potentiality varies according to provinces' employment 
structures, namely how large a proportion of workers is hired in labor-intensive 
industries (LIIs), because LIIs are more likely to exploit their employees, given that 
labor cost accounts for the largest expense in these companies. In China, many LIIs 
adopt practices to increase numerical flexibility including the use of workers with 
short-term contracts or even without any contracts. Labor unrest such as employee 
suicides and strikes is more frequently found in these industries. When more workers 
are hired in labor-intensive industries in a province, the provincial government will 
tend to feel less safe, because labor unrest is more likely to happen and will be more 
detrimental to the maintenance of the province's social stability. This study thus uses 
the share of employees in LIIs in a provincial-level region as the proxy to measure the 
degree of potential labor instability in that locality.  
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4.2.1 Workers' Grievances at the Provincial Level  
 
To identify labor-intensive industries in China, I calculate the factor intensity 
in every Chinese industry. Factor intensity can be measured in several ways. Das and 
Kalita (2009) examines the labor-capital ratio defined as number of labor per unit real 
gross fixed capital, and divides India's manufacturing industries into labor- and 
capital-intensive respectively. X. Zhang (2000) groups China's tradable manufacturing 
commodities into physical capital-intensive, human capital-intensive, and unskilled 
labor-intensive ones, based on the measurement of the capital stock and the skill levels 
of these industries. According to Zhang, the indicator of capital stock is the physical 
capital-labor ratio, defined as the net value of fixed capital assets per employee. And 
skilled labor refers to those who have education above the high school level (over nine 
years of schooling).  
In this chapter, I examine all the Chinese industries as listed on the Chinese 
Yearly Industrial Data published by China's National Bureau of Statistics, and divides 
these industries into two categories only, capital- and labor-intensive. The reason why 
I do not adopt Zhang's categorization to distinguish human capital-intensive from 
unskilled labor-intensive industries is that most of Zhang's human capital-intensive 
industries are not free from labor protests. In fact, mass group incidents (quntixing 
shijian) are widespread in these industries too. Take the electronic manufacturing 
industry for example. This industry falls into the human capital-intensive category in 
Zhang's study. As a local Chinese newspaper reported, among the forty-one mass 
group incidents which occurred from January to June in 2010 in various Chinese 
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provinces, there were sixteen cases taking place in electronic manufacturing 
factories.134 Moreover, in many localities, it is common for workers whose education 
is above the high school level to go on a strike. This demonstrates that in China, labor 
instability is also serious in many human-capital intensive industries. We should thus 
include these industries when calculating the degree of potential social unrest in a 
locality.  
In the Chinese Yearly Industrial Database, there are thirty-nine industries in 
total.135 I categorize these industries into two groups by the capital-labor ratio defined 
as the net value of fixed capital assets per employee. Using the 2006 data, the labor 
intensity (capital-labor ratio) in all the 39 Chinese industries ranges from 22.59 (the 
industry of Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products) to 1007.87 (the industry of 
Electricity and Heating Production and Supply), and the medium number is 96.37. 
Nineteen industries whose capital-labor ratios are less than 96.37 in 2006 are selected 
as labor-intensive ones (See Appendix 4.10).  
The three provincial-level regions display different patterns of employment 
structure. The percentages of employees hired in labor-intensive industries in Beijing 
was 40% of all its employees in 2006, while in Hunan, it was 43% and in Guangdong, 
it was more than 60%. 
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 The list was created by Wenwei News Info, July 02, 2010. 
http://trans.wenweipo.com/gb/info.wenweipo.com/ 
135
 The list of industries is provided in Appendix 4.10. 
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Table 4.3 Employment Structure of Beijing, Hunan, and Guangdong, 2006. Unit: % 
 
 
 
Note: The share of employees in LIIs in a province is calculated by the number of 
employees in LIIs divided by the number of employees in all industries in the province.  
Source: Yearly Industrial Data 2006, China Data On-line, and author's calculations.  
 
Table 4.3 illustrates that, among the three provincial-level regions, Guangdong 
suffered a much higher degree of potential labor instability than Beijing and Hunan. 
Guangdong's high degree of potential labor unrest, however, did not result in a 
stronger labor regulatory regime established in the province until 2007. In comparison, 
while the potential labor instability in Beijing were less serious, the government still 
made efforts to draft detailed and rigid regulations to support the labor contract system. 
At the same time, Hunan also invested in building a labor regulatory regime, despite 
the low degree of potential labor unrest. Potential social instability itself did not seem 
to be the ultimate reason for a local government to build a pro-labor regime.  
 
4.2.2 Resistance of the Business Community at the Provincial Level  
 
Unlike the central bureaucrats, provincial officials face much stronger 
resistance of the business community to the regulation of the labor market. This is 
because for most enterprises, blocking the local policy implementation is much more 
important than lobbying the central officials to make preferential national regulations. 
Accordingly, most businessmen only wield their power at the local level. This 
Provincial-level Region Beijing Hunan Guangdong
The Share of Employees 40 43 62
in Labor-intensive Industries
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explains the observation made by many researchers that despite the announcement of 
many high-quality labor regulations by the central government, the actual labor 
conditions in China at the enterprise level still have not been significantly improved.   
However, while many businessmen act strongly to delay the implementation of 
the labor contract system in their enterprises, they are not very successful in stopping 
local governments' campaigns for ensuring every worker to have a labor contract. Nor 
could they delay the activity of organizing trade unions in their enterprises. As some 
researchers point out, in the 2000s, many enterprises could not resist the establishment 
of trade unions in their factories, because local governments firmly supported the 
central government's union organizing agenda, given that the policy was helpful for 
social stability (Liu 2008, 19-20). Most enterprises were forced to accept unions due to 
the pressure of local governments. At the same time, many enterprises were also not 
able to stop local governments' inspection of labor contract signing, because the policy 
was the major focus of the central government. In many localities, the top agenda of 
labor inspecting missions was to force enterprises to sign labor contracts. For example, 
the Beijing government announced hard indicators (zhibiao) to force the district and 
county governments to achieve a certain level of labor contracting.136 The campaigns 
for signing labor contracts and organizing trade unions generally met the purpose.  
Businessmen were, however, very successful in posing obstacles to the 
implementation of some other rules, such as those on overtime work and wage arrears, 
which were also supposed to be regulated under the labor contract system. As labor-
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 See the website of Beijing Recruitment (gongzhao). 
http://www.bjgongzhao.com.cn/bjgongzhao/ARTICLES/64910/124103.htm 
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intensive enterprises were the hardest hit by rigid labor market regulations, many 
businessmen made use of their personal connections to lobby all the relevant 
government officials, including those in the Labor Departments, the Provincial 
Federations of Trade Unions, the Provincial Federations of Industry and Commerce, 
and even top provincial leaders, to impede the full implementation of the pro-labor 
policies in their enterprises. 
Among the three cases under study, Guangdong's labor-intensive industries 
had the strongest leverage in the provincial labor policy implementation process, 
because the province's economy relied more on these industries' development. Table 
4.4 calculates the share of LII's value-added to illustrate these industries' importance to 
the local economy. To make sure the economic growth, the Guangdong officials were 
more likely to compromise with these enterprises. 
 
Table 4.4 The Importance of LIIs to Beijing's, Hunan's, and Guangdong's economic 
growth, 2006. Unit: %.  
 
 
 
Note: The importance of LIIs to a province's economic growth is calculated by the 
value-added of LIIs divided by the value-added of all industries in the province.  
Source: Yearly Industrial Data 2006, China Data On-line, and author's calculations.  
 
In comparison with Hunan, the importance of LIIs to Beijing's economy was 
lesser. This demonstrates that in Beijing, the government did not have to make high 
degrees of compromise with labor-intensive enterprises about the labor contract 
system in order to keep the province's economic growth. This provides the foundation 
Provincial-level Region Beijing Hunan Guangdong
The Share of the Value-added 24 35 38
of Labor-intensive Industries
174 
for the Beijing government to build a more rigid labor regulatory regime. On the other 
hand, in Hunan, LIIs had stronger leverage in the province, because the share of the 
LII's value-added in Hunan is larger than that in Beijing. This somehow explains why 
the Hunan labor regulations were weaker than those of Beijing. However, the Hunan 
officials still invested in building bureaucratic agencies to support the regulation of the 
labor market. As will be discussed in the next section, Hunan's plan largely resulted 
from the labor officials' bureaucratic interests to stay more powerful in the province.  
For Guangdong, the government was less willing to supply more rigid labor 
policies because the development of LIIs is important to its economic growth, even 
though the flexible labor regulatory regime is likely to trigger more serious labor 
unrest. However, these privileges given to the business community were rescinded in 
2007. The next section will discuss how the labor-intensive industries lost the game in 
2007 when the provincial leader's aspirations for more political power triumphed over 
the concern about local economic growth.  
 
4.3 Political and Bureaucratic Incentives behind the Provincial Labor Policy-
making  
 
As discussed in section 4.1, to construct a provincial labor regulatory regime to 
carry out the central pro-labor reform, similar to the national process, the PDLSS and 
the PFTU were the major actor. Top provincial leaders also had a role in the process in 
the sense that they could intervene in the policy-making if they did not see eye to eye 
with these labor officials. Accordingly, this section studies two types of local officials. 
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In addition to top provincial leaders, who can usually be regarded as the generalists 
(Shih 2009), I include a study of the career patterns of a particular sub-level provincial 
political elites, who enjoy a status called “zheng di ting ji,” signifying that they hold a 
director-level position within a provincial department. These particular bureaucrats 
usually falls into the “technocrats faction” in Shih's terms (2009). This level of 
officials who are in charge of the PDLSS and the PFTU are frequently critical of 
drafting provincial labor regulations. Due to the tradition of “departmental legislation”, 
many provincial regulations directly reflect these bureaucracies' interests. 
To have a good grasp of these officials' promotion routes, I use data from 
various resources. Unlike the members of the CCP Central Committee, whose profiles 
are all listed on the official website of Xinhua News Agency and in the Dictionary of 
the Central Committee, the political résumés of many local officials are much less 
available. In order to deal with the problem, I first collect provincial yearbooks to get 
the name-and-title list of all the provincial labor officials with director-level positions, 
and then search those names in various Chinese newspapers and magazines, including 
Renmi Ribao, Xinhua News Agency, Renwu Online,137 Junzheng Online,138 provincial 
governments' official websites, and local newspapers, to gather the political résumés 
of local officials.  
In China, top provincial leaders refer to the Provincial CCP Secretary, often 
regarded as the first hand (yibashou) of a province, and the Governor, as the second 
hand (erbashou). In addition to these two top leaders, the Provincial CCP Standing 
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 See Renwu Online at http://www.renwuonline.com/ 
138
 See Junzheng Online http://www.ourzg.com/ 
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Committee constitutes the third-level leadership in a province. The governing structure 
of a provincial-level region is illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 Leadership Structure in Beijing, Hunan, and Guangdong, from 2007 and 
on.139 
 
Provincial CCP Secretary 
Governor                                                                  
Provincial CCP Standing Committee (9-11 members in total):140 
   Beijing: Chairman of the MFTU (Liang Wei) 
Provincial CCP Committee (81-93 members in total):141 
   Beijing: Director of the MBLSS (Zhang Xinqing) 
   Hunan: Director of the PDLSS (Zhao Xiangping),  
                Chairman of the PFTU (Liu Lianyu) 
   Guangdong: Director of the PDLSS (Liu Youjun 2008-2009;142 Ou Zhenzhi 2009-),  
                        Chairman of the PFTU (Deng Weilong) 
 
Note:  
MFTU: Municipal Federation of Trade Unions 
PFTU: Provincial Federation of Trade Unions 
MBLSS: Municipal Bureau of Labor and Social Security 
PDLSS: Provincial Department of Labor and Social Security 
 
As the Figure indicates, in most provincial-level regions, the Director of Labor 
Department and the Chairman of Trade Union Federation are on the Provincial CCP 
Committee, and not the Standing Committee. Beijing is an exceptional case, where the 
Chairman of the MFTU is on the Standing Committee, and hence has a higher political 
status. In all the three provincial-level regions, the 9-11 members of the Provincial 
                                               
139
 In the Figure, the leaders in Beijing were elected in the 10th Municipal CCP Congress in May 2007. 
As for Hunan, the leaders were from the 9th Provincial CCP Committee elected in December 2006. On 
the other hand, the Guangdong list was confirmed in the 10th Provincial CCP Congress in May 2007.  
140
 The number excludes the Provincial CCP Secretary and the Governor. In Beijing, currently there are 
nine members on the Provincial CCP Standing Committee. In Hunan, there are ten members, and in 
Guangdong, eleven members.  
141
 Currently, there are 84 members in Beijing, 81 members in Hunan, and 93 members in Guangdong.  
142
 Liu was removed from the office in May 2009 due to corruption. 
177 
CCP Standing Committees usually include several Prefecture CCP Secretaries of the 
most important prefectures within the province, the CCP Secretary of the Provincial 
Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Minister of the Provincial Organization 
Department, the Minister of the Provincial United Front Department, the Minister of 
the Provincial Propaganda Department, etc. For the Director of the PDLSS and the 
Chairman of the PFTU, in principle, the potentiality of their political promotion is to 
be selected to these positions which usually guarantee the membership on the Standing 
Committee. Another way is to be selected to the MOLSS or the ACFTU in the central 
government.  
While all government officials have the opportunities for promotion, they face 
different constraints. An official can try to demonstrate his loyalty and performance, 
but he can hardly get around some objective criteria such as age. According to 
“Provisions on the Retirement of Elderly Cadres” promulgated by the State Council in 
1982, for most top officials, including Ministers in the central government (the level of 
“zheng bu ji”) and Party Secretaries and Governors at the provincial level, the 
retirement age is 65 years old. For cadres of one level below, including Bureau Chiefs 
(sizhang) in the central government, Directors of provincial departments (the level of 
“zheng di ting ji”), Ministers of CCP provincial ministries, and prefecture-level Party 
Secretaries, the retirement age is earlier at 60 years old (Article 2). Sometimes, these 
rules are not enforced, but since the early 2000s, the Chinese government has begun to 
be more serious about the rules on age. For example, in March 2001, Sheng Huaren 
and Zhu Lilian were removed from their positions as the Director of the National 
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Economic Committee143 and the Minister of Science and Technology respectively, 
because they were 65 years old already then, although originally, their assigned term 
of office would not have ended until 2003. According to this new trend, if a Director 
of a Provincial Labor Department is in his 60s, there are fewer chances for him to have 
a promotion either to the central government or to a upper-level position in the 
province.  
The age criterion constrains these officials' career opportunities. As the 
following discussion will illustrate, if a Director is young, and if he is in a region 
where his predecessors and many other former Directors of other departments all had 
chances to be promoted to the central government, he will be likely to choose a way to 
implement the central labor policy to signal that he deserves a move-up. On the other 
hand, if he is young but in a region where few former Directors ever had the chance to 
the central level, then he will pay more attention to maximizing the political power he 
can get in the province, given there is still a long time before his retirement. On the 
contrary, if the then Director of a Provincial Labor Department is already old in the 
early 2000s when the central pro-labor policy reform is launched, he will be less 
concerned about strongly implementing the central reform to enhance his political or 
bureaucratic power because he is going to retire from the office and has little chance to 
be promoted to other positions.  
 
 
 
                                               
143
 The National Economic Committee was under the State Council. It was abolished in 2003.  
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4.3.1 Provincial regulations as a signal to the central government  
 
In Beijing, the Labor Bureau and the Trade Union Federation worked together 
in making the detailed and rigid labor regulations. The rationale behind Beijing's 
endeavor resided in the fact that the officials of the two institutions aimed to use the 
rigid provincial regulations to signal the central government that they were seriously 
implementing the policy following the issuance of the central directives. By nature, 
Beijing's documents constituted overarching regulations that the central government 
expected to see after the central policy was announced. These regulations acted as a 
credible signal of compliance and cooperation reaching the central government's 
attention. Investing in these regulations was thus noticeable to the central government. 
In Beijing, there is frequent traffic between various Municipal Bureaus and the 
Central Ministries. This has made many of the officials in the Beijing Labor Bureau 
pay more attention to the central Labor Ministry than to the municipal government. 
Records show that several former Directors of the Beijing Labor Bureau were 
upgraded to the central government after several years of service at the municipal level. 
For example, during the 1980s, Liu Zhihua, the then Vice-director of the Beijing 
Labor Bureau, was promoted to the Central Labor Ministry in October 1989. This 
tendency was not reversed during the 2000s, either. In 2008, You Lantian, the former 
Director of the Labor Bureau before 2001, was promoted to the CCP's Central United 
Front Department (tongzhanbu).144  
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 See Caijing Net, December 2, 2008. http://www.caijing.com.cn/2008-12-02/110033569.html 
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Surrounded by the environment where chances of local officials to be 
promoted to the central government were high, the then officials in Beijing who were 
in charge of implementing the labor contract system in the 2000s had made efforts to 
find ways to send signals to the central government that the reform principles were 
being carried out in their jurisdictions. Engrossed in the political upgrades to the 
central government, the Director of the Beijing Labor Bureau, Zhang Xinqing, who 
was appointed to the job in 2001 when he was 45 years old, thus worked hard to 
propose rigid regulations to signal compliance to the central government.  
For the Beijing Federation of Trade Unions, it was also successful in putting 
detailed rules favoring its role in regulating the labor condition. This largely resulted 
from the fact that the Federation was a strong bureaucracy in the government. 
Compared to other provinces where the Chairmen of the Trade Union Federation were 
only on the Provincial CCP Committees, the Beijing Chairmen were always members 
of the Standing Committee. One of the Chairmen who were responsible for 
implementing the labor contract system in the 2000s, Yan Anjiang, was moved up to 
be the Vice-secretary of the CCP in Beijing. His determination to make rigid pro-labor 
regulations during the years in the Trade Union seemed to be of help in achieving this 
appointment. As a research fellow informed me, “nowadays, for most technocrats or 
middle-level officials, professional ability is important. They might still need to have 
strong backgrounds and good connections, but top-notch performance on the job also 
helps them to stand out.”145 
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 Informant 23. Interview conducted in Beijing on July 10, 2008.  
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Compared to Hunan where bureaucratic restructuring was the central agenda of 
the Labor Department in implementing the labor contract system, the Beijing Labor 
Bureau did not choose to do so. Unlike the Hunan Labor Department which wanted to 
use the restructuring to enhance its bureaucratic power in the province (as will be 
discussed in the next subsection), the higher opportunities to be promoted to the 
central level drove the Beijing labor officials to target the central government rather 
than the municipality. In addition, the historically fragmented bureaucratic structure in 
Beijing also prevented the municipal government from conducting any significant 
restructuring of the government's organization. As many studies have pointed out, the 
division of powers among horizontal levels within the Beijing government was 
persistently kept even. For example, during the process of urban health care reform, 
the fragmented bureaucratic structure in Beijing severely impeded the government's 
attempts to establish a comprehensive reform agenda (Aitchison 1997). Moreover, in 
their study on Beijing's development model, Segal and Thun find that the inability of 
the Beijing government to coordinate relations between various bureaus induced the 
city to develop the IT industry rather than the automobile manufacturing as Shanghai 
did (2001, 578). The equal division of power among different Bureaus in Beijing 
disabled the Labor Bureau from integrating other Bureaus into a government 
restructuring agenda.  
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4.3.2 Bureaucratic restructuring as a measure for enhancing power within the 
province 
 
In Hunan, restructuring the bureaucracy to establish the Small Leading Group 
and the Liaison Mechanism was essential to the province's reform agenda. Although 
this by no means implies that Hunan did not promulgate rules to regulate the labor 
market, the province nonetheless did not pay full attention to making as rigid and 
detailed rules as Beijing did. The Hunan pattern to implement the central plan of was 
largely led by the Labor Department. While the Hunan Federation of Trade Unions 
also supported these policies, it was not the main initiator of the provincial agenda. As 
one of the members of the Legislative Affairs Division of Hunan's Labor Department 
informed me, “most of the reforms were initiated by the Labor Department, including 
making the drafts of provincial regulations.”146 Compared to Beijing, the Hunan Trade 
Union Federation was less influential during the process of regulating the labor market. 
The then Chairwoman of the Hunan Trade Union, Liu Lianyu was only a member of 
the Hunan CCP Committee, and not on the Standing Committee as the Beijing 
counterpart was. The weaker political status of the Hunan Trade Union was also 
revealed by the fact that most of the Hunan regulations do not provide the Trade 
Union with more power to implement the reform. For example, the 2003 Hunan 
Regulation does not have any single clause or chapter on collective contracts. The 
rules on the role of trade unions are also not detailed (See Appendix 4.6). 
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 Informant 23. Interview conducted in Beijing on July 10, 2008.  
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The major impetus behind the Labor Department's move to be the key 
advocate of implementing the labor contract system was that the reform could help 
strengthen its power in the provincial government. Compared to the Beijing Labor 
Bureau, most officials in the Hunan Labor Department paid more attention to the 
province than to the central government. This is because the career paths of most 
Hunan technocrats were to be promoted to higher-level positions within the province, 
given that in the past, only few Directors or other officials at the level of “zheng di 
ting ji” had the chances to the central government. Moreover, before moved up to the 
current positions, most Directors had a career path that was very closely tied to Hunan. 
For example, the current Labor Department Director, Zhao Xiangping, was born in 
Xiangtan Municipality in the province, and has worked for Hunan since 1968. Zhao 
was a member on the Hunan Planning Committee from 1989 to 2000 before upgraded 
to the current position as the Labor Department Director in 2001 when he was 50 
years old.147 Being deeply involved in the Hunan political community, the officials in 
Hunan were less interested in positions at the central level. Accordingly, the Labor 
Department officials had less impetus to use detailed and rigid regulations to signal 
compliance to the central government. Enhancing the Labor Department's power 
within the province was more important. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the labor assistants in the Hunan Labor 
Department were not pleased by the extra workload that came with the enhanced 
bureaucratic power of the Department. However, formal officials, including the labor 
commissioners and the cadres, were generally supportive of the plan. Labor assistants 
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 See Hunan Yearbooks (various years) and the official website of the Hunan Labor Department. 
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(laodong baozhang xieguan yuan) and labor commissioners (laodong baozhang 
zhuanguan yuan) are the two kinds of administrators who work at the grassroots level, 
dealing with the actual practice of regulating the labor market, such as inspecting 
enterprises and advertising the reform. Labor commissioners are civil servants of the 
government, and need to pass the general civil servant exam before being recruited. 
Their salary is paid by the budget of the Labor Department. The number of 
commissioners that a Department could have is officially assigned by the provincial 
government, and these commissioners are part of the “establishment of posts”, namely 
“bianzhi” in Chinese.  
On the other hand, ever since the central government launched the program of 
regulating the labor market, many Provincial Labor Departments have helped their 
lower-level Labor Bureaus to recruit more labor assistants to facilitate the process of 
implementing the central policies. Labor assistants are not part of the bianzhi, and 
their salary has nothing to do with the Departments' assigned budget. In many 
provinces, most labor assistants are originally SOE laid-off workers. Some of them 
served as trade-union assistants before. A labor assistant is not admitted through the 
general civil servant exam, but is supposed to pass the given Department's special 
exam in order to be recruited.  
In Hunan, there were myriad complaints from labor assistants about the 
enormous workload. One labor assistant complained, “we share the heaviest workload, 
but we're like temporary workers compared to the formal staff such as the labor 
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commissioners and the cadres, and our wages are much lower.”148 Moreover, given 
that they were not formal civil servants of the government, but were hired directly by 
the Labor Department, the chances of transferring their official records (dangan) to 
other departments was slim, and thus it was hard to be promoted to other departments. 
It was also difficult for them to be upgraded to a higher status within the same 
department. As the same labor assistant stated, “the leaders of our department usually 
came from the formal staff, or from other places.”149 
This displays the divergent career paths of labor commissioners and assistants. 
Generally speaking, labor commissioners' political interests were tied to the 
Department, and a more powerful Department was always to their benefit. Extra 
workloads did not bother labor commissioners too much, because they could always 
assign the tasks to labor assistants, allowing them to pay more attention to meeting 
with higher-level officials for their own political promotion in the province.150  This 
phenomenon was widespread across provinces. In the case of Hunan, the Labor 
Department successfully negotiated with other Departments for more tasks, and it did 
not encounter massive resistance at the grassroots level from labor assistants, because 
the labor commissioners were generally supportive of the leaders' activities. The 
Hunan Labor Department achieved restructuring the government with a goal to 
enhance its bureaucratic power in the province. Accordingly, the Hunan case 
illustrates a situation where the Labor Department Director who had more chances to 
stay influential in the province than to be promoted to the central government took 
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 Informant 34. Interview conducted in Yiyan, Hunan on May 23, 2008. Many comments at internet 
forums confirmed this interview. 
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 Informant 34. Interview conducted in Yiyan, Hunan on May 23, 2008. 
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 Informant 37. Interview conducted in Yiyan, Hunan on May 25, 2008. 
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advantage of implementing the labor contract system to enhance its bureaucratic 
power through restructuring the government structure such as establishing the Small 
Leading Group and the Liaison Mechanism in the province.  
 
4.3.3 Flexible labor regulatory regime as a result of the low chance of political 
promotion 
 
In comparison to Beijing and Hunan, before 2007, Guangdong's labor 
regulatory regime was the most flexible one. The failure of Guangdong to build a rigid 
regulatory framework directly resulted from the unwillingness of the Labor 
Department and the Federation of Trade Unions to regulate the non-state sector. 
Similar to Hunan, labor officials in Guangdong did not have good chances to be 
selected to the central government, and hence making rigid labor regulations to 
implement the central pro-labor reform was not an urgent concern. In fact, many 
Guangdong officials were parochial-type bureaucrats who were deeply involved in 
local political and economic networks, and had no interests in any promotions if they 
needed to leave the town.151 For those who still had aspirations for political promotion, 
similar to Hunan, the general pattern was to be selected to higher-level positions 
within the province, and not to the central government. For example, Sun Qingqi, who 
in 2000 served as the Vice-director of the Labor Department (at the level of “fu di ting 
ji” in the Chinese bureaucratic structure), was promoted to the Directorship of the 
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 Informant 46. Interview conducted in Shenzhen, Guangdong on January 15, 2008. 
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Guangdong Pricing Bureau in November 2005 (at the level of “zheng di ting ji”).152 
Without strong chances to be moved up to the central level, the Labor Department 
officials did not focus on drafting rigid regulations to support the central pro-labor 
policies.  
But unlike Hunan labor officials, while most Guangdong counterparts paid 
more attention to the province than the central government, the Guangdong Labor 
Department did not engage in many activities to enhance the bureaucratic power in the 
province. On the contrary, the then Director of the Guangdong Labor Department, 
Fang Chao-gui, who was in office from 2000-2007 during the period of central pro-
labor policy reform, proposed some bills that were deemed as anti-labor. In 2005, 
Fang suggested that female workers' retirement age should be raised to the same year 
as male workers'. Currently, the retirement age for female workers in China is ten 
years earlier than male workers. According to the “Interim Provisions on the 
Retirement of Staff and Workers” promulgated by the State Council in 1958, the 
retirement age for male staff is 60 years old and for female staff is 55. Fang 
recommended that both genders should not retire until the age of 60. Fang's proposal 
triggered massive resistance from the working class, especially from SOE laid-off 
workers, because this action would delay their receiving of pension funds. For these 
workers, when they were forced to leave their original SOEs in the late 1990s under 
the plan of SOE privatization and corporatization, they had hard time to get re-
employed. As many of these laid-off workers were the so-called “4050 people,” 
namely 40-year-old female workers and 50-year-old male workers, according to the 
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current regulation on the retirement age, they only needed to wait for ten years to 
receive their pension. If the retirement age was raised to five years older, then SOE 
laid-off female workers would need to wait for more years.153 At the same time, the 
proposal was not supported by the unemployed or unskilled outside workers either, 
because keeping the already-hired and skilled inside workers in enterprises would 
reduce employers' willingness to hire new workers. Just a few days after Fang's 
proposal was released to the public, many petitions were sent to newspapers against 
Fang's idea.154 Some internet forums even created pages to ask the government to 
discharge Fang.155 
This example shows that the Guangdong Labor Department did not always 
support pro-labor policies, even when protecting the disadvantaged has become a 
central doctrine under the Hu-Wen administration. More importantly, Fang's proposal 
actually explicitly ran against the central government's agenda. While the issue of 
retirement age has been under debate by some Chinese scholars, the central Labor 
Ministry has made it clear that this was a sensitive issue and the central government 
had no plan to change the current system in the near future.156 The major reason why 
the Guangdong Labor Department was not always fully following the central pro-labor 
agenda is that these labor officials did not aim to use the pro-labor reform to enhance 
their bureaucratic power or political status. Their economic interests and relationships 
with the local business community trumped over the attempts to be more 
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bureaucratically powerful in the province. In fact, Fang retired from the position in 
2007 when 60 years old and was not given any further political positions later. 
Guangdong's reluctance to increase the rigidity of its labor regulatory regime 
was also brought to light by the fact that before 2007, the Labor Department was 
relatively weak in the province. Unlike his successors, Liu Youjun and Ou Zhenzhi, 
who were in office after 2008 and had the membership in the Guangdong CCP 
Committee, Fang Chao-gui, the Labor Department Director from 2000-2007 during 
the central pro-labor reform, was only an alternative member on the 9th Guangdong 
Committee in 2002. This shows that protecting labor rights was not as important for 
the province as for Beijing and Hunan, because the Guangdong Labor Department was 
not granted the same level of political status as the Beijing and Hunan counterparts 
were.  
At the same time, the leadership structure of the Guangdong Federation of 
Trade Unions also displays the province's disinclination to build a rigid labor 
regulatory regime. The then Chairman of the Guangdong Trade Union during the 
period of central pro-labor policy reform, Tang Weiying, was appointed to the office 
in 2001 when he was already 59 years old. Although Tang did not retire at the age of 
60 when he was supposed to according to the 1982 Regulations and continued to serve 
as the Chairman until 2007, it was not hard to imagine that Tang did not have deep 
interests to promote the bureaucracy's power, because he would be asked to leave the 
office at any time. In general, the incentive of Guangdong labor officials to regulate 
the labor market was not strong.    
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4.3.4 Provincial leaders' intervention as a signal to the central leader 
 
The Guangdong government only began to actively make policies to expedite 
the process of regulating the labor market in 2007, when Party Secretary Wang Yan 
was appointed to the province.157 Around the end of 2007, Wang and the Governor 
Huang Huahua launched a campaign of industrial upgrading to demonstrate their 
competence to implement the central government's new agenda of regulating the labor 
condition in the non-state sector. To facilitate the new task, the newly appointed 
Directors of the Labor Department from 2008, Liu Youjun and then Ou Zhenzhi, were 
given the membership in the Provincial CCP Committee, unlike the former Director 
Fang, who was only an alternative member.  
Wang's endorsement of the labor contract system in the non-state sector was 
driven not only by his desire to demonstrate the ability to execute the central plan and 
to maintain social stability, but also by his incentive to signal to the central 
government his loyalty toward following the central government's new development 
mode of economic upgrading. When Xi Jinping was thought by many Chinese 
political observers to be the next top leader, Xi's industrial policy in Zhejiang Province 
when he was the Provincial Party Secretary in 2005 was regarded by many political 
actors as the central government's new mode of economic development. According to 
Xi's experience in Zhejiang, regional economic development should target the 
domestic market and reduce reliance on foreign investment. In this plan of economic 
                                               
157
 The former party secretary of Guangdong (2002-2007), Zhang Dejiang is widely thought of by many 
political observers as an official in good standing with the former top leader Jiang Zemin, but not with 
the current leader, Hu Jintao. 
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upgrading, “emptying the cage for new birds” was the core slogan. As Xi was thought 
to be selected over Li Yuanchao of Jiangsu Province and Zhang Dejiang of 
Guangdong Province as the national prospective top leader in 2007, the Zhejiang 
agenda of upgrading the economic structure and eliminating dependency on foreign 
enterprises defeated the Jiangsu mode (where the Township and Village Enterprise 
had accounted for the largest economic share) and the Guangdong mode (which had 
relied on export-oriented foreign-invested labor intensive manufacturing 
enterprises).158 As a political actor with a strong aspiration for, and a good possibility 
of, entering the central top leadership group, given that Wang was only 52 years old in 
2007 when appointed to Guangdong, the Party Secretary deliberately directed the 
campaign of economic upgrading echoing the slogan of “emptying the cage for new 
birds,” namely kicking out labor intensive manufacturing enterprises and moving in 
high-technology and capital-intensive ones. Regulating the labor market served as a 
persuasive signal to the central leaders of his cooperation with the new reform 
mode.159 There were thus several pro-labor policies announced in the province as 
indicated in section 4.1.3. The strong political incentive of top provincial leaders to be 
promoted to the central leadership group transformed the original flexible labor 
regulatory structure and brought in several rigid labor rules to it. This new regime 
directly led to the run-away of many labor-intensive manufacturing enterprises which 
used to rely on the management-biased preferential policies offered by the provincial 
government.160   
                                               
158
 See Duowei Monthly, June 2008. 
159
 See Duowei Monthly, February 2009. 
160
 Informant 47. Interview conducted in Guangzhou, Guangdong on June 10, 2008. 
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4.4 Conclusion  
 
The case studies in this chapter have informed us the basic logic of Chinese 
provincial labor policy-making. Based on the discussion, I will generate several 
hypotheses in the next chapter about under what conditions a local labor bureaucracy 
acts on behalf of workers' voices. First, potential labor unrest is not an adequate 
answer to the question of why local officials make policies that favor the working 
class. The three studied regions face different levels of potential unrest. As the number 
of employees in labor intensive industries outweigh that of other industries, the 
Guangdong government is under the most considerable pressure of labor protests. In 
comparison, the potential degrees of labor unrest in Beijing and Hunan are relatively 
lower. But the labor regulatory regimes in these two regions are more rigid. This tells 
us that the concern about labor unrest and the wish for social stability itself is not a 
satisfying answer to why a local government builds a pro-labor regime.  
Second, my study on the incentive structure of the heads of Provincial Labor 
Departments and Provincial Federations of Trade Unions shows that, when these 
officials have better chances to be promoted to the central level, constantly drafting 
rigid labor regulations serves as a signal to the central government that they are loyal 
and competent, as illustrated in the Beijing case. When the chance of promotion to the 
central level is low, if a local labor director will not retire from the office soon, he will 
be likely to take the opportunity to implement the central reform in a way that 
enhances his bureaucratic power in the provincial government. As in the Hunan case, 
193 
the implementation of the labor contract system centers its efforts around bureaucratic 
restructuring such as creating the Small Leading Group to integrate the different 
departments in the provincial government, and establishing the Liaison Mechanism to 
coordinate all the local governments below the provincial level. In these two cases, 
even if the potentiality of labor unrest is not particularly high, labor officials still 
promote pro-labor policies. The major motivation behind this action is not to protect 
workers, but to increase their own political power.  
On the other hand, a labor official will choose to speak for the business 
community and not for the working class when there are slim opportunities to the 
central government, and when he will retire from the office very soon. As in the 
Guangdong case, labor officials can be captured by the personal ties with the local 
business community in the labor policy implementation process. This inclination is 
intensified by the province's industrial structure. In Guangdong, labor-intensive 
enterprises account for almost 40% of its GDP growth. The province's high degree of 
labor flexibility only starts to decrease when the top provincial leaders, who have 
strong aspirations and good opportunities to be promoted to the central government, 
intervene in the current system and initiate pro-labor administrative activities to send 
signals to the central leaders of their loyalty and competence to comply with the new 
development mode. The conclusion drawn from the case studies on the three regions 
provides the foundation for hypothesis testing in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Career Prospects and Local Socio-bureaucratic Synergy: 
The Regulation of the Labor Market in Thirty-one Provincial-level Regions 
 
This chapter statistically assesses the conclusion drawn from the last chapter. 
According to the case studies on Beijing, Hunan, and Guangdong, in the 2000s, when 
Labor Department Directors and Trade Union Federation Chairmen had high 
expectations to be promoted to the central government or to stay bureaucratically 
stronger in the region, they tended to make more rigid rules to regulate the labor 
market under their jurisdictions. Based on the discussion, the chapter will examine all 
the thirty-one Chinese provincial-level regions to test the following hypothesis: when 
labor officials have good career prospects, they will implement the central agenda of 
regulating the labor market and promoting labor rights with a great deal of efforts. The 
rationale behind this action is that active implementation of the pro-labor policies is 
helpful for labor officials' future careers.  
The analysis precedes as follows. First, I will discuss how to measure Chinese 
provinces' annual labor policy implementation. In addition to their published labor 
rules and government restructuring, I will examine the provincial yearbooks and 
construct a synchronized index to measure the degree of labor market rigidity across 
provincial-level regions. The second part of the chapter is devoted to the study of the 
incentive structure of Chinese local officials, particularly the directors of provincial 
labor departments, the chairmen of provincial federations of trade unions, and 
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provincial party secretaries. Under the cadre management system, these officials are 
constrained by higher-level governments' monitor, especially when they have strong 
expectations for more political power. I will show that officials' career expectations 
are a function of their personal characteristics and past working experiences. In the 
third section, the chapter will employ two ordered logistic regressions to test whether 
local labor officials (namely Labor Department Directors and Trade Union Federation 
Chairmen) with higher levels of career prospects make more efforts to regulate the 
labor condition to signal their loyalty and competence to comply with the central 
government's new reform agenda. Section four gives my brief conclusion.  
 
5.1 The Regulation of the Labor Market in China's Thirty-one Provincial-level 
Regions 
 
As the last chapter indicates, Chinese provinces' efforts to implement the 
central pro-labor policies were crystallized in making labor regulations and 
restructuring the provincial bureaucratic structures. In addition to governmental 
regulations and administrative activities, we can also examine the actual outcome of 
labor policy implementation to see how the central reform was carried out at the 
provincial level. In China, the only source to find out how many workers were hired 
with written labor contracts is the official provincial (municipal) yearbooks.161 
However, the data recorded in these yearbooks do not necessarily reflect the real 
situation. In fact, most provinces tend to exaggerate their performance in the 
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 The Labor Statistical Yearbooks published by the MOLSS do not have this information. 
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yearbooks (see later discussion in this chapter). It is thus actually impossible to know 
the real numbers of labor contracting from the yearbooks. 
But official yearbooks still reveal important information about how regional 
governments intend to comply with the central government. In China, every 
provincial-level government publishes its own yearbook at the end of each year to 
record its performance in implementing all kinds of central directives. Most yearbooks 
have sections about provincial party secretaries' major activities, such as their visits to 
some localities in the provinces, and the regions' overall economic and social 
development. In practice, these records serve an important function to show off or 
display (biaotai) provincial-level governments' performance (zhengji) and loyalty 
(zhongcheng) to the central government. While it is unlikely to know the real situation 
of labor contracting from the yearbooks, we can sense a general picture of how 
provincial-level governments try to or wish to echo the central reform direction.  
Scholars have found that Chinese local officials are inclined to publicly flaunt 
their loyalty in order to signal the affinity to a particular leader (Shih 2008). In Shih's 
work, major provincial newspapers are the source to know how provincial leaders 
“nauseatingly” show off their loyalty (Ibid.). This dissertation finds that yearbooks tell 
a more direct story about local officials' intention to display their compliance, because 
yearbooks are published by regional governments themselves. Another advantage of 
using yearbooks to study government officials' behaviors resides in the fact that 
different sections in the yearbooks are written by different provincial departments 
within the governing structures including the governments and the party apparatuses, 
and hence we can look into these sections to understand a certain department's 
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intention to implement a central agenda. For example, the Provincial Bureau of 
Industry and Commerce is responsible for reporting whether market competition in the 
region has been guaranteed, the Provincial State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission is in charge of recording how provincial SOEs are 
regulated, and the Provincial People's Congress is to record the making of provincial 
rules. As far as labor policies are concerned, every region's Department (Bureau) of 
Labor and Social Security (DLSS) is the one to write the report regarding the 
implementation of the labor contract system in both the state and the non-state sector, 
and the Provincial (Municipal) Federation of Trade Unions (PFTU) is to record the 
achievement of organizing trade unions and promoting the collective contract system. 
We can thus read these sections in the yearbooks to know the attitudes of these labor 
officials in complying with the central pro-labor agenda. By doing this, the researcher 
is able to include a study on the labor officials' role in the policy-making process, 
rather than merely focusing on the action of top provincial leaders, as we have already 
seen from the case studies in the last chapter that local labor officials are the major 
actor in the process.  
Accordingly, this chapter conducts analyses on the labor issues recorded in all 
the thirty-one regions' yearbooks to have a good grasp of how the policy of regulating 
the labor market is perceived by regional governments. In addition to the 
aforementioned advantages, another rationale to use yearbooks to measure local 
governments' efforts is that unlike governmental regulations which are not 
promulgated or revised every year, yearbooks have data on each government's annual 
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performance. This enables the author to trace the changes of labor officials' behaviors 
across years.  
To analyze a written record, the basic way is to conduct word frequency 
counting and sorting (Lowe). A researcher can count how many times a particular 
word is mentioned in a text. Following the logic, two steps are introduced when 
coding these provincial-level yearbooks. First, I focus on all the keywords related to 
the regulation of the labor condition in the 2000s. As discussed in chapter three, when 
the central government launched the labor market reform in the 2000s, the focus was 
to require enterprises to sign labor contracts and to organize trade unions. At the 
regional level, Labor Departments and Trade Union Federations were responsible for 
making sure enterprises' compliance with these rules, and these two tasks were both 
recorded into the yearbooks to be part of the governments' display of performance and 
loyalty. The way in which different regions recorded these tasks diverged from each 
other, however. Some regions emphasized their achievement in regulating the non-
state sector, while others just reported the improvement of the overall labor condition. 
In addition, not all of the regions wrote down the detailed information about the labor 
contracting rates. Some provinces published the individual and collective labor 
contract signing rates in enterprises with different ownership structures, but others 
only had the overall rates or did not record any related information. Given these 
variations, for those who provided more detailed information, we can say that they had 
paid more attention to the pro-labor reform and tried to put it into practice for the 
purpose of sending signals to higher-level officials of their efforts in implementing the 
pro-labor agenda. 
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Second, I only count those sentences that clearly indicated how successful the 
task of regulating the labor condition was achieved. Due to the fact that yearbooks 
were published for showing off regional governments' performance, it is not surprising 
that most governments tended to exaggerate what they had done. In fact, sentences 
without any real meaning were everywhere in these yearbooks. For example, in most 
yearbooks, the section about labor protection usually began with a sentence like 
“under the lead of the provincial CCP committee, the labor department 
enthusiastically embraced the concept of scientific development (kexue fazhan guan) 
to actively maintain harmonious and stable labor relations.” In some yearbooks, the 
only achievement mentioned was that the government had fulfilled the requirement set 
up by last year. While all of these “lip-service sentences” could serve as signals of 
labor officials' compliance, sentences that recorded the numbers of achievement would 
be more credible. Accordingly, I only count those with numbers in my measurement. 
For example, I include sentences which indicated how many individual and collective 
labor contracts had been signed in the region, and how many enterprises had been 
inspected already, but not those which just mentioned that the regional government 
had successfully inspected enterprises and forced them to sign labor contracts. That is 
to say, only those words that reported numbers are counted. By doing this, we can 
have a better capture of the regional governments' intention of labor policy 
implementation.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, if labor officials expect a promotion to the 
central government, they will make regulations to signal to central leaders their loyalty 
of complying the reform agenda. If the desire is to stay more powerful in the province, 
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they can restructure the bureaucracies to establish a small leading group to empower 
the labor department. In this chapter, I do not, however, distinguish these two patterns 
from each other when examining the yearbooks, given that they both aim to 
implement the pro-labor reform. For this chapter, I will focus on measuring the degree, 
and not the pattern, of provincial governments' overall regulation of the labor market.  
The records about regulating the labor market in the yearbooks could be 
divided into two major categories, according to the nature of these tasks. For 
promoting individual labor contracts, it was more related to Labor Departments' 
supervision, while organizing trade unions and promoting collective labor contracts 
were under Trade Union Federations' direct charge. Therefore, I use different sets of 
index to examine these two tasks. The code list for analyzing the content of provincial-
level yearbooks regarding individual labor contracting is presented in Appendix 5.1, 
while the list for examining the sentences in yearbooks on collective labor contracting 
is shown in Appendix 5.3.  
First, for regional governments' promotion of individual labor contracting, in 
addition to the records in the yearbooks, Chapter Four have analyzed provincial 
regulations and government structures to measure regional labor regulatory regimes. 
This chapter integrates all of these indicators, namely government regulations, small 
leading groups of labor contracting, and the records on labor protection in provincial-
level yearbooks, into a synchronized index to measure Chinese regions' promotion of 
individual labor contracts. (See Appendix 5.2 for the synchronized index of promoting 
individual labor contracting.) Based on this new synchronized index, I calculate the 
degree of all the thirty-one regional governments' promotion of individual labor 
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contracts from 2001-2008, and construct a cross-section time-series data set. The 
results range from 0 to10 points, and are grouped into four ordered categories from 0-3. 
For those observations whose synchronized points are from 0-3, they are grouped into 
degree 0. If synchronized points are from 4-5, they are equal to degree 1; synchronized 
points 6-7 are grouped into degree 2; synchronized points 8-10 are grouped into 
degree 3. (See Figure 5.1). The rationale for grouping all the observations into a 
smaller number of categories is to minimize potential measurement errors.  
Figure 5.1 Regional Governments' Promotion of Individual Labor Contracting, 2001-
2008.  
 
Notes: Along the horizontal axis, 0 stands for the lowest degree of the promotion of 
individual labor contracting, and 3 is the highest degree.  
Frequency indicates the number of observations at a certain degree of promoting 
individual labor contracts.  
Units are province-years (e.g. Beijing 2002, Beijing 2003, Hebei 2005, Hebei 2006, 
Shandong 2007, etc.).  
Total number of observations: 169. 
Source: Author's database.  
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On the other hand, for the task of regulating collective labor contracts, I 
examine the records in provincial-level yearbooks. The code list for differentiating the 
degree of promoting collective labor contracts is provided in Appendix 5.3. The 31 
regions' performance from 2001-2008 is grouped into four ordered categories from 0-3. 
For those observations whose points in the yearbooks are from 0-4, they are grouped 
into degree 0. Points 5-8 are grouped into degree 1; points 9-12 are grouped into 
degree 2; points 13-16 are grouped into degree 3. (See Figure 5.2).  
Figure 5.2 Regional Governments' Promotion of Collective Labor Contracts, 2001-
2008 
 
Notes: Along the horizontal axis, 0 stands for the lowest degree of the promotion of 
collective labor contracting, and 3 is the highest degree.  
Frequency indicates the number of observations at a certain degree of promoting 
collective labor contracts.  
Units are province-years (e.g. Beijing 2002, Beijing 2003, Hebei 2005, Hebei 2006, 
Shandong 2007, etc.).  
Number of observations: 238. 
Source: Author's database.  
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To explain the variations of regional governments' promotion of individual and 
collective labor contracts across years, I go back to my hypotheses generated from the 
last chapter. The next section discusses the measurement of labor officials' career 
prospects.    
 
5.2 Career Prospects of Labor Officials  
 
Drawn from my three case studies, the Directors of Provincial Labor 
Departments and the Chairmen of Provincial Trade Union Federations are the key 
actors in regional regulation of the labor market. On the one hand, these officials may 
be vulnerable to be captured by local business community, but on the other hand, they 
may also have political aspirations and promotion expectations for higher-level 
positions. In this section, I discuss how they balance between these two incentives. I 
argue that when the political incentive trumps, there will be synergy between 
provincial labor officials and the working class. These labor officials become a 
“bureaucratic representative” for the working class to promote pro-labor policies.  
Unlike most existing studies which focus on the role of top provincial leaders 
in local policy implementation, my research on regional labor officials' career 
prospects clearly stands out. These officials are not “generalists” such as provincial 
party secretaries or city mayors (Landry 2008). They usually fall into the “technocrats 
faction” in Shih's terms (2009). In China studies, few works have systematically 
analyzed the career pattern of this type of officials. Local labor officials' career 
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expectation refers to their prospects to be promoted to higher-level positions or to stay 
bureaucratically stronger in the provinces. In practice, Chinese officials face 
possibilities of position change before their terms actually end. While one term is five 
years and there is no rule about term limits, many officials do not serve in office for 
the full length of five years, and are to be dismissed or promoted to other positions 
before the end of the term. As shown in the last chapter, in the 2000s, Chinese 
officials' expectation is highly influenced by their age. When an official is going to 
retire soon, he will not have strong career prospects to be promoted, or to have more 
bureaucratic power in the region. In addition to age, officials' career prospects is also a 
function of other personal characteristics and past working experiences. When these 
labor directors and trade union chairmen are evaluated by provincial CCP 
Organization Departments, age, gender, ethnicity and seniority all matter. Accordingly, 
to calculate local labor officials' political prospects, this chapter collects the political 
résumés of all the Directors of Provincial Labor Departments and the Chairmen of 
Provincial Trade Union Federations in the thirty-one provincial-level regions who 
served in office from 2001-2008.  
The collection of these officials' profiles is challenging. First, while it is not 
too difficult to know who are the current heads of Labor Departments and Trade 
Union Federations through regional governments' official websites, the names of 
former directors and chairmen are not easy to find out. To deal with the problem, I 
look into yearbooks to get the name-and-title list of all the provincial labor officials 
with director-level positions. But still, this does not solve the problem. Some regions 
do not record the name list of these officials, so there are quite a few missing data here. 
205 
Second, even when the name list is known, unlike provincial party secretaries whose 
profiles are all listed on the official website of Xinhua News Agency, the political 
résumés of Labor Department Directors and Trade Union Federation Chairmen are 
much less available. For Chairmen, some of their biographical notices can be found in 
the official Trade Union Yearbooks published by the ACFTU. The MOLSS's Labor 
Yearbooks, however, do not have this kind of information for Labor Department 
Directors. This chapter relies on a variety of sources to collect labor officials' career 
information.162 Combining all of them, I construct a cross-section time-series data set 
of the political résumés of director-level labor officials.  
Overall, local officials' career prospects are a function of their age, gender, 
ethnicity, birth place, education, seniority in the CCP, past working experiences in the 
municipalities within the provinces, and past positions in the Youth League. For age, 
in the 2000s, most officials with a status called “zheng di ting ji,” including Labor 
Department Directors, are in their early 50s when in office. For Trade Union 
Federation Chairmen, the average age is late 50s and some of them did not retire when 
older than the legal retirement age at 60. Table 5.1 shows the age distribution of these 
labor officials. 
 
 
 
                                               
162
 These sources include various Chinese newspapers, websites and magazines, such as Renwu Online 
(Renwu Tong at http://www.renwuonline.com/), Junzheng Online (Junzheng Zaixian at 
http://www.ourzg.com/), Renmi Ribao, Xinhua News Agency, Caijing Net, Duowei Monthly, provincial 
governments' official websites, and local newspapers. 
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Table 5.1 Age Distribution among Provincial Labor Department Directors and Trade 
Union Federation Chairmen, 2001-2008 
 
Source: Author's database.  
 
For gender and ethnicity, when other characteristics are equal, the career 
prospect will be better if an official is female or a minority. At the same time, an 
official is likely to have higher career expectations if he is more well-educated. For 
seniority in the CCP, the chance to be promoted will be decent if an official has 
become a CCP member for a long time. The expectation can also be higher if an 
official was born in the same province for which he is working, because he is 
supposed to have better connections in the province, given the long stay in the same 
place. Moreover, past working experiences also have significant impacts on officials' 
career calculation. In China, a promising official usually has many local experiences. 
At the central level, the conventional practice is to send important political elites to 
several provinces before promoting to the leadership group in the central government. 
At the regional level, officials who have served in leadership positions in more 
municipalities in the province are likely to be rising stars. The expectation is hence 
higher if an official has more municipal experiences before he becomes the province's 
Labor Department Director or the Trade Union Federation Chairmen. In addition to 
local experiences, connections with the Youth League is thought to be positive for 
N Mean Std. Dev.  Min. Max.
The Age of Labor 169 52.63 3.81 39 60
Department Directors
in Office
The Age of Trade Union 238 56.41 4.37 45 65
Federation Chairmen
in Office
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political promotion in the Hu-Wen era. If an official is from the Youth League, his 
career prospect will be more brilliant. 
Based on the discussion, I employ a simple equation that adds all of these 
personal attributes together to measure labor officials' career prospects. Regarding the 
variable of age, some studies have found that its effect may not always be linear (Li 
and Zhou 2005, 1749). To capture the nonlinear effect, I calculate how many years 
remain before a director or a chairman will be 60 years old, and group these officials 
into two categories. In a given year, a director can have more than five years left until 
the retirement age at 60 (coded 1); or just five years or less than that (coded 0). The 
equation differentiates Chinese labor officials' career prospects into three groups: low, 
medium, and high. In the next section, I will statistically examine whether the 
variations shown in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 can be explained by labor officials' different 
degrees of career expectation.  
 
5.3 Modeling Regional Behavior:  
The Impact of Career Prospect on Labor Policy Implementation  
 
This section tests the impact of labor officials' career prospects on their pro-
labor policy implementation from 2001-2008 across the thirty-one provincial-level 
regions. Two hypotheses are generated based on my diverse case studies on Beijing, 
Hunan, and Guangdong. The first one concerns Labor Department Directors' career 
expectation and regions' annual performance in promoting individual labor contracts; 
208 
the second one examines the role of Trade Union Federation and the annual regulation 
of collective labor contracts.   
 
Hypothesis One: The degree of a regional government's promotion of individual 
labor contracts (SYNINDI) increases with the career prospect of its Labor 
Department Director (LABORC).  
 
To test this hypothesis, I focus on the career prospects of all Labor Department 
Directors from 2001 to 2008 whose political résumés are available. Based on Figure 
5.1, we see that the degree of individual labor contracting across province-years is 
categorical and not continuous. Moreover, due to the fact that these levels are ordered 
strictly along a single dimension from 0 to 3 degrees, I estimate a cross-section time-
series ordered logistic model, a suitable approach for evaluating the categories of an 
ordinal dependent variable that can be ranked (Long and Freese 2001).  
Several variables are controlled.  
1) The role of provincial party secretaries (SECREC) 
Provincial party secretaries are the top leaders of provinces and are responsible 
for provinces' overall development. Their attitudes to the labor reform is critical to 
how regional labor officials, who are under provincial party secretaries' supervision, 
act in the process of labor policy implementation. Similar to labor officials, provincial 
leaders' attitudes depend on their promotion expectation. Since the 2000s when the 
central agenda of regulating the labor market is initiated, provincial leaders who have 
higher prospects of promotion are supposed to be more interested in implementing the 
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labor contract system, because this is one of the ways to send signals of their loyalty of 
complying the central reform agenda.  
For provincial party secretaries, their promotion prospects are also a function 
of personal characteristics, including age (required to retire at 65), gender, ethnicity, 
and connections with the Youth League, as well as their past working experiences in 
other provinces, given that a promising political actor is usually equipped with 
bunches of regional experiences. In addition, if a provincial party secretary has served 
in leadership positions in the central government before, this may allow him to 
maintain stronger connections with the central officials, which will likely turn out to 
be helpful for his future career (Li and Zhou 2005, 1749). As for education and 
seniority in the CCP, these characteristics are not very important to determine 
provincial top leaders' political promotion, because almost all provincial party 
secretaries have high-level education and are very senior in the CCP.   
In addition to personal attributes, many studies find that good economic 
performance is likely to result in better turnover prospects (Landry 2008; Li and Zhou 
2005). Accordingly, I include provinces' annual GDP growth into the calculation of 
party secretaries' career prospects. If a province's GDP growth is high, the province's 
leader will have better career expectation.163 For data collection, China's National 
Bureau of Statistics have all the records of GDP growth across 31 regions.  
 
2) The degree of potential labor instability (lagged by one year) (UNREST) 
                                               
163
 As for directors of the labor departments and the chairmen of trade union federations, their major 
task is to implement the labor policy. Given that they are not responsible for the provinces' overall 
economic growth, provincial GDP growth is not likely to affect their career expectation. Therefore, 
provincial GDP growth is not included in my calculation of labor officials' career prospects. 
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According to the conventional wisdom about regime stability, an autocrat will 
be more eager to preemptively promote the rights of the socially disadvantaged for the 
purpose to prevent their grievances from deteriorating into serious unrest or even 
revolution. At the regional level, a local government may also make more efforts to 
improve the labor condition if its worry about the potential labor unrest is high. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the degree of potential labor instability can be 
measured by the share of employees in labor-intensive industries (LIIs) in a region. 
When more workers are hired in LIIs, the potentiality of labor unrest will be more 
detrimental to the maintenance of the region's stability.  
 
3) The resistance of the business community to the pro-labor reform (lagged by one 
year) (BUSINESS) 
LIIs are the major loser of the regulation of the labor market because the labor 
cost is likely to increase. Facing the reform, the business community may lobby local 
governments in the policy implementation process to make sure the pro-labor rule is 
not carried out in their own enterprises. In theory, the business community has greater 
leverage in blocking the pro-labor reform if the province's economy relies more on the 
development of LIIs. Based on the logic, I calculate the share of LII's value-added to 
all industries' in a given province to measure the leverage of the business community 
in the pro-labor policy implementation process.  
 
4) Percentage of the subsidy from the central government in a region's total fund 
(SUBSIDY) 
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In theory, a regional government will have less autonomy and discretion about 
policy implementation if it relies more on the central government's subsidy. 
Accordingly, I calculate the share of subsidy from the central government in a region's 
total source of fund. The data are originally recorded by the Ministry of Finance and 
can be obtained from the China Premium Database in the CEIC Data.  
 
5) Share of the number of non-state enterprises (lagged by one year) (NONSTATE) 
As discussed, many non-state enterprises do not sign any labor contracts with 
their employees. It may be more difficult to carry out the agenda of labor contracting 
if a region has more non-state enterprises. China's National Bureau of Statistics has 
these data and they can be obtained in the CEIC database. In the model, the variable is 
cube-transformed because of its left-skewed distribution. 
 
6) GDP Per Capita (lagged by one year) (GDPPER) 
My model also takes into consideration the effect of provincial level of 
development. Higher-level economic development decreases the difficulties of 
regulating the labor market. I use the lagged provincial GDP per capita to control for 
this potential effect. The data are retrieved from China Data Online (Zhongguo Shuju 
Zaixian), and the variable is log-transformed due to the left skewness.   
 
7) Registered urban unemployment rate (lagged by one year) (UNEMPLOY) 
A region's regulation of the labor market may also be affected by its degree of 
unemployment. If the unemployment rate is high, the government may be less 
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interested in rigidifying the labor market regulation because creating jobs for the 
unemployed is the priority. While the variable is not my main interest, I include it as a 
control in the model.  
 
8) The percentage of urban employees (lagged by one year) (URBAN) 
The share of urban employment refers to how many workers are in the urban 
labor market compared to the rural one. As the promotion of labor contracting in the 
2000s mainly focuses on regulating the urban labor market, the variable is important 
to be included in my model. Its interpretation is mixed, however. When urban labor 
market is larger in a region, the local government may focus more on developing a 
sound labor market through enforcing the rules about labor contracting. But it may 
also be less willing to implement the labor contract system to regulate the urban labor 
market if potential unemployment is expected. The data about urban employment are 
recorded by the MOLSS and can be retrieved from the CEIC database. The variable is 
log-transformed in my model. 
  
9) The share of employment in the secondary industry (lagged by one year) 
(SECONDARY) 
In general, the secondary industry has the lowest labor contracting rate. But the 
interpretation of this variable is also mixed. If a region's employment in the secondary 
industry is higher, the task of promoting labor contracting will be harder. But if more 
workers are in the sector, the local government may have more pressure to develop a 
sound labor market. The original data of the variable are also recorded by the MOLSS 
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and can be obtained from the CEIC database. The data are log-transformed to create 
this variable, given its skewed distribution to the left.  
 
In addition, I also include variables to control for the potential effects of time 
and section for my panel data. First, I use the size of regional area (AREA) as a 
regional indicator. The task of regulating the labor market is supposed to be more 
demanding if the area of the region is larger. The variable is skewed toward the left so 
is log-transformed. Second, I also include year dummy in my model (year 2008 is 
omitted). As for LABORC and SECREC, namely the career prospects of Labor 
Department Directors and Provincial Party Secretaries, because the two variables are 
both three-categorized at low, medium, and high levels, I create two dummy variables 
for each of them, i.e. LABORC_2, LABORC_3, and SECREC_2, SECREC_3. For 
LABORC_2 and LABORC_3, the reference group is the low level of career prospects. 
LABORC_2 stands for the medium level of career prospects and LABORC_3 is the 
high level. Same approach is adopted to create SECREC_2 and SECREC_3. Table 5.2 
is these variables' summary statistics.  
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Table 5.2 Summary statistics of variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent: 
     
SYNINDI 169 1.48 1.11 0 3 
Independent: 
     
LABORC_2 169 0.46 0.50 0 1 
LABORC_3 169 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Control: 
     
SECREC_2 169 0.44 0.50 0 1 
SECREC_3 169 0.26 0.44 0 1 
UNREST 169 0.45 0.11 0.20 0.73 
BUSINESS 169 0.30 0.11 0.08 0.56 
SUBSIDY 169 0.44 0.16 0.12 0.70 
NONSTATE 169 0.48 0.26 0.01 0.96 
URBAN 169 -0.54 0.20 -0.94 -0.09 
SECONDARY 169 -0.68 0.17 -1.02 -0.34 
GDPPER 169 4.10 0.28 3.51 4.83 
UNEMPLOY 169 3.74 0.82 0.80 6.50 
AREA 169 5.14 0.51 3.80 6.22 
 
Regression results 
Table 5.3 reports the maximum likelihood results of an ordered logistic model 
estimating the effect of Labor Department Directors' career expectation on regional 
governments' promotion of individual labor contracting. In the first model (1) in Table 
5.3, I report a regression where all the control variables are included but the variables 
regarding local officials' career expectation are left out. Here we see that neither the 
potential labor unrest nor the resistance of the business community has a significant 
effect on regional governments' behavior. In the second model (2) where only the 
interested independent variable, namely the career prospects of Labor Department 
Directors, and the regional and year indicators are included, consistent with my 
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hypothesis, Labor Department Directors' career expectation has a positive impact on 
regions' degree of individual labor contracting. The next model (3) reports a regression 
which contains all the explanatory and control variables. With these control variables, 
the Labor Department Directors' career expectation is still important in explaining 
regional implementation of individual labor contracting. Individually, LABORC_2 
and LABOR_3 are statistically significant and we can determine from the likelihood 
ratio chi-square (chi2(2)=5.70 and Prob>chi2=0.058) that they are jointly significant at 
the 10% level, i.e., that the variable LABORC is significant. Moreover, from the 
model, we also see that the resistance from the business community has a significantly 
negative impact on individual labor contracting. When a region's economic growth 
relies more on the development of labor-intensive industries, with other variables held 
constant, it is less interested in promoting individual labor contracts.  
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Table 5.3 Ordered logistic model estimating the effect of Labor Department Directors' 
career prospects on regions' promotion of individual labor contracts 
 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. *** refers to the significant level of 1%, 
** refers to 5% and * refers to 10%. All regressions include the provincial and year 
indicators.  
 
In addition to individual labor contracting, organizing trade unions to promote 
collective collects and collective negotiation is another focus of the regulation of the 
labor market. The following paragraphs examine regional governments' 
implementation of the collective labor contract system.  
From the last chapter's three case studies, we see that the standing membership 
of a Trade Union Federation Chairman on the province's CCP Committee was crucial 
to whether the region would make efforts to promote collective labor contracting. In 
Beijing where the chairman is a standing member (see Figure 4.3), the region invested 
in promoting collective contracts. In Hunan and Guangdong where the chairmen did 
Dependent variable: Promoting individual labor contracts (synchronized)
(ordered: 0, 1, 2, 3 from low to high)
(1) (2) (3)
LABORC_2 1.084 (0.379)*** 1.004 (0.465)**
LABORC_3 1.222 (0.410)*** 1.143 (0.521)**
SECREC_2 -0.076 (0.432)*
SECREC_3 0.157 (0.491)*
UNREST -5.229 (3.479) -4.640 (3.612)
BUSINESS -4.087 (3.342) -6.177 (3.481)*
SUBSIDY -0.164 (2.717) 0.654 (2.806)
NONSTATE 1.108 (1.841) 1.961 (1.916)
URBAN 3.810 (2.467) 2.250 (2.600)
SECONDARY -3.188 (2.595) -3.661 (2.847)
GDPPER 4.344 (3.222) 5.487 (3.315)*
UNEMPLOY -0.241 (0.241) -0.429 (0.257)*
AREA 1.233 (0.518)** -0.020 (0.281)* 1.137 (0.534)**
Number of obs 169 169 169
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.322 0.178 0.335
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not enjoy such membership, the promotion of collective contracts was not a critical 
agenda when regulating the labor market. Accordingly, we can generate a hypothesis 
to test the effect of the political status of Provincial Trade Union Federation in the 
governing structure on the region's promotion of collective contracts.  
 
Hypothesis Two: The degree of regional implementation of collective labor 
contracting (COLLECTIVE) is higher when the Chairman of Provincial 
Federation of Trade Unions is a standing member on the region's CCP 
Committee (CONCUR).  
 
According to Figure 5.2, the degree of regional governments' promotion of 
collective labor contracting is categorical and strictly ordered. Another ordered logistic 
model is thus employed for this hypothesis. In the model, I control for the effects of 
the career expectation of Provincial Trade Union Federation Chairmen (UNIONC). 
Similar to Labor Department Directors, these Chairmen's expectation refers to their 
prospects to be promoted to higher-level positions or to stay bureaucratically stronger 
in the provinces, and is a function of their age, gender, minority, birth place, education, 
seniority in the CCP, past working experiences in the municipalities within the 
provinces, and past positions in the Youth League. Because the variable UNIONC is 
three-categorized at low, medium, and high levels, I use the low level as my reference 
group, and create two dummy variables, i.e. UNIONC_2 and UNIONC_3. UNIONC 
_2 stands for the medium level of career prospects and UNIONC _3 is the high level. 
In addition to this variable, the model also includes all those controls in the previous 
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regression (from 1) to 9)) on individual labor contracting. Table 5.4 is the summary 
statistics for my model on collective labor contracting.  
 
Table 5.4 Summary statistics of variables 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent: 
     
COLLECTIVE 238 1.44 1.03 0 3 
Independent: 
     
CONCUR 238 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Control: 
     
UNIONC_2 238 0.33 0.47 0 1 
UNIONC_3 238 0.37 0.48 0 1 
SECREC_2 238 0.46 0.50 0 1 
SECREC_3 238 0.27 0.45 0 1 
UNREST 238 0.45 0.11 0.17 0.73 
BUSINESS 238 0.29 0.11 0.08 0.56 
SUBSIDY 238 0.45 0.16 0.12 0.86 
NONSTATE 238 0.54 0.25 0.02 0.97 
URBAN 238 -1.30 0.46 -2.16 -0.21 
SECONDARY 238 -1.61 0.43 -2.78 -0.78 
GDPPER 238 9.34 0.63 7.89 11.13 
UNEMPLOY 238 3.76 0.75 0.80 6.50 
AREA 238 12.01 1.23 8.75 14.32 
 
Regression results 
Table 5.5 reports the ordered logistic regression results on the effect of Trade 
Union Federation's political status on the degree of collective labor contract promotion. 
Model (2) and (3) both tell us that whether a Trade Union Federation Chairman is a 
standing member on the Provincial CCP Committee has an important impact on the 
region's attitude to collective contracting. On the other hand, in both of these two 
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regressions, because UNION_3 is significant but UNIONC_2 is not, we see that 
compared to the low level (i.e. the reference group), when union chairmen's career 
prospects are in the high level, provincial governments tend to invest in regulating 
collective labor contracts. But when union officials' career expectation is in the 
medium level, compared to the low level, the argument for its effects on regional 
performance is not confirmed. The three regressions in Table 5.5 all indicate that the 
implementation of the collective labor contract system is highly impeded by the 
resistance of the business community. When a region's economic growth relies more 
on labor-intensive industries, the degree of collective contracting is lower.  
Table 5.5 Ordered logistic regression estimating the effect of Trade Union Federation's 
political status on the annual promotion of the collective labor contract system  
 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses. *** refers to the significant level of 1%, 
** refers to 5% and * refers to 10%. All regressions include the provincial and year 
indicators.  
 
Dependent variable: Promoting the collective contract system
(ordered: 0, 1, 2, 3 from low to high)
(1) (2) (3)
CONCUR 1.635 (0.292)*** 1.281 (0.358)***
UNIONC_2 0.253 (0.327) 0.403 (0.381)
UNIONC_3 0.652 (0.334)** 0.718 (0.397)*
SECREC_2 0.062 (0.345)
SECREC_3 0.622 (0.412)
UNREST -3.905 (2.548) -2.819 (2.879)
BUSINESS -7.881 (2.269)*** -6.589 (2.359)***
SUBSIDY 0.860 (1.987) 1.744 (2.076)
NONSTATE -2.847 (1.493)* -3.600 (1.604)**
URBAN -0.794 (0.709) -1.415 (0.758)*
SECONDARY 0.988 (0.716) 0.628 (0.738)
GDPPER 1.591 (0.789)** 2.062 (0.809)**
UNEMPLOY 0.495 (0.202)** 0.276 (0.221)
AREA -0.141 (0.155) 0.017 (0.104) -0.147 (0.160)
Number of obs 238 238 238
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.213 0.149 0.255
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Discussion 
Both the models on regional regulation of individual and collective labor 
contracts show that neither of them are sensitive to potential labor unrest. Local 
officials in general pay more attention to the business community and are willing to 
compromise with them if labor-intensive industries are important to the regions' 
economic growth. But Table 5.4 also reveals that when Labor Department Directors 
have strong political incentives, their action is less determined by the business 
community, and labor-intensive industries are not successful in blocking the pro-labor 
policy. In order to gain more political or bureaucratic power, Labor Department 
Directors tend to make efforts to regulate individual labor contracting. In this situation, 
Labor Department Directors act as a bureaucratic representative for workers, although 
the major motivation behind this action is not to protect workers' rights.  
On the other hand, the situation of promoting collective contracting is more 
complicated. From Table 5.5 we know that Trade Union Federation Chairmen's career 
expectation is not a satisfying answer to the regional variation of collective labor 
contracting. But a local government's performance is deeply influenced by the political 
status of the Trade Union Federation in the region's leadership structure. If a Chairman 
is not granted the standing membership on the Provincial CCP Committee, promoting 
collective contracts is not likely to be included on the government's labor regulation 
agenda. This shows that the promotion of collective contracting is related to the 
political status of the Trade Union, but not to the individual Chairman's political 
incentive for promotion. One of the possible explanations about why union officials 
with a medium level of career expectation do not necessarily invest in collective 
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contracting resides in the fact that many Union Chairmen are already very senior in 
the Chinese government, and they can make use of their own political connections for 
promotion rather than rely on the performance regarding labor issues. Moreover, 
unlike Labor Department Directors, many Union Chairmen are already old in office, 
and for them, there is actually not much chance of getting more political power 
through promotion or staying bureaucratically stronger in the current position. As 
Table 5.1 indicates, the average age of Union Chairmen is 56 years old. As one term is 
usually five years and the retirement age is at 60 years old, many Union Chairmen are 
going to leave the office soon and hence do not devote themselves in regulating the 
labor market. Only when they have the highest degree of career expectation, as 
represented in the variable of UNIONC_3 in Table 5.5, will Union Chairmen make 
efforts to implement the collective contract system.  
Based on the above discussion, we find that under the cadre management 
system, the central government's political control is likely to drive local labor officials 
to follow its reform direction. When deciding whether and how to implement the 
central government's agenda, Chinese local officials with strong incentives for 
promotion will calculate the effects of complying with the new policy on their political 
career. In the 2000s, when the pro-labor reform is launched, local labor officials need 
to take into consideration cooperating with the central government on regulating the 
labor market if they have high expectations for their political future. Promoting the 
reform is a costly policy for regional governments, because the implementation may 
incur resistance from the business community. It thus serves as a signal to the central 
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government of regional officials' loyalty and competence in complying with the new 
agenda.  
However, from these two sets of models, the chapter also finds that top 
provincial leaders, namely provincial party secretaries, do not see the task of 
regulating the labor market helpful for their career promotion. In Table 5.5 on 
collective contracting, neither SECREC_2 nor SECREC_3 is statistically significant. 
This reveals that in provincial party secretaries' minds, promoting the collective labor 
contract system is not critical for promotion. As for regulating individual labor 
contracts, the impact of provincial party secretaries' career prospect varies according 
to the level of their promotion expectation. As shown in Table 5.3, compared to 
provincial leaders whose career expectation is at the low level, those with a high-level 
career expectation tend to more rigidly regulate the process of individual labor 
contracting. But compared to those with a low level of career prospects, those in the 
medium level make less effort to promote individual labor contracting. According to 
these results, we see that provincial party secretaries' career expectation does not 
always have positive impacts on the performance of regulating individual labor 
contracts.  
Regional leaders' indifference and ambiguous attitudes to regulating the labor 
market sheds light on the fact that while the central pro-labor reform has been 
launched, most provincial party secretaries do not find that cooperating with the 
agenda will be helpful for their political promotion. This is because in China, the 
evaluation of provincial party secretaries still largely depends on provinces' economic 
performance. Only after 2008 are there some regional leaders such as Wang Yang in 
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Guangdong as discussed in the last chapter, interested in regulating the labor market. 
Top regional leaders with lofty political aspirations generally do not rely on labor 
policy implementation for promotion. As the implementation of labor market 
regulations is in the hands of the Labor Department and the Trade Union Federation, 
the regional performance is mainly determined by these labor officials' action. In the 
2000s, local labor officials with ambition for more political or bureaucratic power tend 
to make use of the cooperation with the central government on the pro-labor reform to 
achieve this goal.  
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
Based on the ordered logistic regression on individual contracting, this chapter 
finds that Labor Department Directors' attitudes are critical to provinces' performance 
in regulating individual labor contracts. These attitudes are a function of their 
calculation about the future career. When labor officials have higher chances of career 
promotion, they tend to make use of the task of regulating the labor market to gain 
more bureaucratic power or to enhance their promotion opportunity. When this 
happens, we say that there is socio-bureaucratic synergy between labor officials and 
workers in the process of promoting pro-labor policies. The first hypothesis, generated 
from my diverse case studies in the last chapter, is confirmed.  
At the same time, the large-N study on collective contracting also supports the 
finding of the last chapter that the political status of the Trade Union Federation in the 
regional leadership structure has a great impact on whether the promotion of collective 
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labor contract system is put on the region's regulation agenda. But the effect of Union 
Chairmen's political incentive is ambiguous. This is because most Union Chairmen 
rely less on labor policy implementation for promotion. Similar logic is applied to 
provincial party secretaries' behavior. While local labor officials may have 
expectations for political promotion through implementing the central government's 
pro-labor reform, for provincial top leaders, promoting economic growth is still the 
focus. Hence, we do not see a positive impact of provincial party secretaries' career 
aspirations on regulating the labor market in both sets of models.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation examines China's labor policy changes from the 1980s to the 
2000s. I find that these reforms are largely determined by the incentive of some 
political elites, mainly central bureaucrats and local officials, to gain more 
bureaucratic or political power. My study illustrates a top-down decision making style. 
In China, the policy-making is not driven by societal actors' pressure, but by 
bureaucracies' use of social forces to enhance their political status.  
 In the 1980s, the labor contract system was introduced to flexibilize the iron-
rice-bowl system in the state sector. The government first experimented with the 
reform in some localities before its nationwide implementation. In the process, many 
experimental regulations were announced. Local experiments were concluded in the 
1994 Labor Law. This gradualist policy-making style was proven to be successful. 
While at the beginning, the reform encountered SOE managers' and workers' 
resistance, it was kept going on and facilitated by other labor policy changes including 
wage and welfare reforms under the agenda of SOE restructuring. This gave new 
impetus for local governments to transform fixed workers into contract ones. Since the 
mid-1990s, the number of state workers on contracts significantly increased. The goal 
of deregulating the workforce in the state sector was able to achieve.  
The second part of the dissertation investigates how the policy of regulating 
the non-state labor market was initiated in the 2000s. Why did a country whose 
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economic growth was widely thought of as being fostered by labor-intensive 
manufacturing industries make rigid employment regulations, given that there was no 
formal representation of the working class in the political system? Contrary to the 
usual view which claims that threats of revolution and concerns about regime 
transition compel autocrats to appeal to the socially disadvantaged for support, my 
explanation focuses on the dynamics of how labor officials in the government made 
use of workers' grievances to secure or enhance their bureaucratic power. In the 2000s, 
the policy reform to protect workers' rights centered its efforts around promoting 
inside and skilled workers' job security. Outsider groups' employment opportunity was 
largely ignored. Through a positive and negative case analysis of the political 
leverages of laborers and managers in the process, I find that inside workers' 
grievances were more powerful in directing the reform, because there were some 
bureaucracies seeing that it was in their interests to act on behalf of inside workers' 
voices.  
This dissertation proposes a concept of “socio-bureaucratic synergy” to trace 
the internal politics within the state structure and how different state actors interact 
with social forces in the labor policy reform process. Unlike “state-society synergy” 
discussed by Evans (1997), socio-bureaucratic synergy does not treat the state as a 
unitary actor when facing social pressures. Rather, I argue that only some 
bureaucracies in the state, and not the state as a whole, can successfully link 
themselves to some societal actors and put forward these officials' desired reform 
agenda. As Chapter Three on reform in the 2000s illustrates, the expansion of labor 
rights under the contract system from state to non-state workers was a direct result of 
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the desire of two bureaucracies, namely the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and 
the All China Federation of Trade Unions, to take the opportunity to regain their 
power that had been relinquished under marketization since the 1980s. When these 
labor officials wished for the same policy outcome as inside workers and successfully 
put this policy on the government's agenda, we say that there was socio-bureaucratic 
synergy between the two.  
When it came to implementation, some regional governments invested more in 
carrying out the pro-labor reform than others. This local variation provides an example 
to examine the incentive of local officials in the local labor policy-making. Based on 
three case studies, this dissertation finds that local implementation of the pro-labor 
reform primarily depended on the calculation of regional Labor Department Directors 
and Trade Union Federation Chairmen about their career prospects. In Beijing, when 
local labor officials had better chances to be promoted to the central level, constantly 
drafting rigid labor regulations served as a signal to the central government that they 
were loyal and competent, because reform was always a costly policy. In Hunan, when 
the chance was low, labor officials who was not going to retire soon would be 
interested in implementing the central reform in a way that helped enhance his 
bureaucratic power in the regional government. But a labor official might choose to 
speak for the business community and delay the implementation of the pro-labor 
reform when he had no bright future for more political or bureaucratic power, as the 
Guangdong case indicates. These results are generally confirmed by my large-N study 
in Chapter Five on 31 provincial-level regions from 2001-2008.  
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Methodologically, I employ both qualitative and quantitative evidence based 
on government documents and in-depth interviews to analyze the regional variation of 
labor policy-making. In political science, mixing qualitative and quantitative methods 
has been increasingly popular. In studying Chinese politics, while small-N research is 
still the most common choice in the field, many scholars have also utilized “mixed 
methods” in their projects. Perhaps the most prevalent attempts to combine the two 
kinds of methodology is to integrate survey and fieldwork methods. Surveys are 
thought to be able to contribute to fieldwork with respect to the generalizability of 
results, and qualitative methods can aid survey work through the identification of 
omitted variables (Tarrow 1995). In China studies, many quantitative-oriented 
researchers also incorporate surveys in exploring issues ranging from private 
entrepreneurs' political attitudes (e.g. Chen and Dickson 2008; Chen and Dickson 
2010) to grass-roots officials' career patterns (e.g. Walder 1995; Walder, Li, and 
Treiman 2000; Zhou 1995; Zhou 2001). These studies have facilitated our 
understanding of the behavior of Chinese societal actors and lower-level officials.  
What if our research is targeted at higher-level political elites? Apparently 
survey methods are not very suitable for this type of study. My analysis on labor 
policy-making provides an example to illustrate the ways in which multiple methods 
are combined in studying Chinese “high politics.” First, I employ a diverse-case-
selection strategy (Gerring 2006, 97-101) to conduct three case studies on the patterns 
of Beijing's, Hunan's and Guangdong's regulation of their labor markets. I find that the 
provincial labor officials are likely to implement the pro-labor reform when they see 
implementing the central policy beneficial to their political careers. Second, based on 
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these case studies, the dissertation generates two hypotheses regarding the effects of 
regional officials' political aspirations on their attitudes to improving the labor 
condition. To test these hypotheses, I code the records in regional governments' 
official yearbooks on their implementation of the pro-labor reform. I then synchronize 
it with regional regulations on labor contracts as well as regional small leading groups 
on labor contracting to construct an index of labor market rigidity to measure the 
degree of local implementation of the pro-labor reform in all 31 Chinese provincial-
level regions from 2001-2008. For the explanatory variable, I collect the political 
resumes of regional Labor Department Directors and Trade Union Federation 
Chairmen to group their career prospects into several degrees. My ordered logistic 
regressions show that local labor officials tend to make efforts to build a rigid labor 
regulatory regime when they have high career prospects. This is the first systemic 
study in the field on Chinese regional labor officials' career and its role in the local 
policy-making process.  
This conclusion shows that while societal actors have become more visible in 
the 2000s, the policy-making is still largely in the hands of political elites. Whether a 
social voice is influential in directing the policy outcome depends on government 
officials' incentive to enhance their bureaucratic status or to gain more political power. 
This finding echoes the state-centric approach in the political economy of reform 
literature, but provides a more subtle analysis of the internal politics within the state.  
In the China field, the elite-centric policy-making is well examined under the 
framework of fragmented authoritarianism (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; 
Lieberthal and Lampton 1992). For these studies, policy-making in China is driven by 
230 
bargaining among different ministries. However, right after the framework is proposed, 
China's deepened marketization has raised considerable challenges to state-centric 
studies. As Saich indicates, the market-oriented reform has created spaces for the 
expansion of social organizations (2000). Under this trend, many researchers switch 
their focus to social dynamism. Behind these studies is the intellectual inquiry about 
the strength of China's social actors and how they participate in Chinese politics. For 
example, scholars have investigated how different kinds of environmental NGOs, 
including registered NGOs, student environmental associations and web-based groups, 
mobilize resources in China's environmental politics (G. Yang 2007). The existence of 
the NGOs enables Chinese citizens to practice political skills and even “to test 
political limits” (G. Yang 2005, 65). As Young indicates, NGOs facilitate the 
democratic value of civic participation and open up the channels for citizens to 
participate directly in political processes (Ibid., 66).  
Unlike environmental NGOs, labor NGOs in China are much less able to have 
a say in the policy-making. Most labor NGOs are service-oriented, primarily engaging 
in legal advising and training (Friedman and Lee 2010). Workers do not participate in 
the political process through labor NGOs. In fact, while Chinese workers' legal 
consciousness is not low, given that sometimes they use the law as their weapon to 
fight against managers (Gallagher 2005) or to accuse local officials of acting “against 
the law” (C. Lee 2007), they do not have high democratic values of political 
participation. As Stockmann and Gallagher point out, when Chinese citizens are 
exposed to media reporting about labor law-related issues, they tend to choose to 
participate in the legal system, rather than to ask for political rights, because the media 
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help portray the legal system in an overly pro-labor way (Stockmann and Gallagher 
2011).  
While many Chinese workers seek legal services to settle their grievances, 
some of them still participate in the policy-making process through organizing labor 
protests or attending public hearings. In the literature on Chinese workers' relationship 
with the state, most studies focus on the effectiveness of workers' collective actions in 
changing the state's action. Sometimes, when a laborer bypasses the court and directly 
presents her grievances on the street, local courts may respond to the protest positively 
by taking the initiative to collect evidence (Su and He 2009). In addition to 
contentious collective actions, social actors can participate in the policy-making 
through public hearings. According to the Law-making Law (lifa fa) promulgated in 
2000, forums, seminars and hearings should be held when a legislative bill is placed 
on the agenda of the NPC Standing Committee (Article 34). Moreover, public 
opinions may also be included when a draft of legislation is published for feedback as 
discussed in Chapter Three with regard to the making of the 2007 LCL. This practice 
is called collecting social opinions for legislation before a law's promulgation, namely 
kaimen lifa in Chinese. Some other previously-excluded social actors such as legal 
experts are also likely to be part of the policy-making if decision makers consult with 
them before a policy is made.  
These new channels go beyond the “enlisted involvement in coproduction” in a 
Leninist regime, aiming to block the growth of participatory pressures (Roeder 1989). 
In the current China, societal actors are allowed to participate in the policy-making 
process through one of the mechanisms. Given that the state-society relation is no 
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longer repressive in today's China, a popular framework is to emphasize that the state 
and the society are mutually constituted and conditioned (Shue 1990; Shue 1994; 
Foster 2001). As a growing body of literature have devoted its attention to the study of 
societal actors in China, most researchers seem to agree on the reason why social 
voices are able to participate in the process. The answer is either the rapid 
socioeconomic change, or top leaders' concern about regime stability. For the former, 
as Mertha points out, social actors' entry into the political process results from the 
agency slack of the state (Mertha 2009). The existing institutions are unable to adapt 
sufficiently to the complicated situation in the reform era, and the government does 
not have the knowledge to deal with many new problems and hence needs to listen to 
experts or even societal groups directly. On the other hand, many political observers 
refer to the concern about regime stability to explain why participatory channels are 
opened up and why the CCP is building intra-party democracy (dangnei minzhu). 
These answers may all be correct in illustrating China's pluralizing political 
process. However, even when previously-excluded social actors are now allowed to 
participate in the politics, this does not amount to the fact that they have the ability to 
direct policy-making. As Gilley points out, social organizations' freedom was granted 
by the state and there is very limited tolerance for policy conflicts (2011, 525). 
Without fundamental changes of the political system, the regime is very much resilient 
and adaptive (Nathan 2003). As Chapter One indicates, while media freedom is 
granted to some degree, the state still hold the power to sweep away issues that are 
considered sensitive to the regime. So, the state is still the critical actor in defining 
state-society relationships (Gilley 2011). These channels open rooms for citizens' 
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“enlisted participation” (Hsu 2011), but there is very low possibility for citizens to 
change policy directions.  
In most cases, China's policy-making is still dominated by a small set of 
political elites. As this dissertation argues, the labor policy-making is directly 
influenced by the self interests of Chinese bureaucracies. Social voices are included 
when these bureaucrats see that doing this is helpful for achieving their political goals. 
My conclusion calls for a revisit of the state-centric approach to Chinese politics. As 
Gilley tells us, the literature on Chinese societal actors “has succeeded in showing 
when and how state dominance in China has been compromised, but in doing so it has 
also underlined the resilience of state dominance itself” (2011, 530). My study reveals 
that there is a need to examine the internal politics within the state apparatus and how 
different state actors make use of various social forces in the policy-making process.  
My conclusion is somehow provocative, in the sense that it argues that, 
although the thirty years of reform have pluralized China's political arena, social 
voices do not enjoy systematic power in the policy-making process. In order to know 
whether this research perspective captures China's general policy-making structure, 
the next step of study is to extend the argument to other policies. First, in addition to 
the promotion of labor contracting, is my conclusion applicable to other labor policy 
changes such as the reform of the household registration system (hukou)? In the State 
Council, while the MOLSS somehow supports the hukou deregulation although it is 
not the MOLSS's major agenda, the Ministry of Public Security is constantly a strong 
opponent of liberalization. Loosening the regulations of geographical mobility will 
increase the cost of maintaining the social order, and thus is against the Ministry's 
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interest. Employing my framework, a possible explanation is proposed as follows. The 
speed and magnitude of the hukou deregulation is determined by whether the MOLSS 
ardently advocates the reform as well as by how the MOLSS interacts with the 
Ministry of Public Security. The lack of a strong bureaucracy acting on behalf of 
migrant workers may lead to a delay in the reform of labor mobility regulations in 
China. 
Second, if we want to make the argument proposed in this dissertation a 
generalized claim about China's policy-making, it is also essential to examine other 
policy areas outside the labor reform. In his work on the FA 2.0 framework, Mertha 
uses a crucial case, namely the debate over child safety regulations regarding China's 
trade policy, to generalize his argument that social actors can have significant impacts 
on policy outcomes if they frame their grievances in a way to enlarge their audience 
(2009). The logic of crucial case is to look for cases where the outcome is least likely 
to happen. If the outcome still takes place, we will have more confidence in our 
argument (Lijphart 1971; Gerring 2007, 115-122). For future studies, this method will 
also be useful to test my theory in other policy areas.  
To decide which cases to be included to examine whether China's policy-
making structure is now open to societal actors, we should develop some criteria for 
cross-policy comparison (Tung, Chou, Hsu, and Wang 2011). For example, if for a 
certain policy, the original policy preference of the Chinese government and that of 
societal actors does not conflict, the case will not be very crucial, because for the 
Chinese government, it never hurts to integrate social voices into the policy-making, 
given that both of them wish for the same policy outcome. As this dissertation finds, 
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non-state workers and some Chinese political elites, including the MOLSS, the 
ACFTU, and local labor officials with high degrees of career prospect, do not have 
conflicting preferences with regard to the regulation of the labor market in the 2000s. 
Workers' voices are thus easy to be incorporated into the labor policy reform. The 
policy-making is still a top-down process. My examination on China's internal politics 
in the labor policy reform provides a basis for future cross-policy comparison in the 
study of China's policy-making.   
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APPENDIX  
 
Appendix 4.1 Administrative Rank of the People's Republic of China 
 
 
 
Notes:  
1. Central-level governments include the National People's Congress, Presidency, 
State Council, Central Military Commission, Supreme People's Court, and the 
Supreme People's Procuratorate164 
2. Provincial-level regions include Province, Direct-controlled Municipality, 
Autonomous Region, and Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong and Macao) 
3. Prefecture-level regions include Prefecture (diqu), Prefecture-level Municipality 
(dijishi), Sub-provincial city (fushengji chengshi), Autonomous prefecture (zizhizhou), 
and League (meng in Inner Mongolia) 
4. County-level regions include County (xian), County-level City (xianjishi), Sub-
prefecture-level City (fudijishi), City Districts (shixiaqu, including Districts in a 
Direct-controlled Municipality), Autonomous County (zizhixian), and Banner (qi in 
Inner Mongolia) 
5. Township-level regions include Town (zhen), Township (xiang), Street or 
Subdistrict (jiedao in a City District), and Sumu (in Inner Mongolia) 
6. Village (cun)165 
 
                                               
164
 See the official website of the Central Government of the PRC. http://www.gov.cn/gjjg/2005-
08/28/content_27083.htm 
165
 In China, villages are not listed as an official rank in the administrative structure. 
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Appendix 4.2 Issues for Measuring the Rigidity of Provincial Regulations on Labor  
Contracts 
 
Category Sub-category Content Marks Points
Number 60-69 1.5
of articles 50-59 1.0
40-49 0.5
30-39 0.0
Non-fixed term Who are eligible An worker works consecutively for an employer for 10 years aa 2.0
labor contracts for non-fixed Others who are eligible for non-fixed term labor contracts bb 3.0
contracts cc 1.0
the procedures relating to the signing of the contract have not been gone 
through, it shall be regarded that the worker has a non-fixed term contract. 
Restrictions on the eligibility of non-fixed term labor contracts ee -1.0
Restrictions on dd -1.0
non-fixed term which the contract is to be terminated.
contracts No rules on non-fixed term labor contracts 0.0
Renewal of Who are eligible Where a labor contract expires and the labor relationship between an A 1.0
labor contracts for renewal employer and an worker still exists even if the 
procedures relating to the termination of the contract have not been gone 
through, it shall be regarded as a renewal of the labor contract. 
When a labor contract ends, if the employer and the worker can still fulfill V 0.5
the requirements in the original contract, the contract shall be renewed. 
Where an worker contracts occupational diseases or a work-related D 1.0
injury that is proved to well fit into one of the disability categories, his
employer shall renew the labor contract. 
Renewal An employer shall, 30 days prior to the expiration of a labor contract, F 1.0
procedure notify the worker in writing of its intention to 
terminate or renew the labor contract and go through the formalities related 
to he termination or renewal of labor contract through consultation. 
When an employer and an worker agree to renew the labor contract, the G 0.5
procedures relating to the signing of the contract shall be conducted before 
the original contract ends. 
When an employer or a worker intends to renew a labor contract, he shall R -0.5
notify the other party in writing, 30 days prior to the expiration of the contract, 
of its intention. The other party shall respond in writing, 15 days prior to the 
expiration of the contract. If there is no response, the contract shall not be 
regarded as renewed. 
Content of the No probation shall be included in the renewed labor contract. B 1.0
renewed Where an employer and an worker do not reach agreement on the C 1.0
contract term of the renewed labor contract, it shall not be less than 1 year
from the date of signing.
Where an employer and an worker do not reach agreement on the term M 0.5
of the renewed labor contract, it shall not be less than 
6 months from the date of signing.
Compensation Where an employer fails to renew the labor contract after its expiration E 0.5
but the labor relationship still exists, it shall compensate the worker. 
Fines Where an employer violates the provisions regarding the signing, renewal, K 0.5
or termination of a labor contract, the department of labor and social security 
shall order it to make correction within a given period of time. Where 
it fails to do so, a fine of RMB1000 yuan or less shall be imposed. 
Where a labor contract expires and the labor relationship between an X 0.5
employer and an worker still exists, but the procedures relating to the renewal 
fails to do so, a fine of RMB1000 yuan – RMB 10000 yuan shall be imposed. 
Collective  Rules on collective labor contracts 1.0
contract No rules on collective labor contracts 0.0
Trade union Rules on the role of trade unions 1.0
No rules on the role of trade unions 0.0
When an worker is eligible for a non-fixed term labor contract, even if
A non-fixed term labor contract shall include conditions under 
have not been gone through, the department of labor and social security shall 
order the employer to make correction within a given period of time. Where it 
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Appendix 4.3 Rigidity of Regulations on Labor Contracts, 31 Provincial-level Regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region Regulation on the labor contracting process, change, termination, Year of Number Points Non-fixed term Points Collective Trade union Renewal of labor Points Total points
and renewal promulgation of articles labor contract contract points points contract marks
Beijing Provisions on Labor Contracts 2001 53 1.0 bb 3.0 0.0 1.0 FBDACE 5.5 10.5
Tianjin Provisions on Labor Contracts (Revision) 2002 45 0.5 bb 3.0 1.0 1.0 G 0.5 6.0
Hebei Measures for Labor Contracts 2002 31 0.0 aa,dd 1.0 0.0 0.0 GA 1.5 2.5
Shanxi Missing
Inner Mongolia Provisions on Labor Contracts 2003 34 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 1.0 BGA 2.5 3.5
Liaoning Provisions on Labor Contracts 2004 36 0.0 bb 3.0 0.0 1.0 FDAM 3.5 7.5
Jilin Measures for Labor Contracts 1997 32 0.0 aa, dd 1.0 0.0 1.0 GJK 1.0 3.0
Heilongjiang Provisions on Labor Contracts 1998 46 0.5 bb, dd 2.0 0.0 1.0 BFA 3.0 6.5
Shanghai Ordinance on Labor contracts 2001 62 1.5 0 0.0 0.0 1.0 B 1.0 3.5
Jiangsu Ordinance on Labor contracts 2003 63 1.5 0 0.0 1.0 1.0 FA 2.0 5.5
Zhejiang Measures for Labor Contracts 2002 48 0.5 bb, dd 2.0 0.0 1.0 FBAE 4.0 7.0
Anhui Ordinance on Labor contracts 2004 59 1.0 0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0 0.0 2.0
Fujian Provisions on Labor Contracts (Revision) 2003 29 0.0 bb, dd 2.0 0.0 1.0 GX 1.0 4.0
Jiangxi Implementation Plan for Overall Implementation of the Labor Contract System 1995 17 0.0 bb, dd 2.0 0.0 1.0 V 0.5 3.5
Shandong Ordinance on Labor contracts 2001 35 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 1.0 BGA 2.5 3.5
Henan Missing
Hubei Provisions on Labor Contracts 2005 51 1.0 dd -1.0 0.0 1.0 FE 1.5 2.5
Hunan Provisions on Labor Contracts 2003 44 0.5 aa, cc 3.0 0.0 1.0 GBE 2.0 6.5
Guangdong Provisions on Labor Contracts (Revision) 2003 52 1.0 aa, dd, ee 0.0 1.0 1.0 0 0.0 3.0
Guangxi Missing
Hainan Provisions on Labor Contracts 1996 52 1.0 aa, dd 1.0 1.0 1.0 E 0.5 4.5
Chongqing Provisions on Labor Contracts 1994 25 0.0 aa, dd 1.0 0.0 1.0 0 0.0 2.0
Sichuan Implementation Opinions of Several Issues Concerning Implementing the Labor Law* 1996 57 1.0 bb 3.0 1.0 1.0 0 0.0 6.0
Guizhou Opinions of Overall Implementation of the Labor Contract System** 1995 0.0 aa 2.0 1.0 0.0 0 0.0 3.0
Yunnan Ordinance of Protecting Labor Rights 2005 48 0.5 0 0.0 1.0 1.0 BE 1.5 4.0
Tibet Missing
Shaanxi Interim Provisions on Labor Contracts*** 1996 46 0.5 0 0.0 0.0 1.0 AK 1.5 3.0
Gansu Provisions on Labor Contracts 1990 56 1.0 aa, dd 1.0 0.0 1.0 K 0.5 3.5
Qinghai Opinions of Further Regulating Labor Contracts and Labor Relations 2001 13 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 AF 2.0 2.0
Ningxia Ordinance on Labor contracts 2005 57 1.0 0 0.0 0.0 GAF 2.5 3.5
Xinjiang Measures for Labor Contracts (Revision) 2003 32 0.0 bb, dd 2.0 0.0 1.0 FACD 4.0 7.0
Note: *No rules on change and renewal of a labor contract.
**No rules on labor contracting process, termination, and renew. Only rules on change of a labor contract. 
***Invalidated
Source:Author's database. 
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Appendix 4.4 GDP of BJ, HN, and GD, 1978-2009. Unit: RMB Billion 
 
 
 
Note: BJ refers to Beijing, HN refers to Hunan, and GD refers to Guangdong.  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, CEIC China Premium Database 
(Zhongguo jingji shujuku) 
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Appendix 4.5 GDP per Capita of BJ, HN, and GD, 1978-2008. Unit: RMB 
 
 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, CEIC China Premium Database 
(Zhongguo jingji shujuku) 
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Appendix 4.6 Differences among Provincial-level Regulations on Labor Contracts 
 
National Beijing Hunan Guangdong National
Labor Law Provisions on Provisions on Provisions on Labor Contract
(LL) Labor Contracts Labor Contracts Labor Contracts Law
(Revision) (LCL)
Year of promulgation 1994 2001 2003 2003 2007
Number of articles 107 53 44 52 98
Non-fixed term An worker works consecutively √ √ √ √ √
labor contracts for an employer for 10 years
An worker has been given two √
fixed term contracts consecutively
Others who are eligible for √ √
non-fixed term labor contracts
√
non-fixed term labor contract, even if
the procedures relating to the signing 
of the contract have not been gone 
through, it shall be regarded that the 
worker has a non-fixed term contract. 
√
shall include conditions under 
which the contract is to be terminated.
Restrictions on non-fixed term Non-fixed term 
labor contracts contracts are 
usually concluded 
with workers in
regular technological 
positions.
Renewal of Where a labor contract expires and the √
labor contracts labor relationship between an employer 
and an worker still exists even if the 
procedures relating to the termination 
of the contract have not been gone 
through, it shall be regarded as a 
renewal of the labor contract. 
Where an employer fails to renew the √ √
labor contract after its expiration but 
the labor relationship still exists, 
it shall compensate the worker. 
Where an worker contracts √
occupational diseases or a work-related 
injury that is proved to well fit into one 
of the disability categories, his
employer shall renew the labor contract. 
An employer shall, 30 days prior to the √
expiration of a labor contract, notify the 
worker in writing of its intention to 
terminate or renew the labor contract 
and go through the formalities related to 
the termination or renewal of labor 
contract through consultation. 
When an employer and an worker agree √
to renew the labor contract, the 
procedures relating to the signing of the 
contract shall be conducted before 
the original contract ends. 
No probation shall be included √ √
in the renewed labor contract.
Where an employer and an worker do √
not reach agreement on the term of the 
renewed labor contract, it shall not be 
less than one year from the date of 
signing.
Rules on collective labor contracts √ √ √
Rules on the role of trade unions √ √ √ √ √
When an worker is eligible for a
A non-fixed term labor contract
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Appendix 4.7 Differences among Provincial-level Regulations on Trade Union  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National Beijing Hunan Guangdong
Trade Union Measure for Measure for Measure for 
Law Implementing Implementing Implementing 
(TUL) the TUL the TUL the TUL
Year of promulgation 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of articles 57 66 33 33
How long a union shall be organized Not specified Six months One year Six months
since the enterprise is established?
Dismissal of  workers Firm-level unions shall be notified √ √ √ √
when a worker's contract is and the employee 
terminated without shall be notified 
negotiation with him. within seven days.
Trade union fee Punishment, if an enterprise fails to Not specified The fee shall be paid Not specified Not specified
submit fees to the trade union
every month. If an 
enterprise fails
to do so, the penalty 
is 5% of the 
outstanding balance. 
Bankruptcy SOE's bankruptcy scheme shall be √
Trade union shall recruit √
Labor Law Inspector. 
Organizing trade unions
to the union by 15th 
submitted to representative assembly. 
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Appendix 4.8 Provincial Small Leading Groups (SLG) of Labor Contracting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SLG Departments that are coordinated under the SLG
(Yes Provincial Provincial Provincial Provincial Bureau Provincial Provincial Provincial Provincial Department Provincial Provincial Commission Provincial Provincial 
or Labor Federation of Enterprises of Industry Finance Public Security Department of of Housing and Department of State-owned Assets Commission Bureau of 
No) Department Trade Unions Confederation and Commerce Department Department Civil Affairs Urban-rural Development of Supervision Supervision and Administration of Transport Statistics
Beijing Yes √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Tianjin Yes √ √ √
Hebei Yes √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Shanxi Yes √
Inner Mongolia Yes √ √ √
Liaoning No
Jilin Yes √ √ √
Heilongjiang No
Shanghai No
Jiangsu Yes
Zhejiang No
Anhui Yes
Fujian Yes √ √ √
Jiangxi Yes √ √ √
Shandong Yes √ √ √
Henan No
Hubei Yes √ √ √ √ √ √
Hunan Yes √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Guangdong Yes √ √ √
Guangxi Yes √ √ √
Hainan Yes √ √ √
Chongqing No
Sichuan No
Guizhou No
Yunnan Yes √ √ √
Tibet missing
Shaanxi No
Gansu No
Qinghai Yes √ √ √
Ningxia Yes √ √ √
Xinjiang Yes √ √ √
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Appendix 4.9 The Labor Contract Signing Rates in Beijing, Hunan, and Guangdong, 
2000-2005. 
Year Beijing Hunan Guangdong 
Type of enterprises All urban enterprises All enterprises All enterprises 
2000 82.00% * 95.00% 85.60% 
2001 83.20% * 74.00% 85.60% 
2002 86.00% * 88.60% 88.60% 
2003 89.00% * 90.10% 
 
2004 90.90% * 90.50% 84.80% 
2005 91.10% * 90.50% 85.00% 
Note: * refers to the rate of labor contract renewal. The Beijing Yearbooks did not 
record the rate of signing labor contracts. 
Source: The Yearbooks (Nianjian) of Beijing, Hunan, and Guangdong, 2001-2006. 
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Appendix 4.10 Capital-labor Ratio for Chinese industries, 2006 
 
Note: Capital-labor ratio is calculated by the average balance of net fixed assets 
divided by the number of employees. The unit of the net value of fixed capital is 1,000 
RMB.  
Source: Yearly Industrial Data 2006, China Data On-line, and author's calculations.  
Industries Capital-labor ratio 
 Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products 22.59
 Clothes, Shoes and Hat Manufacture 26.46
 Cultural, Educational and Sports Articles Production 28.14
 Craftwork and Other Manufactures 34.52
 Furniture Manufacturing 47.10
 Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Office Machinery Manufacture 58.30
 Metal Products 62.98
 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber and Straw Products 66.16
 Electric Machines and Apparatuses Manufacturing 66.51
 Textile Industry 67.74
 Ordinary Machinery Manufacturing 72.09
 Non-metal Ores Mining & Dressing 74.53
 Special Equipment Manufacturing 78.28
 Plastic Products 81.92
 Waste Resources and Old Material Recycling and Processing 84.70
 Non-ferrous Metal Ores Mining & Dressing 85.56
 Ferrous Metal Mining & Dressing 89.79
 Coal Mining & Dressing 90.03
 Smelting & Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals 93.03
 Agricultural and Sideline Foods Processing 96.37
 Rubber Products 97.43
 Communications Equipment, Computer and Other Electronic Equipment Manufacturing 97.49
 Food Production 99.42
 Other Mining Industries 108.55
 Priting and Record Medium Reproduction 108.58
 Nonmetal Mineral Products 114.46
 Transport Equipment Manufacturing 125.46
 Medical and Pharmaceutical Products 141.14
 Beverage Production 151.06
 Papermaking and Paper Products 172.51
 Raw Chemical Material & Chemical Products 196.28
 Chemical Fiber 265.00
 Tobacco Products Processing 343.07
 Water Production and Supply 402.62
 Petroleum Processing, Coking and Nuclear Fuel Processing 407.69
 Fuel Gas Production and Supply 440.23
 Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction 531.39
 Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals 616.86
 Electricity and Heating Production and Supply 1007.87
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Appendix 5.1 Provincial Performance Indicators of Promoting Individual Labor 
Contracting in Yearbooks, 2001-2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category Indicator Weight 
Signing individual labor contracts How many labor contracts have been signed after the labor department's inspection? 1 point
How much is the rate of signing labor contracts? 1 point
How much is the rate of signing labor contracts in the non-state sector? 1 point
How many labor contracts have been signed during this year? 1 point
How many labor contracts have been renewed during this year? 1 point
How many labor contracts in the non-state sector have been renewed during this year? 1 point
How many labor contracts have been verified by the labor department? 1 point
How many labor contracts have been invalidated by the labor department? 1 point
How much is peasant workers' labor contract signing rate? 1 point
Labor inspection How many reports have the government accepted from the public? 1 point
How many reports have been adjudicated? 1 point
How many enterprises have the labor department inspected? 1 point
Labor disputes 1 point
How many cases have been adjudicated? 1 point
How much is laborers' winning rate? 1 point
How many cases concerning collective labor disputes have been 1 point
How many child workers have been dismissed? 1 point
How many letters and calls are received? 1 point
How many letters and calls have been adjudicated? 1 point
How many people have visited the labor department for petitioning? 1 point
How many people have collectively visited the labor department for petitioning? 1 point
Wage arrears How many workers have demanded back their defaulted salaries? 1 point
How many peasant workers have demanded back their defaulted salaries? 1 point
How much is the average wage increased? 1 point
How much is the average wage in the non-state sector? 1 point
How many prefectures or counties have raised their minimum wage? 1 point
How many cases have been accepted by the labor dispute arbitration committee? 
    accepted by the labor dispute arbitration committee?
Petitions (xinfang and shangfang) 
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Appendix 5.2 Synchronized Index of Promoting Individual Labor Contracting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual Index Source Points under the Original Individual Index Weight
Regulations on Labor Contracts Appendix 4.3 No regulations on labor contracts 0 points
     (or missing)
Years before the promulgation 0 points
    of the regulations on labor contracts
0.5 – 2.5 points 1 point
3.0 – 5.0 points 2 points
5.5 – 7.5 points 3 points
8.0 – 10.5 points 4 points
Provincial Small Leading Groups Appendix 4.8 No SLG 0 points
 (SLG) of Labor Contracting Years before the SLG is established 0 points
3 departments are coordinated under the SLG 1 point
More than 3 departments are under the SLG 2 points
Promoting Individual Labor Appendix 5.1 1 – 6 points 1 point
Contracting in Yearbooks 7 – 13 points 2 points
14 – 20 points 3 points
21 – 26 points 4 points
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Appendix 5.3 Provincial Performance Indicators of Promoting Collective Labor 
Contracting in Yearbooks, 2001-2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category Indicator Weight 
Signing collective labor contracts How many enterprises are there that have prepared collective labor contracts 1 point
    with their workers?
How much is the rate of signing collective labor contracts in the non-state sector? 1 point
How many collective labor contracts have been renewed? 1 point
How much is peasant workers' collective labor contract signing rate? 1 point
How many collective labor contracts have been verified by the labor department? 1 point
Organizing trade unions How many grass-roots trade unions are established this year? 1 point
How many non-state enterprises have established trade unions? 1 point
How many members are included in trade unions this year? 1 point
How many peasant workers are included in trade unions this year? 1 point
Trade union's revenue How much is the growth rate of Provincial Trade Union Federation's revenue? 1 point
Collective negotiation How many enterprises are there that have implemented the collective negotiation system? 1 point
How many workers have been trained to conduct collective negotiation? 1 point
1 point
    labor relations     for coordinating labor relations?
1 point
    for coordinating labor relations?
Workers congress system How many enterprises are there that have established the workers congress system? 1 point
How many times have the workers congress convened? 1 point
Tripartite mechanisms for coordinating How many times have the provincial government held the tripartite mechanisms 
How many prefectures or counties have established tripartite mechanisms
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